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I know full well that the reader has no great desire to know all this,
but I have the desire to tell them of it.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Samenvatting
H
ET onderwerp van dit proefschrift is het beter beveiligen van acties die gebruikers
uitvoeren via een mobiel apparaat, zoals een smartphone of tablet. De belang-
rijkste bijdragen zijn drie praktische mechanismen, in de vorm van hardware en
software, om de beveiliging in deze gevallen te verbeteren.
Het eerste mechanisme gebruikt de locatie van een mobiele telefoon als extra factor
in de authenticatie, maar op een privacy-vriendelijke manier. Deze locatie-informatie,
verstrekt door het telecombedrijf, is betrouwbaar zelfs als de telefoon gecompromitteerd
is. Het mechanisme biedt voordelen voor alle betrokken partijen: de dienstverlener kan
locatie-informatie gebruiken als extra factor bij toegangscontrole, waardoor fraude moei-
lijker wordt; de gebruiker hoeft geen interacties uit te voeren in het hele proces rond de
locatieverificatie en zijn locatie wordt zo geheim mogelijk gehouden; en het telecombe-
drijf kan haar bestaande infrastructuur gebruiken voor een extra dienst voor haar klanten.
Bij het tweedemechanismewordt gebruik gemaakt van een los apparaatje dat verbon-
den wordt met de smartphone (of tablet) en dat een vertrouwd kanaal biedt voor invoer
en uitvoer bij online transacties. De communicatie tussen het apparaatje en de online
server is hierbij versleuteld en geauthenticeerd, zodat deze niet gemanipuleerd kan wor-
den, zelfs niet als de smartphone gecompromitteerd is. Bottleneck bij een dergelijke op-
lossing is het beperkte aanbod van interfaces voor randapparatuur op smartphones en
tablets. Gebruik maken van het aanraakscherm—de zogenaamde haptische inferface—
bleek te lastig, maar een oplossing met de standaard audio-ingang van een smartphone
(de 3,5 mm. Tip-Ring-Ring-Sleeve interface) bleek wel mogelijk, zoals ook met een pro-
toype is aangetoond. In het kader hiervan is ook gekeken naar de mogelijkheden om het
beveiligingsprotocol Transport Layer Security (TLS) optimaal te configureren voor verbin-
dingen met lage bandbreedte, zoals deze audio-interface.
Het derde mechanisme, BALSA (Bluetooth Low Energy Application Layer Security Add-
on), beveiligt informatie-uitwisseling via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). BLE is standaard be-
schikbaar op veel smartphones en tablets, en biedt hiermee een beveiligde manier om
Internet-of-Things sensoren te beheren en configureren via BLE. Het geïmplementeerde
prototype toont aan dat deze oplossing kan werken op bestaande Android en iOS appara-
ten met BLE, en op standaard hardware modules voor BLE.

Summary
T
HIS doctoral thesis addresses the problem of securely conducting operations from
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Its main contribution consists of
a set of three practical mechanisms in the form of hardware and software add-ons
that can be used to enhance the security of operations involving mobile devices.
The first mechanism allows the location of a mobile phone to be determined and used
as an additional authentication factor in a privacy-preservingmanner. This location infor-
mation is trustworthy even when the mobile phone has been compromised by malware.
This mechanism provides benefits to all parties involved: service providers can utilize lo-
cation data with confidence as an authentication factor, e.g., to implement access control
and reduce fraud; users do not need to be involved in the location verification process and
can maintain their location and relationship with service providers private; and mobile
network operators can leverage their existing infrastructure to provide privacy-preserving
location verification to their subscribers and eventually generate additional revenue.
The second mechanism provides transaction security for mobile devices based on a
companion device able to establish a secure link to the server. The messages exchanged
on this link are encrypted and authenticated, thereby preventing tampering at any point,
particularly at the mobile device. Using this concept, the injection of a forged or manipu-
lated request to the server will become evident to the user on the companion device, thus
preventing the attack from taking place. We demonstrate the feasibility and viability of
our proposedmechanism by having developed a successful, fully functional prototype us-
ing the 3.5-mm Tip-Ring-Ring-Sleeve audio interface. In this context, research results of
how to optimize TLS to make it usable on top of low-bandwidth channels (such as those
provided by the audio interface) are also provided.
The thirdmechanism,Bluetooth LowEnergy Application Layer Security Add-on (BALSA),
provides confidentiality and authenticity of information exchanged with Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE). BALSA allows the securemanagement and configuration of Internet-of-Things
sensors using the standard BLE interface readily available in existingmobile devices. It can
be implemented on existing Android and iOS mobile devices, as well as on off-the-shelf
BLEmodules, as demonstrated by our proof-of-concept implementation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
M
OBILE DEVICES such as smartphones and tablets are possibly the most perva-
sive electronic devices of our time. The services they provide are so rich and
useful in daily life thatmany people can no longer imagine livingwithout them.
These devices are increasingly used for personal and business-related tasks, often involv-
ing security-sensitive applications, e.g., interaction with embedded devices, such as fit-
ness trackers, payments, eBanking, and, in general, for remote access to information ser-
vices for our business andprivate lives. On the onehand, there are productivity and conve-
nience benefits to usingmobile devices for applications any place, any time. On the other,
there is the challenge of ensuring that these applications are not abused or exploited by
unauthorized entities. Such abuse means that a security goal is not achieved, e.g., a user
may wish for certain photos taken with her phone and sent to another user not to be dis-
closed to any third party, i.e., maintain the confidentiality of the photos.
Confidentiality is not the only security goal worth achieving. Indeed, there are other
goals, such as integrity and authentication, that may also be important to achieve. For ex-
ample, location information retrieved by an app running on themobile device can be used
to grant access to a building or provide access to a workstation. If an attacker manages to
tamper with such location information, then she might be able to gain unauthorized ac-
cess. In another setting, consider that mobile devices are often used to access financial
services. Once the user has logged in and sent a banking order, the attacker may attempt
to change the recipient account number included in the order. In this case, confidential-
ity is important insofar as the user may not wish to disclose the existence or contents of
the banking order. However, the financial damages resulting from stealing funds from the
user’s account—by subverting the integrity of the order, or injecting a bogus one—deserve
very serious consideration. A final example, where authentication plays an important role,
consists of using mobile devices to control home automation systems. It is paramount
that the system only communicates with devices that have been suitably authenticated. It
would be highly inconvenient—and in many cases downright dangerous—if an attacker
manages to use an unauthorized device to open doors, turn off lights, disable the alarm,
change the system’s software, etc.
There are mechanisms that can be used to achieve a set of security goals when mo-
bile devices are used. These mechanisms are seldom used in isolation. Instead, they are
combined to achieve the security goals at different layers, provide resiliency, or achieve
several security goals. Security mechanisms can be classified in two categories, hardware
2 1. Introduction
and software. The most notable state-of-the-art hardware mechanisms used in mobile
devices are:
Security co-processor. Ahardware component that provides cryptographic services
and a limited amount of isolated storage for cryptographic keys. Those keys can be
created such that they may never be exported outside of the security co-processor.
Secure Element (SE). A hardware component capable of running applications in
isolation from the rest of the mobile device. Unlike apps—which can be installed by
the user—these applications can only be installed by the entity who “controls" the
SE. The SIM card (controlled by the mobile network operator) is an example of a SE.
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A hardware/software environment that pro-
vides functionality similar to that of the SE. However, unlike the SE, it is not com-
pletely isolated in hardware from the rest of the mobile device.
Biometric sensors. Mobile devices are increasingly being shipped with biometric
sensors, usually in the form of fingerprint readers, that can be used to authenticate
the mobile device user.
The most noteworthy state-of-the-art software mechanisms are:
Boot sequence security. Starting with the Bootloader, the first program that is exe-
cuted when the device is switched on, the integrity and authenticity of every piece
of software up to the OS kernel and modules is verified by checking their digital sig-
natures. As a result, a chain (or tree) of trust rooted on read-only memory is estab-
lished. This mechanism is used to prevent the execution of tampered versions of
the mobile OS kernel or software at lower layers. A TEE or security co-processor is
normally used to actually check the digital signatures.
Encrypted storage. The files stored on the mobile device are always transparently
encrypted when written to persistent memory and decrypted when read by an app.
User authentication. There are several approaches to authenticate the user: using
something that she knows, e.g., a PIN, a password, or a “secret" pattern drawn on
the touchscreen [82]; something she has, e.g., a contactless card that can be read by
the mobile device [112]; and something that she is, e.g., voice, face, a fingerprint.
Frequently several approaches are combined to authenticate the user in a practice
known asmultifactor authentication.
App security. Consists of a family of mechanisms enforced by the mobile OS in-
tended to prevent malicious or misbehaving apps from subverting security goals set
by the OS itself or other apps.
The first mechanism concerns the provenance of apps, which are usually procured
from centralized repositories, e.g., the Android “Play Store" and the iOS “App Store".
3These repositories perform a certain degree of curation, i.e., only publishing apps
that pass a screening for malicious behaivour.
The second mechanism consists of validating the integrity and authenticity of apps
prior to being installed and executed by checking their digital signatures.
The third mechanism, sandboxing, consists of executing each app in an isolated
software context. The goal of sandboxing is preventing misbehaving (or malicious)
apps from interfering with the execution of other apps. In particular, sandboxing
prevents apps from accessing each other’s resources, e.g., files, memory, network.
The last mechanism, app permissions, consists of each app declaring a list or sensi-
tive operations that it will be allowed to perform once installed, e.g., placing phone
calls, sending SMS messages, accessing the network. These permissions are shown
to the user during the installation of the app, which is aborted if the user does not
grant the requested permissions. This mechanism aims to prevent apps from per-
forming rogue operations without the user’s knowledge, e.g., it would be extremely
suspicious for a flashlight app to request permissions to make phone calls or access
the user’s contact list.
Mobile Device Management (MDM) and policy enforcement. These mechanisms
ensure that a set of security policies is enforced on the mobile device. For example,
mandating all network traffic to be send through a VPN, preventing the use of the
camera while at certain geographical area, and white/black listing the apps that can
be installed on the device. The policies may be enforced either by the OS [51, 83] or
by special apps known as security containers [84,94]. These mechanisms are partic-
ularly important for corporate ownedmobile devices.
Tokenization. A mechanism increasingly gaining popularity due to its applicabil-
ity to mobile payments. It consists of replacing a sensitive piece of information,
e.g., a payment card number, with a less valuable one, e.g., a temporary payment
card number that can only be used within the next minute exclusively at a certain
merchant. The goal of tokenization is to prevent the unintended disclosure of sensi-
tive information stored in a mobile device or processed by an entity that is not fully
trusted.
A set of security goals can be achieved using one or more security mechanisms. How-
ever, eachmechanism has a set of assumptions about the environment where it is used, as
well as dependencies on the presence and correctness of other security mechanisms. As a
notable example, most security mechanisms available on mobile devices assume that the
mobile OS provides a set of core security mechanism such as sandboxing and validation of
app signatures. This assumption no longer holds when the mobile device has been sub-
jected to a process called rooting or jailbreaking, as a result of which many of the security
mechanisms provided by the OS are disabled [141, 191]. Interestingly, users often willfully
engage in this process—notwith the goal of disabling the securitymechanisms per se—but
with the intention of performing an action prevented by the mobile OS, e.g., executing an
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app that is not available in the App Store, tethering, and removing factory apps [138]. Crip-
pling themobile OS security mechanismsmakes it possible formalware to be executed on
the mobile device. Malware, pieces of code designed to run covertly from the user’s at-
tention, deserves special attention since it performs some malicious activity to the user’s
detriment. In doing so, it frequently breaks a set of security goals [45, 81, 100]. Malware
can find its way into a mobile device in several ways, for example:
Preinstalled on the device: The nature of preinstalled apps is normally benign,
but there have been cases where they collect and disclose information without ex-
plicit user permission/knowledge [138]. One such app was discovered in late 2011
running covertly on out-of-the-box devices. It gathered and was capable of send-
ing “diagnostic" information about the device usage, including but not restricted to
keystrokes and location [58, 134]. Even though some controversy remains on the
subject, it is indisputable that its presence constitutes at the very least a violation of
the user’s privacy. There are also cases where it has been found that manufacturer-
provided apps bypass the standard OS permission system, creating a vulnerability
that can be readily exploited by malware [56].
Installed or executed by the user: The user can be tricked into installing a ma-
licious app by convincing her that she will obtain a performance, functionality, or
security gain, as happened in the famous Eurograbber scam [119]. In general, an
attacker will make themalicious app appear legitimate by employingmasquerading
or repackaging/trojanizing techniques. Using the former, the installer of a legitimate
app is replaced altogether. Using the latter (repackaging/trojanizing), the legitimate
installer package is modified so that the legitimate app coexists with the malicious
software, and both will be executed on the target platform upon installation.
Installedor executedby theattacker: A typicalmobile device provides a plethora of
interfaces that can be used as vectors to inject malware into the device, e.g., wireless
interfaces such as Bluetooth, Near FieldCommunication (NFC),Wi-Fi; flashmemory,
USB, the FM receiver [83, 105]. Obtaining physical access to the mobile device may
be risky and difficult, but it constitutes a very powerful vector because of the rela-
tive ease with which the app can be installed. A more realistic—and in most cases
least risky scenario–consists of the attacker only having remote access to the device.
Wireless interfaces and services are particularly appealing to attackers because they
can be exploited remotely and en masse without the implicit risks entailed by phys-
ically present for the attack to take place.
Exploiting software bugs is a very effective mechanisms to execute malware after it
has been injected into the mobile device. For example, bugs in the implementation
of sandboxing can render it ineffective [197, 198]. Similarly, bugs in the firmware
or drivers may be exploited to execute malware on the device [3, 207]. Other com-
mon sources of bugs that can be exploited to execute malware are, apps handling
email [60], internet browsing [130], PDF viewing [165], and SMSs [141].
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Once malware is running on a mobile device, the scope of the operations that it can
execute is restricted to the privileges assigned to the process under which it was launched
and the user who started it. However, once malware is running, it can use privilege es-
calation techniques to perform operations that require super-user privileges. These op-
erations may prevent existing security mechanisms from achieving their goals passively,
e.g., inferring interactions with the touchscreen when entering PINs and passwords [11,
34, 35, 183], or actively, e.g., tampering with electronic banking transactions involving the
mobile device [77,119].
1.1. Outline
This doctoral thesis is divided into two parts: Chapters 2 & 3, and Chapters 4 to 7.
The first part aims to further acquaint the reader with some existing security mechanisms
available in mobile devices by taking a concrete security-sensitive scenario involving mo-
bile devices and discussing in depth the availablemechanisms to achieve a concrete set of
security goals. The specific scenario that we have chosen is Point Of Sale (POS) payments
using NFC. We have selected such a scenario for two reasons: First, the topic ofmobile pay-
ments at the POS has been, is, and—in the opinion of the author—will remain an important
and relevant topic for several years. Clearly, the main driver of mobile payments is not the
technology or even security per se, but rather the additional revenue that can be generated
when mobile devices are used for payments. Nevertheless, as security is a very important
factor, the topic is highly appropriate for discussing some of the technical mechanisms
available onmobile devices to prevent fraudulent payments. Second, the author hasmore
than seven years of experience working with NFC [44,112,149,196]. Even though there are
other technologies that can be used formobile payments, e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
and 2D barcodes, NFC not only provides the most convenient and intuitive user interface
(by tapping), but it is also compatible with most existing contactless payment terminals.
In Chapter 2 we provide a description and comparison of a set of security mechanisms
to store payment keys and execute the payment application onmobile phones in the con-
text of the chosen POS payments scenario. We cover the Secure Element, which provides a
fully isolated, tamper-resistant environment; Host Card Emulation (HCE), which no longer
requires dedicated hardware and thus allows the payment application to be executed on
the mobile phone OS along with other mobile apps; SE in the Cloud, which consists of
a combination of HCE and cloud services; and Trusted Execution Environments, which
leverage shared hardware to protect the payment keys and execute the payment appli-
cation. Interestingly, some of these mechanisms (e.g., TEEs) are independent of the NFC
interface. At the same time, all of them can be used in scenarios other than POS payments.
The contents of this chapter have been based on “A review of technical approaches to re-
alize NFCmobile payments," an article written by the author and accepted for publication
in IEEE Security & Privacy [153].
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In Chapter 3 we turn our attention to the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification,
which provides a mechanism that can be used to lower the exposure of payment informa-
tion stored in mobile devices. Even though this topic could have been included in Chap-
ter 2, we have decided to address it in an independent chapter to allow amore in-depth re-
view and analysis. This is warranted given that, despite the attention increasingly attracted
by the topic of tokenization, there is very little literature about it beyond the specifications
themselves. Moreover, besides distilling themain concepts of the EMV Payment Tokenisa-
tion Specification, we have also assumed a critical posture by pointing out shortcomings
and eventual issues that can arise from using it, as well as suggesting an enhancement.
Readers already familiar with EMV tokenization, but interested in our critical comments,
are referred to Section 3.7 (page 34). The contents of this chapter have been based on the
article “A critical review of the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification," written by the
author and published in Computer Fraud & Security (Elsevier, 2014) [150].
The second part of this thesis comprises Chapters 4 to 7. It contains the main contri-
bution of this doctoral thesis consisting of a set of mechanisms in the form of hardware
and software add-ons to enhance the security, i.e., achieve a set of security goals, of oper-
ations involving mobile devices. Such mechanisms are associated to the following topics:
privacy-preserving location verification, transaction security, and secure interaction with
Internet-of-Things devices. We follow a rigorous approach in exploring different alterna-
tives and experimenting with them, paying special attention to the practicability of the re-
sultingmechanisms. This should come as no surprise, considering that this PhDwork has
been conducted in an industrial setting where sound theory is important, but so are prac-
ticable results to facilitate eventual productization. Nevertheless, the suggested mecha-
nisms go beyond an engineering effort: additional to the prototypes that we have built, we
have subjected our work to peer reviews, leading to several publications [36,151,152,154]
and patent applications [13,30,40].
In Chapter 4 we address our first topic: privacy-preserving location verification. We
propose a mechanism to use the mobile phone location as an additional authentication
factor in scenarios where it is possible to identify a certain geographical area from which
legitimate transactions are likely to occur. In such a setting, the fact that themobile phone
is within such an area at the time of the transaction can be used as a strong indicator of
the legitimacy of the transaction. Consider, e.g., payment transactions with conventional
credit cards, where the majority of credit card fraud occurs in foreign countries far away
from the user’s home country. To prevent this type of fraud, transactions from abroad
are in many cases denied unless the user notifies the bank that she will be traveling, or
she is contacted by the bank to validate the legitimacy of the transaction. We note that, if
the user’s phone is currently within the country where the transaction is taking place, this
fact can be used as an authentication factor. In this example, it is sufficient for the credit
card company to know merely that the phone is somewhere within the expected country,
without having to learn its exact location. Consequently, the privacy concerns of location-
based services, such as service providers creating movement and behavior patterns from
the data they collect, might sell this data or lose it in a data breach can be avoided.
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This idea forms the basis of our proposal: to provide a mechanism intended to obtain
the location of a user’s phone in a trustworthy manner with minimal erosion of the user’s
privacy. The privacy safeguards in our proposed mechanism are realized using attribute-
based credentials, an established privacy-enhancing technology briefly described in Sec-
tion 4.3 (page 39). In hindsight, it was unavoidable to leverage this technology at some
stage in this doctoral thesis, considering that it was conducted at ZRL, where Dr. Jan Ca-
menisch is one of the world’s leading cryptographers in the area of privacy [41], and at
the University of Nijmegen, where the Digital Security group is heavily involved in the
privacy field with the IRMA (I Reveal My Attributes) project [18]. With our proposedmech-
anism we suggest an additional practical use case for attribute-based credentials beyond
the selective disclosure of personal attributes, e.g., that a date of birth is prior to a given
date. The work presented in this chapter has been jointly conducted with Franz-Stefan
Preiss under the supervision of Jan Camenisch and is based on the article “Strengthen-
ing authentication with privacy-preserving location verification of mobile phones," written
with the same co-authors and published in the Proceedings of the 14th ACMWorkshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society (ACM, 2015) [36]. In the context of this work, we have
also filed the following patent applications: “Authentication of user computers" (US Patent
App. 14/692,441, 2015) [30], and “Privacy friendly location based services" (US Patent App.
14/943,144, 2015) [40].
In Chapter 5 we address our second topic: transaction security. This chapter acknowl-
edges that consumermobile devices lack a trusted channel with the user, e.g., malware on
a mobile device can eavesdrop or modify any output shown to the user (on the display),
as well as any input entered by the user (using a keypad or the touchscreen). To deal with
such a scenario, this chapter contributes to the design of a mechanism based on a trusted
companion device supplementary to the mobile device. Instead of using hardware com-
ponents within the phone as described in Chapter 2, e.g., an SE or a TEE, the companion
device brings its own hardware with the ultimate goal of detecting and preventing attacks
even when all security mechanisms provided by the mobile device have been subverted.
The companion device is an embedded system—smaller than a mobile phone—that is
able to create a trusted channel with the server by using mutually authenticated Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS). It has a user interface consisting of a display and buttons and is
used both to present sensitive information to the user (sent by the server), and to convey
sensitive input to the server (entered by the user).
We decided that the companion device would communicate with the server through
the mobile device instead of having a direct standalone connection to the server to sim-
plify its design, ensure low power consumption, and avoid the need for expensive hard-
ware components (e.g., wireless radios). We chose widely available interfaces to connect
the companion device to the mobile device to ensure its compatibility with as many mo-
bile devices as possible. We developed and built two prototypes for the companion device:
one using the optical and haptic (i.e., touch) interfaces, and another using the connected
audio interface. In this chapter we provide details about the development of these proto-
types and the empirical results obtained with them.
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The main contribution of Chapter 5 is twofold: First, it consists of the design of the
security mechanism involving the companion device for mobile devices, which is mainly
covered in Section 5.2 (page 60). Second, it comprises the prototypes that we built, along
with the lessons learned while attempting to use analog interfaces (i.e., connected au-
dio, optical, and haptic) to establish a connection between the mobile and the compan-
ion devices. In particular, we provide a systematic exploration of how the haptic inter-
face could be used forMachine-to-Machine (M2M) communication instead of its intended
use forHuman-to-Machine communication. Such exploration (presented in Section 5.3.2,
page 71), along with our in-depth analysis of why it was generally not possible to achieve
reliable communication using multiple touch pads (presented in Section 5.3.3, page 81),
are novel and have not been published before.
Our research in this area is relevant to anyone intending to use the haptic interface
for M2M communication. Even our usage of the connected audio interface has resulted
in valuable results despite the fact that using audio for digital communication is far from
being a new or unaddressed problem, i.e., digital communication over analog telephone
lines was “solved" decades ago. Our exploration of the connected audio channel on mo-
bile devices (presented in Section 5.4, page 85) has shown how certain optimizations in-
tended to make audio reproduction more pleasant to the human ear, e.g., fading audio
signals to smooth the beginning or ending of playback; or intended to filter noise during
the recording of speech, e.g., limiting the range of frequencies or auto-adjusting the am-
plitude range, have a significant impact on the choice of modulation schemes that can
be used effectively. This chapter can be seen as an expanded version of “Bringing strong
authentication and transaction security to the realm of mobile devices," published in the
IBM Journal of Research & Development (IBM, 2014) [154]. Our work on this topic also
resulted in the filing of the following patent: “Automatic rotation of display contents of a
handheld companion device rigidly attached to a handheldmobile device" (GB Patent App.
1313167/7, 2013) [13].
The trusted companion device described in this chapter is a follow-on to the Zone
Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC). The ZTIC is a device used by several banks to ensure
that their eBanking services can be used securely from PCs [205, 206]. The ZTIC was de-
veloped by members of the BlueZ Business Computing group at ZRL. The author is affili-
ated with this group as a software engineer, thus being actively involved at later stages of
the development of the ZTIC. Upon completion of the ZTIC, the author had some involve-
ment with follow-on projects beyond participating in discussions, one of which resulted
in a patent application in the area of using the ZTIC to control access to sensitive docu-
ments [12]. Given his interest in mobile devices, he jointly worked with Reto Hermann to
bring the concept of the ZTIC to themobile world. This work consisted of adapting the ZTIC
architecture to fitmobile devices, designing the electronics (undertaken by RetoHermann
and Hansruedi Steinauer), building the prototypes, developing their firmware, and con-
ducting informal usability assessments. In summary, we started with the ZTIC and finished
by producing a fully functional Mobile ZTIC prototype capable of interoperating with the
backend of the ZTIC and ready to enter a productization stage upon interest from potential
customers, e.g., banks.
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The interfaces used to connect our prototypes to mobile devices provide very limited
bandwidth, leading us to investigate ways to minimize the overhead of TLS to use it ef-
ficiently on top of such low-bandwidth interfaces. Our research into optimizing TLS for
low-bandwidth environments, presented in Chapter 6, could have been subsumed under
the preceding chapter. We decided against this on the grounds of organization and ap-
plicability: It would have been too dense to have the design, description, development
and results of using the trusted companion device, along with the exploration of the TLS
optimizations in a single chapter. More importantly, low-bandwidth interfaces are also
frequently encountered in Internet-of-Things networks, e.g., sensors and smart electricity
meters communicating over long-range channels. Consequently, these optimizations are
applicable beyond our trusted companion device. Furthermore, evenmobile devices with
fast Internet connections can benefit from a bandwidth-optimized TLS setting because it
saves power and allows for more efficient application execution.
In Chapter 6 we identify several areas where overhead can be reduced while main-
taining fully compatibility with standard TLS. The most relevant (and straightforward)
approach consists of moving from RSA to Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the certificates,
which reduces the overhead of the TLS handshake between 22% and 60%, depending on
the chosen security level. More interestingly, we also contribute two TLS extensions that
further reduce the size of the handshake by using a compact certificate format and cer-
tificate caching. Using compact certificates instead of Elliptic Curve Cryptography-based
X.509 certificates reduces the overhead of the handshake between 11% and 20%, depend-
ing on the security level. Using certificate caching avoids exchanging certificates more
than once irrespective of the number of times the handshake is performed. This chapter
has been based on: “Optimizing TLS for low bandwidth environments," an article writ-
ten by the author and published in the Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on
Foundations & Practice of Security 2014 (Springer, 2015) [152].
In Chapter 7 we address our last topic of interest: secure interaction with Internet-of-
Things devices. We identify Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) as a suitable interface for mobile
devices to exchange information with Internet-of-Things sensors. When BLE is used to ac-
cess or modify sensitive parameters, exchanged messages need to be suitably protected,
which may not be possible with the security mechanisms defined in the BLE specifica-
tion. The contribution of this chapter is twofold: First, it introduces BALSA (Bluetooth Low
Energy Application Layer Security Add-on), amechanism compatible with existing BLE de-
vices intended to create a secure tunnel at the application layer. BALSA consists of a set of
cryptographic protocols, a BLE service and a suggested usage architecture. These compo-
nents are defined and analyzed in this chapter. Second, it describes our proof-of-concept,
which we build from off-the-shelf components and use to validate and demonstrate the
feasibility and benefits of BALSA. The contents of this chapter have been based on “BALSA:
Bluetooth Low Energy Application Layer Security Add-on," an article written by the au-
thor and published in the Proceedings of the International Workshop on Secure Internet of
Things (IEEE, 2015) [151].

Chapter 2
Technical approaches to realize
NFCmobile payments
Abstract. This chapter describes and compares four fundamental approaches to stor-
ing payment keys and executing payment applications on mobile phones during Near
Field Communication (NFC) payments at the Point Of Sale (POS). Even though the
comparison hinges mainly on security, i.e., how well the keys and payment applica-
tion are protected against misuse, other criteria such as additional hardware require-
ments, availability, management complexity, and performance are also identified and
discussed.
The first approach, the Secure Element (SE), provides a fully isolated hardware tamper-
resistant environment. The second, Host Card Emulation (HCE), no longer requires
dedicated hardware and thus allows the payment app to be executed on the mobile
phone OS along with other apps. In this context, the integrity of the large and complex
phone OSs—a very strong assumption—is required to protect the payment keys, which
in turn gives rise to the third approach, SE in the Cloud, consisting of HCE along with
cloud services. The fourth approach, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), leverages
shared hardware to protect the payment keys and execute the payment application.
Unlike SEs, TEEs are not fully isolated and share hardware resourceswith untrusted soft-
ware running on the mobile phone, so they can be seen as an intermediate approach
between the phone OSs and the SEs in terms of afforded security benefits*.
M
OBILE PHONES supporting NFC—a contactless, low-power technology enabling
devices to communicate over distances in the order of a few centimeters—can
act like a smart card when presented to a contactless terminal in the so-called
card emulation mode. One of the main use cases of this mode is payments at the POS,
which constitutes the focus of this chapter. Using mobile phones instead of (contactless)
cards is advantageous due to the phones’ central role, their ubiquity, and connectivity ca-
pabilities. Yet, despite those advantages and the fact that the coreNFC technology has been
available for several years, there is still no global, established pay-with-your-phonemech-
anism. This lack can partially be explained by the complexity of the NFC ecosystem, i.e., the
variety of stakeholders, including banks, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), phonemanu-
facturers, etc. These stakeholders often have competing interests in the recurring revenue
*The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: D. Ortiz-Yepes. A review of technical approaches to
realize NFCmobile payments. IEEE Security & Privacy [153].
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generated when transactions take place. Traditionally, only financial institutions and pay-
ment networks have shared the per-transaction commission. With phone payments, such
a commission is to be shared between more entities, which is clearly unappealing to es-
tablished stakeholders.
So far no mobile payment scheme at the POS has achieved prevalence. There have
been attempts backed by powerful players but some of them have disappeared without
ever gaining popularity, or evolved by dropping, adapting and mixing particular basic
technologies. For example, Softcard—initially known as Isis Mobile Wallet—was one of
such schemes backed in the USA by AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon that shut down at the
end on March 2015 without ever gaining much popularity [50]. Google Wallet, which has
also failed to reach popularity, was launched several years ago to be used to pay in stores,
but it currently seems limited to send money within the USA [97]. Apple Pay was intro-
duced in September 2014 for the latest generation of iOS devices [7]. Samsung Pay [172]
and Android Pay [95] have been recently introduced at the end of September 2015 for se-
lected Samsung and Android devices, respectively. Given this dynamic and fragmented
landscape, instead of focusing on these particular payment schemes, we aim to address in
this article the fundamentals of how any of them—even new ones—work from a technical
standpoint.
When NFC phones (or payments cards) are used at the POS, a distinction can be made
between closed and open loop payment systems. In the former (closed-loop) a limited
number of entities that know each other beforehand allow money to flow in and out of
the system, e.g., a payment app that can be used to buy coffee only at the shops of a given
franchise [189]. In the latter (open-loop), a large number of entities (merchants and banks)
that do not previously know one another allow such money flow, e.g., Visa and Master-
Card branded systems. We focus on the latter type since it is the most scalable and chal-
lenging. To achieve interoperability, open-loop systems are almost always based on the
EMV specifications [69]. During a contactless EMV payment, the terminal and the pay-
ment application executing on the phone exchange information about the transaction. At
the end, the phone returns the result of a cryptographic computation, i.e., a cryptogram,
using a secret key that is only known by the payment application and the customer’s bank.
It is paramount to protect such a key, and in general all keys involved in the payment pro-
tocol, as well the payment application against misuse. Security is clearly an important
requirement for mobile payments, and the most important criterion that we will use to
compare approaches to realize NFC payments. We identify an attacker or adversary who
may try to perform a payment not intended by the legitimate user. For this purpose, such
an adversary may need one or more of the following capabilities:
• Observing user interaction to learn information entered by the user or presented on
the phone.
• Installing or replacing apps to capture user input, get hold of keys provided by a
server, extract keys from the phone memory, or conduct malware-based relay at-
tacks (explained below).
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• Compromising the phone to subvert security mechanisms provided by the mobile
OS intended to isolate apps and ensure that files can only be accessed by the apps
that created them. These mechanisms, based on access control and encryption,
e.g., [9, 96], are usually employed by payment apps to protect their keys. A phone
compromise can be achieved, for example, by exploiting a vulnerability and giving
the attacker super-user privileges.
Apps can bypass the security mechanisms provided by the mobile OS when a user
roots or jailbreaks her phone [81]. In these cases an attacker can compromise the
phone just by being able to install or replace apps.
There is usually some mechanism implicating the user during the payment. It may
consist of a simple proof-of-involvement: unlocking the phone, pressing a physical but-
ton, tapping on the touchscreen; or an authenticationmechanism: entering a PIN, placing
a finger in the phone’s fingerprint sensor, etc. It makes sense having such a mechanism
insofar it makes hardware-based relay attacks harder or infeasible. In these attacks the ad-
versary uses two NFC devices that communicate with one another in real-time. The first
device is placed at the payment terminal to conduct the transaction posing as the user’s
phone. The second is placed in the vicinity of the user’s phone (which may be on a pocket
or backpack) posing as the payment terminal. If no user interaction is required, the user’s
phone will readily participate in the relayed transaction. It is possible to have schemes
with no user interaction, but preventing hardware-based relay attacks would be very dif-
ficult, as it is with contactless payment cards [121, 181]. A more involved type of relay at-
tack (malware-based) does not require the second device. Instead, the attacker’s device at
the payment terminal communicates directly with amalicious application running on the
user’s phonewhich tries to directly use the payment keys, or trick the payment application
to do so [168].
There are other criteria besides security that we will use in this chapter to compare
technical approaches to realize NFC payments. Namely:
Additional hardware Any hardware required on the mobile phone beyond the NFC an-
tenna and controller to conduct NFC payments. The less required hardware, the bet-
ter.
Availability The user should not be prevented from paying with her phone for technical
reasons. Each additional requirement beyond the phone being present hinders this
criterion, e.g., special payment terminals, network connectivity, a non-discharged
phone (to run a payment app), etc.
Management complexity and cost The amount of effort and investment that is required
to enable the user to pay with her phone. The lower the management complexity
and cost, the better.
Performance The time that it takes between tapping the phone and receiving indication
that it can be removed from the terminal should be less than 400 msec [70]. If pre-
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tapping or post-tapping is required, it should be as quick as possible in order not to
get in the way of the payment process.
The rest of this chapter surveys technical approaches at the phone side to store pay-
ment keys and execute the payment application. Particularly, the Secure Element (SE)
in Section 2.1, Host Card Emulation (HCE) in Section 2.2, SE in the Cloud in Section 2.3,
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in Section 2.4, and combined approaches in Sec-
tion 2.5. These approaches are then compared in Table 2.1 (page 22). Finally, Section 2.6
presents a review of related literature, followed by a summary in Section 2.7, and an out-
look in Section 2.8.
2.1. Secure Element (SE)
Mobile Phone 
NFC Controller 
Secure 
Element (SE) 
Payment 
Application 
Application 
Processor 
Other apps 
NFC Antenna 
Payment Terminal 
UICC/SIM Card 
Embedded 
Secure Memory Card 
Figure 2.1: Secure Element (SE)-based approach: Commands from the Payment Terminal are received via theNFC
Antenna. These commands are decoded by the NFC Controller, which forwards them to the payment application
(dark box) executing in the SE. The SEmay be soldered (i.e., embedded) onto the phone electronics. It may also be a
removable component, e.g., built into a memory card, or the SIM card itself.
The SE is a tamper-resistant hardware component, usually a smart card microcon-
troller capable of securely storing keys and executing code in isolation from the rest of the
phone. Traditionally, phones supporting card emulationmode have delegated the protec-
tion of payment keys and execution of the payment application to the SE. When the NFC
2.1. Secure Element (SE) 15
device is presented to a contactless terminal, its NFCController relays commands between
the terminal and the SE, as shown in Figure 2.1. The SEmay be soldered, or embedded onto
the phone electronics. Alternatively, it may be a removable memory card or the SIM card
itself. The first iteration of Google Wallet [168] and the Dutch Rabo Wallet [161] exemplify
payment schemes based on the SE.
TheGlobalPlatformCard Specification [90] defines the de factomechanism formanag-
ing applications installed on SEs. For suchmanagement operations, a set of keys is needed
to establish a secure channel with each SE. These keys are controlled by the MNOs, phone
manufacturers, and removable SE manufacturers (for SIM cards, embedded SEs, and re-
movable SEs, respectively). So-called Trusted Service Managers (TSMs) are used to manage
those keys and applications across different types of SEs, although in practice most de-
ployments are not able to deal with such heterogeneity and are restricted to a single type
of SE.
SEs are much less powerful than the main processor of a phone, but powerful enough
to perform full payment transactions within 400msec. They are designed to protect sensi-
tive information, especially cryptographic keys, whichmakes themwell suited to safekeep
the keys used during the contactless payment. Note that those keys are provisioned to
the SE under a secure (i.e., authenticated and encrypted) channel between the card issuer
and the SE, which protects them from disclosure to third parties (including to the phone
itself). These keys are never revealed outside of the SE. Extracting key material from a SE is
not impossible, but it is a very costly endeavor anecdotally quantified in the order of mil-
lions of dollars. The difficulty of cloning SIM and (chip-based) payment cards is based on
this property, which evidences that the SE provides an excellent, fit-for-purpose technical
mechanism to protect the keys at the core of the NFCmobile payment security.
Just having an SE is not sufficient to achieve the required level of security: the phone’s
architecturemust ensure that it is not possible to trick the SE into interpreting a command
generated by the phone as if it had been received via theNFC interface. Similarly, payment
applications running on the SEmust be able to distinguish the interface where commands
are received in order to detect attacks launched from a compromised phone.
Every piece of silicon on a consumer device, even if it costs a fraction of a dollar, will
amount to a large cost when fitted intomillions of devices. Such expenditurewould be jus-
tified from the phone manufacturer perspective if there was a way to monetize it, e.g., us-
ing embedded SEs. This does not exactly please the MNOs, who would rather monetize
NFC themselves by renting space in the SIM card and providing TSM services. Consequently,
MNOs have shown reluctance to offer devices with embedded SEs, or have requestedmanu-
facturers to disable themprior to shipment. In our opinion, this has preventedwidespread
adoption of NFC for payments. Furthermore, we note that NFC SIMs cards have not been
widely deployed because of the lack of applications requiring them: a chicken-and-egg
situation!
The problem of SE availability is exacerbated by the heterogeneity of SE types, which
is difficult—if not impossible—to manage in a global (or even national) scale by applica-
tion providers and TSMs. This has been readily evidenced by the fact that some SE-based
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NFC application deployments have required participants to have a contract with a specific
MNO, request a new NFC SIM card, be provided with a removable SE, or be provided with
a pre-configured phone. For real world applications, providing pre-configured phones is
infeasible on economical and user-preference grounds. Using removable cards can hardly
be scaled: phones may have a single memory card slot (if any), which can already be in
use. Besides, the usermay want to remain at liberty to exchange hermemory card without
breaking her NFC applications. In the end, due to the availability and management issues
described above, having a device with an NFC Controller and antenna does not guarantee
that it can readily be used for specific applications unless further conditions are satisfied,
thus resulting in a usability and scalability nightmare.
Additionally, using a SE entails additional costs for the application provider because
the entity managing the application, usually the MNO or the TSM, will charge for those op-
erations. Furthermore, when the SIM card is the SE, the application provider will have to
pay for the memory used by the application. SEs have very limited non-volatile memory,
usually between 32 and 72 KB. A typical payment application takes between 10 and 30 KB.
Consequently, only a handful of (complex) applications can be squeezed into a given SE,
which may be problematic if multiple applications need to be deployed.
One final aspect related to SE-based payment applications is that there are established
evaluation and certification processes for every component of the chain: the SE hardware,
its OS and the payment application on top. Such processes aim to provide assurances that
security and performance goals are achieved and maintained by every component of the
solution. Evaluations and certifications can be beneficial as they mandate application de-
velopers to adhere to best practices and perform a certain minimum level of testing and
documentation for the whole solution. At the same time, they increase development time,
time to market and development costs.
2.2. Host Card Emulation (HCE)
The SE-less architecture for NFC card emulation illustrated in Figure 2.2 was introduced
byBlackBerryOS 7 in 2011 as virtual-card emulation [143]. Such an architecture has gained
a lot of attention following the introduction of Host Card Emulation (HCE) in Android 4.4
at the end of 2013 [98] and its central role in Android Pay. Interestingly, while the first
generation of Google Wallet requires a SE, Android Pay is heavily centered on HCE.
HCE simplifies the NFC ecosystem because developing, provisioning, managing and
maintaining a separate application in the SEs is no longer necessary. In principle, just the
app running on the phone and the basicNFC hardware, i.e., Antenna andController, are re-
quired to enable phone payments.. Like any other app, the payment app ismade available
and maintained using the platform app store, so there is no need for a TSM.
Pure HCE applications leverage the OS provided mechanisms to protect sensitive keys
and execute the payment app in isolation from other apps running on the phone. Alter-
natively (or additionally) they may also use OS extensions providing special security pro-
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Figure 2.2: Host Card Emulation (HCE)-based approach: In a pure HCE architecture (left), commands from the
Payment Terminal are received via the NFC Antenna. These commands are decoded by the NFC Controller, which
forwards them to the OS running on the Application Processor, which in turn sends them to the payment applica-
tion (dark box). The payment application may delegate certain (sensitive) operations, such as key storage, to cloud
services (see Section 2.3). In a combined architecture (right), one or more SEs are also present, and it is up to the
NFC Router to send the command to the appropriate SE or to the Application Processor.
files [215], application-layer security mechanisms, such as running inside a security con-
tainer [84, 94], and/or obfuscation techniques such as white box cryptography [210]. In
all cases, security is only software-based and an attacker compromising the phone will be
able to subvert those mechanisms as there will undoubtedly be exploitable software vul-
nerabilities. Furthermore, an attacker with the capability of installing or replacing apps
may also be able to gain access or entice the user into revealing sensitive information.
2.3. SE in the Cloud
HCE facilitates developing andmaintaining applications using theNFC interface to com-
municate with the payment terminal. Being able to execute these applications on the
phone OS instead of the SE allows leveraging the rich OS Application Programming Inter-
faces (APIs), accessing the phone hardware and sensors, andmost importantly, distributing
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the payment application such that certain operations are performed in the cloud. An ap-
plication can be executed solely in the phone as described in the previous section, but
being able to involve remote services in the cloud can enhance the level of overall security,
which is why it is considered a separate approach [167].
The keys used during the payment process can be better protected in the cloud than in
the phone. Naturally, just protecting these keys is not enough, because the phone (and/or
the user) need to be authenticated to access or operate with those keys. As an example,
the user authenticates to the phone, and then the phone authenticates to the cloud ser-
vice. Once such authentication steps have taken place, one approach is that any operation
involving the payment keys is performed in the cloud and sent back to the phone. Alter-
natively, one-time keys can be provisioned prior or during the payment to be used locally.
In either case, instead of protecting sensitive information on the phone, it must be ensured
that the keys in the remote server can only be accessed by a given user and possibly a given
set of apps and phones, whichmay require protecting another key used to authenticate the
phone to the cloud. Consequently, leveraging the cloud does not really solve the problem
of secure key storage because the phone authentication key would still need to be pro-
tected on the phone. Additionally, network access from the phone is required to reach the
functionality provided by the cloud. In case that such access is not possible, it is likely that
the user will be unable to perform the payment unless there is an offline fallback in place,
thus lowering the availability of this mechanism.
While the phone has a focused view on the current operation (and perhaps its past
operations), the cloud service has a holistic view of all past and current events. This is
an advantage of involving the cloud since real time data analytics can be used to detect
malicious events without relying on software running on the phone. This means that even
when facing an attacker capable of compromising the phone or installing or replacing
apps, the cloud service can be used to hinder malicious transactions. Such an approach
can be particularly useful when offline payment terminals are involved because the trans-
actions can then be monitored and authorized online using the phone network connec-
tion.
When a cloud service is involved during the processing of the commands, network
latency can adversely impact performance. A naive implementation of a SE in the cloud
would consist of relying all commands between the terminal and the cloud. Such an ap-
proach would be extremely slow because of the aggregated latency. Consequently, the
interaction with the cloud should be limited to the minimal amount of exchanges. Fur-
thermore, if the app is not properly optimized, even the time that it takes to establish the
network connection—which could be in the order of a few hundred milliseconds—would
adversely impact overall performance. On the other hand, if the required exchanges are
designed to take place outside of the performance-critical payment phase, and oppor-
tunistically as there is available connectivity, then the performance impact of remote ac-
cess can be reduced.
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2.4. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
A TEE, illustrated in Figure 2.3, is a combination of hardware and software intended to
provide the following security-related functionality [125,202]:
• Isolated execution: An environment where applications can be executed in isolation
from the rest of the applications running on the phone. A TEE runs two OSs in par-
allel: the traditional untrusted, rich OS where most applications are executed; and a
minimal trusted OSwhere sensitive applications are executed.
• Secure storage: Memory space that can be used to protect the confidentiality of sen-
sitive information such as keys and keys from applications executing outside of the
TEE and other applications running on the TEE.
• Remote attestation: Externally verifiable information about the integrity state of the
phone software stack, i.e., the bootloader, the OS kernel, drivers and apps.
• Secure provisioning: A mechanism to deploy and manage the lifecycle of applica-
tions running on the TEE.
• Trusted path: I/O capabilities ensuring that the user and the TEE can communicate
directly without any third party (including the phone OS) being able to intercept or
tamper with the information entered by the user or presented by the TEE.
TEEs use hardware to achieve the security functionality described above. Unlike SEs,
which are self-contained andprovide a very simple command-based interface, TEEs involve
a more intricate architecture where some hardware components are shared between the
trusted and untrusted OSs. Consequently, TEEs can be seen as an intermediate approach
between the phone OSs and the SEs in terms of afforded security benefits [91], except that
TEEsmay in principle provide a trusted path, which is an advantage compared to SEs.
TEEs could be used as a drop-in replacement for SEs in twoways. First, the secure storage
functionality can be used to store and operate on the payment keys. There are existing APIs
for these purposes [53]. However, it must be ensured that these keys are only accessible to
the authorized payment application. For this it is necessary to rely on the integrity of the
phone OS. Second, a more secure approach consists of leveraging the isolated execution
functionality to also run the payment application in the TEE. In any case, when an app
executes in the TEE it should have exclusive use of the NFC I/O channel so that NFC input
cannot be spoofed or tampered by an app orOS service. Unfortunately the level of isolation
between the NFC Controller and the TEE is unclear in existing implementations.
To the best of our knowledge, there is nomobile payment scheme using TEEs. Although
a specification effort led by GlobalPlatform has been in progress for several years [89], it
has not been completed yet. In practice, TEE implementations available in the market re-
main closed, proprietary and consequently not interoperable. Despite many phones in
the market already including a TEE or its foundation blocks, notably ARM TrustZone [10]
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Figure 2.3: Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)-based approach: Commands from the Payment Terminal are
received via the NFC Antenna. These commands are decoded by the NFC Controller, which forwards them to the
Application Processor. Here two separate environments, normal and trusted, are available. In the former, the
(untrusted)mobile OS andmost apps are executed. In the latter, a separate trusted OS and the payment application
(dark box) are executed. Note that the normal and trusted environments are logically separate, but share hardware
resources.
and Texas Instruments M-Shield [192], using them for applications beyond secure key
storage remains difficult and cumbersome for most developers [67].
Moreover, approval from the party controlling the TEE must be sought for any code to
be executed in the trusted OS, which results in a management burden similar to the one
involving SEs. Fortunately, Android sometimes uses an available TEE to bind secret keys to
the phone when the platform crypto APIs are used [53].
It is regrettable that the trusted path feature is neither required by the GlobalPlatform
TEE specifications nor widely deployed in existing proprietary implementations. Such a
feature would prevent user input and sensitive application output from being intercepted
or manipulated by malicious software on the phone. This crucial feature would greatly
enhance the security of applications built on top of the TEE. The absence of this feature
may be due to the required complexity of the underlying hardware design [201] as well as
existing patents in the field [57].
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2.5. Combined approaches
An application may be partially executed in the SE, partially in the phone OS, and par-
tially in the cloud. An example is the Canadian RBCmobile payment app [14], which uses
a lightweight SE application to generate a token that is subsequently sent to the cloud for
authentication. We think that the rationale for this approach is anchoring the security to
the SE by using it to store and protect the long term key used to generate the transaction-
related token. At the same time, the complexity of the transaction-related processing are
moved to the phone and the cloud. This way, the SE application is smaller, and therefore
easier and cheaper to develop andmaintain.
Apple recently introducedApple Pay, a scheme to paywith the 6th generation of iPhones
and the iWatch. Apple Pay incorporates a SE and tokenization [9]. The most relevant to-
kenization approach, which interoperates with the existing EMV payment infrastructure,
has been outlined by EMVCo in [71]. Due to its importance, we describe this approach in
detail in Chapter 3.
A large set of mobile payment schemes—which would be ambitious to cover in this
chapter—can be obtained by combining approaches for storing payment keys and run-
ning the payment application (which need not to be the same) with user and device au-
thentication mechanisms, cloud analytics, and/or tokenization.
2.6. Related literature
There are three main sources of standardization information pertaining NFC: The NFC
Forum [148], the European Telecommunications Standards Institute [76], and the GSM
Association [99]. A very good overview of the hardware architecture of NFC phones and the
standards that come into play can be found in Chapter 7 of [126]. Even though this book
predates the introduction of HCE, it describes possible SE-less NFC architectures.
According to Roland [166], the main advantage of using HCE is the ease of developing
solutions using existing infrastructures due to the lack of the “SE barrier". In turn, he cites
four main disadvantages of HCE compared to SEs: (1) lower security due to the reliance on
the security of the phone storage; (2) easing the use of consumer devices to perform at-
tacks; (3) lack of support for other contactless protocols; and (4) restrictions on the set of
application identifiers (AIDs) that can be picked for HCE apps, which are used by the termi-
nal to select and communicate with a particular application. On the one hand—as it has
already been discussed in Section 2.2—we agree that reliance on the security of the phone
storage is indeed disadvantageous. On the other hand, we do not consider easing the use
of consumer devices as attack platforms as a real disadvantage given that motivated at-
tackers would find away to abuse devices and subvert their functionality. Furthermore, we
do not consider lack of support for other contactless protocols (e.g., Calypso, MIFARE, or
FeliCa) a disadvantage since those are normally used for access control and public trans-
portation ticketing using contactless cards. They are seldom used for payments due to
their limited level of security as well as their licensing models, and therefore are of little
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++
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+
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Table 2.1: High level comparison between approaches to store payment keys and execute the payment application
on the mobile phone.
relevance in the context of mobile payments. Finally, the AID restrictions imposed by the
NFC Controller, i.e., certain AIDs not being available for HCE apps, may actually be bene-
ficial since it would make it harder for malicious applications to impersonate legitimate
payment applications with well-known and established AIDs. This would imply an addi-
tional authentication requirement between the app and the NFCController. Unfortunately
such an authentication scheme is to the best of our knowledge not (yet) specified.
Janssen [118] presents an assessment of the HCE security implications, also arguing
that using HCE is less secure than using a SE. Then he proposes mitigation strategies such
as moving sensitive information from the device to the cloud. He points out that this may
impose performance penalties due to network latency and identifies the problem of au-
thenticating the device to the cloud. In order to solve that, he suggests focusing on au-
thenticating the user or using a SE or a TEE to authenticate the phone. Similarly, he suggests
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imposing transaction limitations such as only allowing online, low value, and/or country
specific transactions, as well as using tokenization. Janssen’s conclusion is that HCE low-
ers the development and deployment barriers for NFC card emulation and may accelerate
the introduction of NFC services, but due to its security limitations its usage should be re-
stricted to closed-loop low-value payments.
SIMalliance deems HCE as “an immature technology to be best utilised in use cases
where stringent security requirements, optimal transaction speeds and always-available
functionality are not mandatory." [182]. Like Roland, it identifies the lack of support for
other contactless protocols as shortcomings, and also advocates limiting usage of HCE to
low value transactions. In fact, it deems HCE suitable only to replace existing Quick Re-
sponse (QR) code schemes. In our opinion, such a position is too extreme: involving an
application running on the phone during the payment process does not dramatically in-
crease transaction speeds [200]. Moreover, HCE has been around for a couple of years and
is supported by several mobile OSs. By leveraging tokenization, open-loop payments may
be handled using HCE. Was this not the case, provisions for not relying on a SE would have
not been made by EMVCo in its tokenization specification [71]. On the other hand, we
agree with SIMalliance that if an AID is not in the NFC Controller routing table, the default
target should be the SE and not—as indicated by the Android HCE documentation [182]—
the phone OS. This way, priority would be given to the more secure and established SE,
while at the same time ensuring that emulated card applications running on the phone
OS can also be accessed. Furthermore, this default approach would allow the SE to han-
dle protocols not supported by HCE, and would nicely agree with the AID restrictions dis-
cussed earlier, which prevent phone malware from spoofing legitimate payment applica-
tions present in the SE.
2.7. Summary
SEs provide the best protection for payment keys because they are fully isolated and
tamper-resistant. Furthermore, they provide an environment where the payment appli-
cation can be executed without interference from potentially malicious software running
on the phone. Additionally, usage of payment keys in the SE can only be triggered by com-
mands received from a contactless terminal via the NFC Controller, i.e., since there is an
isolated hardware path between the NFC Controller and the SE.
HCE is inherently less secure than SEs or TEEs because key protection is software based
and depends on the security of large and complex phone OSs. Furthermore, there is no
special environment where the payment application can be executed in isolation from
potentially hostile code also running on the phone. Because of this, HCE was initially per-
ceived to be suitable only for non-payment, or low value closed-loop payment applica-
tions. The EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification released inMarch 2014 by EMVCo [71]
may however be interpreted as an implicit endorsement of HCE by the world’s largest pay-
ment processors where the value and lifetime of payment tokens can be reduced so the
phone’s security becomes acceptable.
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HCE can be used in conjunction with cloud services in the so-called SE in the Cloud
approach, which increases the level of key protection and provides a safer execution envi-
ronment to operate on those keys. Even though this approach does not require a SE or a
TEE, the phone needs to be online, which may not be always feasible. Furthermore, in this
approach it becomes crucial to ensure that only legitimate users and phones can access
the remotely stored keys. Hence the problem of protecting the keys in the phone is re-
placed by authenticating the user and the phone by the cloud. Interestingly, to effectively
solve that problem a TEE or SE may eventually be needed, either to protect a key used to
authenticate the phone to the cloud or to authenticate the user to the phone, e.g., via the
TEE’s trusted path.
TEEs provide a slightly lower level of protection than SEs: still hardware-based, but
with a larger Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and with neither full hardware isolation nor
tamper-resistance. It remains to be seen how effectively an isolated path between the NFC
Controller and the TEE can be established since insufficient isolation can enable an at-
tacker to trigger payment-related operations with bogus or tampered input not coming
from the NFC Controller. If the TEE provides a trusted path to the user, security is greatly
improved because the risk of malicious code capturing or altering sensitive data would be
effectively mitigated. Indeed, harvesting information such as the user’s PIN, or modifying
the payment details prompted to the user becomes infeasible, even when the phone OS
has been compromised. The level of security afforded by the TEEwould surpass that of the
SE if such trusted path was readily available, but unfortunately a trusted path is rarely en-
countered in practice. In general, practical payment schemes around TEEs are further from
realizability than those around SEs and HCE due to the ongoing specification, deployment
and interoperability state of TEEs.
2.8. Outlook
It is very difficult to predict the future of mobile payments at the POS: on the one hand,
merchants around the world continue to invest in contactless terminals compatible with
NFC and therefore we expect that this technology will be part of that future. It is unlikely
for such an investment just to be replaced with another yet-to-come unproven proximity
payment technology. Furthermore, NFC has been available for several years and the num-
ber of phones supporting it increases year to year. On the other hand, after all this time
there is no widely available payment mechanism using NFC.
The roll outs of Apple Pay, Android Pay and Samsung Pay constitute remarkable mile-
stones in the evolution of mobile payments at the POS. Unfortunately, these solutions are
centered on a single entity and based on exclusion, e.g., Apple Pay cannot be used on An-
droid devices (and vice versa), and Samsung Pay can only be used with Samsung devices.
It would be desirable to have a payment scheme supporting devices from multiple man-
ufacturers irrespective of their OS, but this seems not to fit the business models of phone
(and phone OS) manufacturers.
Chapter 3
An overview of the EMV Payment
Tokenization specification
Abstract. Tokenization consists of replacing sensitive pieces of information with
less valuable representations. It has traditionally been used by some merchants to
protect stored or transmitted card information. The actual mapping from sensitive
information—usually the card number or the Primary Account Number (PAN)—to to-
kens can be arbitrarily chosen by the merchant. Consequently, during the actual pay-
ment process, tokens need to be resolved prior to payment. The EMV Payment Tokeni-
sation Specification defines a framework where tokens have a uniform interoperable
format (following the same rules as PANs), and can therefore readily be used during
the payment process. This chapter identifies the most important elements of the EMV
Payment Tokenisation Specification, as it defines an important mechanism that can be
used to reduce the exposure of payment information stored in mobile devices*.
T
HE EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification defines a Payment Token as “a surro-
gate value that replaces the PAN in the payment ecosystem" [71]. The reverse map-
ping from tokens to PANs takes place during the payment and transparently to
many entities in the payment infrastructure. Thus this specification can be used to lower
the exposure of payment information stored in mobile phones. A Payment Token can be
seen as a shadow PAN allowing untrusted entities involved in the payment process (particu-
larly, mobile phones andmerchants) to remain oblivious to the PAN, which is only resolved
among trusted entities of the payment infrastructure. This does not mean that users and
merchants are all or necessarily malicious, but acknowledges the fact that their devices
can be compromised by malicious actors. Additionally, the risk analysis role that would
be played by the chip is shifted tomore trusted components of the payment infrastructure
instead of the less trusted mobile phone.
The practice of tokenization has already existed in the payment industry for a few
years. There are industry standards [178], as well as commercial solutions such as [52].
These solutions aim to protect stored cardholder information (mostly at the merchant
side), but are not intended to be used during the payment process. While all tokeniza-
tion approaches replace sensitive PAN values with non-sensitive values, EMV tokenization
*The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: D. Ortiz-Yepes. A critical review of the EMV Payment
Tokenisation Specification. © 2014 by Elsevier Ltd, Computer Fraud & Security, October 2014. [150].
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is different to traditional tokenization in the fundamental aspect that tokens have to be
valid PANs [116], whereas in traditional tokenization schemes tokens can be arbitrary val-
ues, e.g., the result of encrypting of the PAN. This difference is crucial because the EMV
approach allows tokens to be used during the payment process. Figure 3.1 provides a
summary of the main concepts related to the EMV Payment Tokens, which will be further
described in the rest of this chapter.
Figure 3.1: Payment Token Concepts.
3.1. New entities in the payment ecosystem
Besides the entities involved in traditional card payment processing, [71] introduces
two new entities: the Token Requestor and the Token Service Provider. These entities are
definedbased on the functionality that they provide and the relationwith the other entities
in the payment ecosystem, particularly, Cardholders, Card Issuers and Payment Networks.
3.1.1. Token Requestor
The Token Requestor is an entity mediating between Cardholders and Token Service
Providers. It is responsible for requesting Payment Tokens from the Token Service Provi-
der on behalf of Cardholders and provisioning them, for example, to the mobile phone or
a remote location in the cloud.
Due to the lack of integrity and authenticity protection of the information exchanged
between the Token Requestor and the Token Service Provider, a secure channel proving
those features has to be established between these entities. We note that it is unlikely for
the payment app to assume the TokenRequestor role because the lack of security provided
by themobile phonewouldmake it difficult establishing the required secure channel. Fur-
thermore, we expect the relationship between Cardholders and Token Requestors to be
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more transient than the relationship between Token Requestors and Token Service Provi-
ders. Finally, having a direct relationship between Cardholders and Token Service Provi-
ders would not profit from the aggregating ability of Token Requestors. Consequently, it
is most likely for the wallet provider or the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) to assume the
Token Requestor role. Notwithstanding, Merchants, Acquirers, Acquirer Processors, Pay-
ment Gateways, Device Manufacturers and Card Issuers may also assume such a role. For
example, an MNO may offer a wallet application to its subscribers, thus assuming the To-
ken Requestor role. Similarly, a phone OS provider such as Google or Apple can behave as
Token Requestors for those customers using their payment apps or OS services.
The Token Requestor has to register with the Token Service Provider. Upon registra-
tion, it will be assigned a unique identifier, the Token Requestor ID, which will be sent to
the Token Service Provider whenever it invokes a service from the Token Service Provi-
der. Besides registering with the Token Service Provider and requesting Payment Tokens,
the Token Requestor can also invoke the services provided by the Token Service Provider
described in Section 3.5.
3.1.2. Token Service Provider
The Token Service Provider is the main entity in the tokenization infrastructure. Its
fundamental responsibilities are issuing Payment Tokens, returning a PANwhenprovided a
Payment Token (de-tokenization), and keeping a record of andmanaging the Payment To-
kens’s lifecycle and associated data. Naturally, the Token Service Provider is not meant to
provide these services to all entities, but to selected ones with whom it must “implement a
securemethod of interaction" [71]. Particularly, it should only issue Payment Tokens to reg-
istered Token Requestors and allow de-tokenization queries to authorized entities such as
Issuers, Acquirers, or Payment Processors. Each entity implementing Token Service Provi-
der functionality should register with EMVCo, which will assign it a unique Token Service
Provider code.
In the mobile payment case the role of the Token Service Provider may be assumed
by new entities in the payment ecosystem. However, it is more likely for existing ones,
e.g., Payment Processors, Issuers, and Payment Networks to assume such a role. Entities
such as Visa orMasterCard are in a very goodmarket position to assume the Token Service
Provider role. Similarly, it is not difficult to envision Issuer Banks implementing Token
Service Provider functionality for their customers/cardholders.
The Token Service Provider offers the functionality intended to manage the lifecycle
of tokens (Section 3.5). It also has a sub-component, the token vault that generates the
Payment Tokens and securely stores their bindings to PANs, along with the domain restric-
tions (Section 3.3) and evidence of performed Identification and Verification (ID&V) meth-
ods (Section 3.2.1). Finally, the Token Service Provider provides functionality to enroll and
manage the Token Requestors entitled to request its services.
28 3. An overview of the EMV Payment Tokenization specification
3.2. Assurance Level
The Assigned Assurance Level is an integer value between 0 and 99 that represents the
“confidence level of the Payment Token to PAN/Cardholder binding", or how trustworthy the
Payment Token is. Such trustworthiness is assigned during Payment Token issuance by the
Token Service Provider depending on the:
Token Requestor: Tokens issued to a certain Token Requestor may have a certain
(maximum) Assigned Assurance Level,
Requested Token Assurance Level: A specific token assurance level may be explic-
itly solicited in the token request,
Token Location: Themore secure the location where the Payment Token is going to
be stored, the higher the possible Assigned Assurance Level,
Performed ID&Vmethods: Described below (Section 3.2.1).
The Assigned Assurance Level may be changed after the Payment Token is issued. Par-
ticularly, when an additional ID&V method is performed. For that, new evidence needs to
be provided to the Token Service Provider.
The Assigned Assurance Level is a value associated to the Payment Token. No mecha-
nism to guarantee its integrity is specified, and therefore it has to be validated either by the
Token Service Provider or by the Issuer. In the former case, the validation is trivial because
the assurance level is assigned by the Token Service Provider. In the latter case, the Issuer
may need to receive additional Token Assurance Data to perform the validation.
3.2.1. Identification and Verification (ID&V) methods
ID&Vmethods are “valid methods through which an entity may successfully validate the
Cardholder and the Cardholder’s account in order to establish a confidence level for Pay-
ment Token to PAN/Cardholder binding" [71]. These methods may be executed during the
generation of the Payment Token, or at a later point, e.g., prior or during a transaction.
Payment Tokens may be issued without performing any ID&Vmethod. In that case, the
Payment Token will have a low Assigned Assurance Level. Conversely, if the performed
ID&Vmethod provides strong assurances, the Assigned Assurance Level will be higher. It is
the responsibility of the Token Service Provider to either perform appropriate ID&V meth-
ods for the Payment Token’s Assigned Assurance Level, or to ensure that such methods
have been performed elsewhere, e.g., by the Card Issuer, or a third party authentication
server, prior to issuing Payment Tokens.
There are several ID&V methods relevant to the Point Of Sale (POS) use case, some of
which are listed below. There are other methods such as using Address Verification Sys-
tems (AVSs) that rather apply to the online commerce use case (cf. Section 3.6.1, page 32).
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Neither this section nor [71] provides an exhaustive list. Also, note that traditional Card-
holder Verification Methods (CVMs) such as Personal Identification Number (PIN) verifica-
tion are not considered ID&Vmethods.
Account verification: Submitting a $0 transaction to the Card Issuer for approval,
therefore checking that the account is valid and active; or checking the Card Verifi-
cation Number (CVN).
Risk score: Assigned by the Token Service Provider.
Based on requestor data: Information considered predictive of fraud, such as ac-
count age and history, IP address, device identifiers, device geo-location, transac-
tion velocity, etc.
Delegated: Using One Time Passwords (OTPs) sent via an out-of-band means, gen-
eration of a OTP using an Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) card (e.g., 3D Secure-based),
using a 3rd party authentication server, login in to the bank’s eBanking system, con-
firmation email, etc.
3.3. Domain Restrictions
The goal of assigning domains to Payment Tokens is that certain additional conditions
need to be satisfied for tokens to be accepted. An example of a domain restriction is mak-
ing the Payment Token usable only at a given merchant, as it has been presented in the
Online card-not-present payments use case described in Section 3.6.1. When a Payment
Token is presented at a merchant different to the one bound to it, payment will be re-
jected, even if the Payment Token is itself valid, which reduces potential fraud if the token
database is compromised. Restrictions can also be imposed in the following domains:
PresentmentMode: The Payment Token is only accepted if presented via POS, or via
a web service. This restriction aims to reduce the risk of cross-channel fraud.
POS Entry mode: This mode imposes restrictions on the way how the Payment To-
ken may be provided to the POS.
Wallet provider: The Payment Token can only be used from a certain wallet or pay-
ment service provider.
Cryptogram: The Payment Token is only valid when accompanied with a per-tran-
saction computed cryptogram.
Token restrictions are assigned and enforced by the Token Service Provider. When the
Payment Token is requested, the restrictions are assigned. Normally, they are not assigned
on a request-by-request basis, but based on the Token Requestor ID. As a consequence, a
Token Requestormay be assigned a plurality of Token Requestor IDs, each associated with
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a fixed set of domain restrictions. At usage time, when the Payment Token is sent for de-
tokenization (Figure 3.2, page 32), the restrictions associated to the token can be enforced
prior to returning the corresponding PAN.
3.4. Token Location
The Token Service Provider needs to know where the Payment Token and its related
data—particularly the associated keys—are going to be stored once provisioned. The ac-
cess controls enforced by the storage location influence the Assigned Assurance Level.
When a Payment Token is requested, its location may be explicitly included in the Token
Request or implicitly known based on the Token Requestor ID (which may be associated
with a default location). Once the Token Service Provider issues the Payment Token, its
location shall not be changed. The following token locations are defined by the specifica-
tion:
Remote storage: “Plain" server storage of the token information.
Remote hardware secured storage: Server storage using tamper resistant or tamper
proof hardware, e.g., Hardware Security Modules (HSMs).
Local Device storage: mobile phone memory.
Secure Element (SE)/ICC: See Section 2.1, page 14.
Local hardware secured storage: A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4, page 19).
3.5. Token Lifecycle
The operations pertaining to the Payment Tokens lifecycle are described in this sec-
tion. These operations are all fulfilled by the Token Service Provider and can all be re-
quested by the Token Requestor.
3.5.1. Issuance
The Token Requestor submits a token request to the Token Service Provider to obtain a
Payment Token. This request includes at least theTokenRequestor ID, the PAN, and thePAN
Expiry Date. The Token Requestor can also include information such as a Requested Token
Assurance Level, the Token Location, a Token Requestor Risk Score, information about the
mobile phone as required by the Token Service Provider.
Upon receiving the token request, the Token Service Provider issues the Payment To-
ken with a given set of domain restrictions, a certain lifetime and an Assigned Assurance
Level. The precise value of those parameters along with the usage count depend on the
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Token Requestor and the information provided in the token request. That information is
stored by the Token Service Provider and validated whenever the Token Service Provider is
involved in the Payment Token usage process. This is relevant because the Payment Token
and its related data are not self-contained and the only entity able to check that informa-
tion is the Token Service Provider.
3.5.2. Provisioning
Once the Payment Token is issued by the Token Service Provider and received by the
Token Requestor, it has to be provisioned either to the mobile phone or to a remote lo-
cation, e.g., in a cloud. The specific provisioning process is proprietary and therefore not
defined by [71].
3.5.3. Retirement
The retirement of a Payment Token can be requested by the Token Requestor, the Card
Issuer, or the Payment Network. Alternatively, it can also be carried out autonomously by
the Token Service Provider. The Payment Token can be retired permanently, in which case
it is said to beunlinked, for examplewhen themobile phoneholding it is reported as stolen
or there is suspected fraud. Alternatively, the binding may be temporarily suspended, in
which case the Payment Token is said to be suspended.
3.5.4. Update
The Assigned Assurance Level and the PAN attributes, particularly the PAN Expiry Date
can be updated. The Token Service Provider can be requested to update the Payment To-
ken’s Assigned Assurance Level by the Token Requestor, the Card Issuer, or the Payment
Network once additional ID&Vmethods are performed. Also, as a consequence of internal
operations, the Token Service Providermay update a Payment Token’s Assigned Assurance
Level.
The Issuer may request the Token Service Provider to update the PAN attributes to re-
flect changes in the account, e.g., extension of the PAN Expiry Date.
3.5.5. Usage
A Payment Token needs to be activated prior to being used. Such an activation hap-
pens implicitly at issuance time or by requesting it to the Token Service Provider, e.g., after
the Payment Token has been suspended.
A payment transaction using a Payment Token and an NFC enabled mobile phone is
illustrated in Figure 3.2. The Payment Terminal sends to themobile phone the transaction
and terminal information (m1 in Figure 3.2). The mobile phone in turn sends back the
tokenized card information, and most likely a cryptographic checksum or an Application
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Figure 3.2: Token-based NFC payment.
Cryptogram (AC) (m2 in Figure 3.2). The tokenized card information contains the Payment
Token and its expiry date instead of the PAN and the PAN Expiry Date. Upon receiving that
information, the Payment Terminal submits it to the Payment Network (m3 in Figure 3.2),
which has to perform a de-tokenization query with the Token Service Provider (m4 in Fig-
ure 3.2). At this point, the Token Service Provider is able to enforce any restrictions bound
to the Payment Token, particularly regarding its usage count, domain restrictions, assur-
ance level and expiry date. Once the Token Service Provider responds with the PAN (m5
in Figure 3.2), the authorization request can be forwarded to the Issuer (m6 in Figure 3.2),
which ultimately decides whether the transaction is approved or declined. Particularly, if
a cryptographic checksum or an AC is generated it would be checked.
Using Payment Tokens implicitly prescribes transactions to take place online because
the merchant’s Payment Terminal should be able to contact the Token Service Provider in
order to validate the Payment Token and obtain authorization from the Card Issuer.
3.6. Use cases of tokenization
3.6.1. Online card-not-present
Many merchants allow card payments over the Internet. In some cases they store the
payment information to automatically retrieve it during subsequent purchases. This facil-
itates the shopping process because payment information needs to be entered only once.
While this is a convenient approach, it is also risky because payment information can be
used to conduct fraudulent transactions. For this reason, such information is valuable and
an attractive target for attackers as shown by recent data breaches e.g. at Target [29].
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Tokenization can be used to restrict the usability of card numbers to single, specific
merchants. This way, if the database of payment information is compromised, it is rather
useless as the card numbers (i.e., tokens) will not be accepted when fraudsters attempt
using them elsewhere.
3.6.2. Mobile/digital wallet e-commerce
Apayment service canbeusedwithmultiplemerchants to pay online, e.g., PayPal [157].
The customer enters her card information only once at the payment service, either via a
web site or a “wallet" app. Towards completing a transaction with a participating mer-
chant, the service is used to obtain authorization for the payment without involving the
merchant.
When such a payment service is used, the database of payment cards is kept by the
service, which can also use tokenization to reduce the impact of a data breach resulting
in disclosure of card information. In this case, the tokens would not be restricted to a
merchant, but to the provider of the payment service.
3.6.3. POS payments
This is the use case considered through this chapter consisting of replacing payment
cards with mobile phones when paying at the POS. In this setting, tokenization can be
used to control the risk of fraud based on several factors, such as the strength and recency
of cardholder authentication, the degree to which the mobile phone can protect the to-
ken and its related data against disclosure, etc. Based on those parameters, the token can
be assigned a certain validity period and usage count. More importantly, when the mo-
bile phone does not offer sufficient defenses against tampering with the execution of the
payment application, transaction risk analysis can be performed altogether outside of the
mobile phone by the Payment Network and/or the Issuer Bank. This use case does not
necessarily require the token to be stored in the mobile phone. In fact, it can be stored at
a remote location and retrieved during or prior to the payment.
3.6.4. Online card-not-present payments
Just as most PCs can be used to shop online, so can most mobile phones. Mobile
phones usually offer a more restricted User Interface (UI) than PCs, but due to their ubiq-
uity, they provide a convenient means to shop online via custom apps or simply using the
mobile phone browser. In both cases, the user may enter her card information during the
checkout process, or use an app/service to perform the payment at the online merchant.
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3.7. Open issues and shortcomings
It is unclear whether POS payments using tokens are considered card-present or card-
not-present. From a practical standpoint, i.e., completing the payment, there is not much
difference. Formerchants, however, this is a decisive distinction because the fees for card-
not-present transaction are much higher than for card-present transactions.
The relationship between Payment Tokens and cryptograms is also unclear. Cryp-
tograms, are referred to andmandated when NFC is used at the POS, but it is notmentioned
how they are calculated. Particularly, it is nevermentionedwhich keys are used to generate
them. It makes little sense to hide the PANs, while using (and exposing!) the keys directly
associated to the PAN. Therefore, some other per-token keys are most likely intended to be
used. Unfortunately, [71] falls short from specifying—or even hinting—at the provenance
of these keys and how tokenization influences the cryptogram generation and verification
processes.
It is not uncommon for EMVCo to provide aminimum layer of common specifications
and letting eachmember come upwith their own refinements and concrete specifications
and implementation guidelines, e.g., by Visa [204]. This seems to be also the case in the
tokenization space. The question is whether the lack of specificity may lead to interoper-
ability difficulties, or even lock-out new players from playing the Token Service Provider
role. We note that semantic subjectivity of the assurance level seems to be problematic,
i.e., a Payment Token with Assigned Assurance Level Ln assigned by one Token Service
Provider is very likely not tomean the same as another Payment Token with Assigned As-
surance Level L′n assigned by some other Token Service Provider (for 1 ≤ n < 99). If the
assurance level were used only within the Token Service Provider such subjectivity would
be no problem, but the fact that it is shared with the Token Requestor and the Card Issuer
means that some sort of agreement between these entities regarding the semantics of the
assurance level is necessary in order to avoid the possible misunderstandings resulting
from per-Token Service Provider disjoint assurance level meanings.
Similarly, for those ID&V methods carried out by the Card Issuer or a third party, it is
stated that “verifiable evidence SHALL be provided to prove that the steps were performed
(...). The details of what constitutes verifiable evidence are outside the scope of this speci-
fication, but examples include a cryptogram or an authorisation code.". Given that many
ID&Vmethods are already established, references could be provided to how such evidence
may be presented.
Besides the token locations defined in [71] and listed in Section 3.4, an additional lo-
cation should have been defined. This location could be named cryptographically pro-
tected local device storage, and at a minimum would provide software-based per-app and
per-user data encryption [53]. Such functionality could be implemented using platform
provided libraries, e.g., [9, 96]. Tokens stored in this location would be better protected
than those stored using local device storage, where they can be accessed by every running
process, and less protection than local hardware secured storage and SE/ICC (both of which
use hardware to protect the tokens and their related data).
Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving location
verification ofmobile phones
Abstract. Mobile devices are increasingly used in security-sensitive contexts such
as physical access control and authorization of payment transactions. In this chapter
we address the first main topic of this doctoral thesis by contributing a mechanism to
verify whether a mobile device currently resides within a geographical area at a given
time, thus enabling the location to be used as an additional authentication factor*.
Trustworthiness, privacy, and practicability are central to our mechanism. In particu-
lar, to provide trustworthy location information, our mechanism uses the location of
the phone as detected by theMobile NetworkOperator instead of relying on the location
detected by the phone itself, which can be manipulated. We have followed a privacy-
by-design approach to ensure that sensitive information, e.g., location and subscriber
data, are only revealed to parties with a need to know. Privacy safeguards are realized
using anonymous credentials, an established privacy-enhancing technology.
Finally, our mechanism is practical and places few requirements on the mobile phone
beyond the ability to run computations on anonymous credentials, as well as Internet
and mobile network connectivity. These requirements are fulfilled by nearly all smart-
phones on the market today.
S
MARTPHONES are probably the most pervasive electronic devices of our time. The
services they provide go far beyond communication and have become so rich and
useful in daily life that most individuals can no longer think of living without them.
Services increasingly make use of the geographic location of the phone to enhance the
user’s experience, improve usability, or strengthen the security of authentication.
In this chapter we propose a mechanism for using the mobile phone location as an
additional authentication factor, but without all the known privacy concerns of location-
based services, such as service providers creating movement and behavior patterns from
the data they collect, selling this data, or losing it in a data breach. More specifically, for
many security-critical scenarios, it is possible to identify a certain geographical area from
which legitimate transactions are likely to occur. If the mobile phone of the user perform-
ing the transaction can be localized within this area at the time of the transaction, then
* The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: Camenisch, J., Ortiz-Yepes, D., Preiss, F.S. Strengthen-
ing authentication with privacy-preserving location verification of mobile phones. Proceedings of the 14th ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, ACM, 2015 [36]
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this is a strong indicator that the transaction is not fraudulent. Consider, e.g., payment
transactions with conventional credit cards, where the majority of credit-card fraud oc-
curs from foreign countries geographically distant from the user’s home country. To pre-
vent this type of fraud, transactions from abroad are in many cases denied unless the user
notifies the bank that she will travel, or she is contacted by the bank to validate the legit-
imacy of the transaction. We note that the fact that the user’s phone is currently within
the country where the transaction takes place can be leveraged as an authentication fac-
tor. In this scenario, it is sufficient for the credit card company to know that the phone is
somewhere within the expected country, without learning its exact location. This idea is
the basis for our proposal, as it allows for verifying the location of a user’s phone without
the call-center costs and without eroding the user’s privacy. The bigger the geographical
reference area, the better the privacy of the user can be preserved.
In addition to payment transactions, there are many other security-critical scenarios
in which location can be used as an authentication factor in a privacy-preservingmanner,
some of which we discuss in Sec. 4.5. In general, these scenarios have four entities in
common: the Service Provider S (the payment terminal and the bank infrastructure that
it connects to), the User U (the subscriber or cardholder), her mobile phone P , and the
Mobile Network OperatorM managing the mobile network to which the phone connects
to.
Determining and using the location of the mobile phone does not replace authenti-
cating the User, i.e., one aspect is ensuring that the mobile phone is at a certain location
and another that the User is also there. There are existing approaches to user authentica-
tion whereby she either authenticates directly to the mobile phone, e.g., providing a pass-
word; or providing some additional authenticator to be forwarded to the Service Provider;
e.g., using a password or some sort of two factor authentication [149]. User authentication
can alternatively take place without involving the mobile phone by requiring the user to
authenticate to the physical infrastructure, e.g., with a card, a PIN (such as when perform-
ing cash withdrawals), and/or a fingerprint.
We contribute in this chapter a practical, secure and privacy-preserving mechanism
enabling a Service Provider to verify whether the mobile phone of a given User currently re-
sides within a certain geographical reference area at a given time. Our mechanism consists
of having the location of the mobile phone determined by the Mobile Network Opera-
tor (MNO) and certified using anonymous credentials.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1we outline the set of desir-
able properties that our location verificationmechanismaims to achieve. In Section 4.2we
describe the notation for geographic measurements that we shall use throughout the rest
of the chapter. In Section 4.3 we introduce the required background concepts concern-
ing anonymous credential systems leveraged by our proposed mechanism. In Section 4.4
we describe such a mechanism, followed by a discussion about our design decisions and
how the proposed mechanism achieves the desired properties in Sections 4.5 to 4.8. In
Section 4.9 we review related work. In Section 4.10 we identify future work.
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4.1. Properties
Location unforgeability
It is infeasible for the area in which the MNO reports the user to be located—which
we refer to as Reported Area—to be spoofed, tampered with, or reused later in time. In
particular, the location verificationmechanism should withstand strong attackers capable
of fully compromising the mobile phone OS and/or its apps.
In ourmechanism, the potentially compromisedmobile phone is not actively involved
in the location determination process, since this is entirely done by the MNO, which we
assume to be a trustworthy location source. Furthermore, the underlying anonymous cre-
dentials (cf. Section 4.3, page 39) are unforgeable and resistant against tampering and re-
play.
User binding
The Service Provider can rest assured that themobile phonewhose location is reported
by the MNO is indeed the mobile phone of the User whom the Service Provider seeks to
authenticate.
In our mechanism, this property is achieved by having two credentials issued to the
User and stored in her mobile phone: a Phone Credential and a User Credential. The
former includes the phone identifier and is issued by the MNO after it has authenticated
themobile phone. The latter is issued by the Service Provider once it has authenticated the
User and includes both the user and the phone identifiers. Binding is establishedwhen the
phone generates verifiable evidence for the Service Provider attesting that the Reported
Area is bound to a valid phone identifier, which is in turn bound to a certain user identifier.
Phone identifier privacy
Phone identifiers such as the International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI), the
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI), or themobile phone number are not dis-
closed to the Service Provider.
In our mechanism, this property is achieved since information pertaining the mobile
phone is only shared with the Service Provider in unintelligible form. In particular, the
phone identifier included in the User Credential is carried over from the Phone Credential
without revealing its value to the issuing Service Provider.
Reported area privacy
The Service Provider merely learns whether themobile phone is within the area where
it expects it to be—whichwe refer to asReference Area—in a yes/no fashion, but not exactly
where. If themobile phone resides outside of the Reference Area, the Service Provider does
not learn its location.
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In our mechanism we rely on attribute predicate proofs, a feature of anonymous cre-
dentials allowing to prove that a given mathematical statement over certified attributes
holds without disclosing the actual attribute values. Using this feature the mobile phone
can thus prove to the Service Provider that the Reported Area is contained within the Ref-
erence Area without revealing its actual location.
Reference Area Privacy
TheMNOdoes not learn theReferenceArea. In ourmechanism, this property is achieved
since the Reference Area is never communicated to theMNO.
Service unlinkability
The MNO cannot link location certification requests made by users via their mobile
phones to a particular Service Provider.
In ourmechanism, this property is achieved because there is no direct communication
between the MNO and the Service Provider, and the mobile phone never shares informa-
tion concerning the Service Provider with theMNO.
Sensor independence
The location verification process does not depend on dedicated hardware of the mo-
bile phone. In particular, location verification does not depend on a Global Positioning
System (GPS) module or a WiFi radio being available, enabled, or active.
In our mechanism, the mobile phone’s lack of involvement in determining its location
leads to sensor independence, which at the same time allows it to be used with any phone
that is connected to amobile network and is capable of running software to perform com-
putations on anonymous credentials.
Usability
The User is not actively involved in the location verification process.
4.2. Geographic areas
For the purposes of this chapter, a quadrilateral area on the surface of the earth can
be described by a 4-tuple
(
φn ,φs ,λe ,λw
)
with φn >φs and λe > λw , corresponding to the
bounding northern and southern latitudes φn ,φs ∈ [−90◦,90◦], followed by the bounding
eastern and western longitudes λe ,λw ∈ [−180◦,180◦].
A location L on the surface of the earth can be represented by three-dimensional
Cartesian coordinates (x, y,z). Such a location can be obtained from a latitude-longitude
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pair (φ,λ) as follows: x := R · cos(φ) · cos(λ), y := R · cos(φ) · sin(λ), z := R · sin(φ). For the
purpose of this work, we assume the planet Earth is approximated by a sphere of radius R
:= 6’378’137m [145].
A circular area on the surface of the earth can be described by a pair (L ,δ), where L ,
being a location as defined previously, is the center of the circular area, and δ is its radius.
4.3. Attribute-based credentials
A credential system allows users to obtain digital attribute-based credentials and prove
possession of these credentials to third parties. A credential system where transactions
performed by the same user cannot be linked is an anonymous credential system because
the unlinkability—in particular from the point of view of the verifier, the so-called verifier
unlinkability—allows the user to remain anonymous across transactions [28,39,46,132].
Anonymous credential systems have strong security properties. In particular, unforge-
ability in the sense that users cannot show credentials that they never obtained, and con-
sistency in the sense that each credential belongs to a well-defined user such that multi-
ple users cannot collaborate to obtain privileges that one user alone would not have got-
ten. At the same time, different levels of non-transferability discourage users from sharing
their credentials with others in the sense that sharing a credential may entail disclosing
a secret—such as the access details of the user’s bank account—or all of the user’s other
credentials’ attributes.
A digital credential is a certified bundle of attribute-value pairs of a specific type is-
sued by a credential issuer to a user. Technically, a credential is a particular kind of digital
signature on a set of attributes that is verifiable under the issuer’ public key. Due to the
attribute-based nature of credentials, they are also referred to as attribute-based creden-
tials (ABCs). ABCs of an anonymous credential system are referred to as anonymous creden-
tials, and denoted byC.
4.3.1. Credential presentation
After a user has obtained an anonymous credential from an issuer, she can convince
a verifier of this and other facts by providing it with a presentation token (denoted by T ).
Such a token consists of cryptographic evidence derived from the credential and a token
description [23, 37]. Although the evidence is derived without involvement of the issuer,
its validity is verifiable under the issuer’ public key. The token derivation is cryptograph-
ically untraceable, i.e., no collusion of issuers and verifiers can correlate the token to the
issuance of the underlying credentials. Depending on the implementation, any two tokens
are also cryptographically unlinkable, i.e., no collusion of issuers and verifiers can deter-
mine whether two tokens were derived by the same user or by different users. The process
of deriving and providing a verifier with a presentation token is referred to as credential
presentation or token presentation.
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Proof of ownership
In its simplest form, a presentation token incorporates a proof that the user owns a
credential of a particular type from a particular issuer, which is referred to as proof of own-
ership. In addition to performing ownership proofs, users have a number of possibilities
for disclosing further information from or about their credential in a privacy-preserving
manner. The exact specification of which credentials a usermust prove possession of, and
which further information from or about these credentials has to be disclosed is referred
to as presentation policy and denoted byψ.
Selective attribute disclosure
When a user proves ownership of a credential, she can selectively decide for every at-
tribute certified in the credential whether its value is disclosed or not. For each disclosed
attribute value, the verifier can rest assured that they are indeed correct w.r.t. the creden-
tial that was originally issued. The possibility to disclose only a subset of a credential’s at-
tributes is a noteworthy advantage w.r.t. conventional digital certificate technologies such
as X.509 where a certificate can only be revealed as a whole [54].
Attribute predicate proof
Rather than revealing the exact values of attributes certified in credentials, anonymous
credential systems also allow for proving themere fact that certified attributes fulfill certain
mathematical properties, without disclosing the underlying attribute values. For exam-
ple, a user can prove that her date of birth according to her passport is before January 28,
1997—i.e., that she is older than 18 years—without revealing her date of birth. The proved
properties may also involve multiple attributes, and/or attributes from multiple different
credentials. For example, a user can prove that the name on her credit card matches the
one on her passport—without revealing the actual name.
Properties that a user can efficiently prove include equality and inequality (e.g., not
equal to, greater than, less than), relations between expressions of the form
∑n
i=1 ciai
where the ci are integers and the ai are integer attribute values certified in a credential,
as well as logical combinations (i.e., conjunction and disjunction) of such (in)equalities.
Although in theory any polynomial over certified attributes can be proved, only for certain
classes of properties—such as the one mentioned previously—it is known how to prove
them efficiently. For every credential involved in an attribute predicate proof, a user has to
provide a proof of ownership. The properties that a user proves, or is asked to prove, about
her credentials are expressed as logical predicate in a presentation token description, or a
presentation policy, respectively.
Message signatures
When authenticating with anonymous credentials, a user can include a message in
the presentation token, and effectively digitally sign that message. The difference to tradi-
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tional digital signatures is that the verifier does not necessarily learnwho consented to the
signed message: the verifier only knows as much about the signing party as is revealed by
the presentation token that contains the message. Incorporating a nonce in the message
that is signed prevents replay attacks.
Credential issuance
Credential issuance is the process in which an issuer issues a new credential to a user
and thus vouches for the correctness of the certified attributes. Prior to performing the
issuance, the issuer determines the values that are to be certified in the new credential
by authenticating the user and her attributes in some way. This can be done by carrying
out some secondary means of authentication or by performing a credential presentation
as previously described. In the latter case, anonymous credential systems allow for very
advanced issuance scenarios where the attribute values from the user’s existing trusted
credentials are carried over blindly to attributes of the newly issued credential—i.e., with-
out the issuer learning these values.
Credential issuance is an interactive protocol between a user and an issuer. It is ini-
tiated by the issuer providing the user with a specification—called issuance policy—that
describes which credentials a user has to present prior to being issued the new creden-
tial, and what the relation between the (possibly undisclosed) attributes of the presented
credentials and the newly issued credential and its attributes will be. For the credentials
that we consider in this paper, the issuance protocol consists of four messages in total, of
which the first is the issuance policy.
Implementations
The two most widely known schemes for realizing anonymous credential systems are
the one of Brands [28] and of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [39]. Both have been imple-
mented in the latest version of the IBM Identity Mixer library, which supports all crypto-
graphic aspects of anonymous credential systems [41]. Complementarily, the Attribute-
Based Credential Engine (ABCE) provides the high-level language capabilities for express-
ing policies and token descriptions, and whether a token fulfills a policy [22].
4.4. Privacy-preserving location verification
In this section we describe the details of our mechanism, which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.1.
4.4.1. Setup
There are two long-lived credentials that have to be issued in a one-time setup phase:
the Phone Credential and the User Credential. Additionally, a Minimal Disclosure Thresh-
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Mobile Phone (P) MNO (M) Service Provider (S) User (U) 
request (subscription credential) 
Csub (expdate), M  
request (phone credential, pid) 
CP (pid)  
request (user credential, uid, blind(pid)) 
CU (uid)  
set (Min. Disclosure Threshold) 
usr auth info 
(1) srv. request (usr auth info) 
(2) S (ref. area), challenge, TS 
(3) request (location credential), TS 
(4) Cloc (pid, timestamp, rep. area)  
(5) TP (rep. area  ref. area), response 
Setup (phone) 
Sec. 3.1 
Setup (billing) 
Sec. 3.4 
Usage 
Sec. 3.2, 3.3  
Figure 4.1: Message flow with privacy preserving features. The basic protocol messages appear in boldface, the
subscription-related messages in italics, and the user authentication related messages in gray.
old has to be configured. The Phone Credential CP is issued by M to P . It certifies an
attribute pid that uniquely identifies P , e.g., based on the IMEI or IMSI (bound to the SIM
card). The User CredentialCU is issued by the S (or another entity to which S delegates is-
suance) toU . The Identity Provider may be the Service Provider (S) itself or another entity
to which S delegates issuance of user credentials. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that I = S.
CU certifies the attributes uid and pid , where uid is set to a value that identifiesU
to S, e.g., a credit card number. In turn, pid is blindly carried over fromCP . To do so,U
proves ownership ofCP to S prior to receivingCU (cf. Section 4.3.1). Once these two cre-
dentials have been issued,U stores them in P . Finally,U defines the Minimal Disclosure
Threshold τM , which is a privacy parameter used to decide whether the actual values of
Reported Area may be revealed to the Service Provider.
4.4.2. Boundary-based verification
In the following protocol we describe the usage of our mechanism based on quadrilat-
eral areas (cf. Section 4.2, page 38).
1. P makes a service request to S.
2. To authenticate the request w.r.t. a given Reference Area AS :=
(
φn
S
,φs
S
,λe
S
,λw
S
)
, S
instantiates a presentation policy with AS and sends the instantiated policyψS to P .
3. P requests a Location Credential fromM .
4. M determines the location of requestor P , and issues a Location CredentialCloc to
it. Cloc certifies the Reported Area AM , the phone identifier pid , and the issuance
date.
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5. P determines whether policy ψS can be fulfilled. In particular, ψS requires proofs
of ownership of Cloc and CU , and an equality proof of the pid in CU and the
pid in Cloc . Additionally, it requires disclosure of the issuance date of Cloc , for
the Service Provider to check freshness. Depending on the scenario, the uid from
the User Credential must also be disclosed, so that the Service Provider can iden-
tify the user. Also, assuming the Location Credential certifies the Reported Area
AM := (φnM ,φsM ,λeM ,λwM ), the policy requires that AM is contained within AS , de-
noted as AM ⊆ AS (illustrated in Figure 4.2), which is equivalent to proving that the
following attribute predicate holds:
(
φnM≤φnS
)
∧
(
φsM≥φsS
)
∧
(
λeM≤λeS
)
∧
(
λwM≥λwS
)
(4.1)
If Equation 4.1 does not hold, P sends an error message to S indicating that the
locations do not match. Otherwise, P checks whether the Reported Area is larger
than τM
2, which can be achieved by evaluating whether:
τ2M <
(
2R×atan2
(√
aφ,
√
1−aφ
))
×
(
2R×atan2
(p
aλ,
√
1−aλ
))
(4.2)
holds, where φˆ := φ
n
M
+φs
M
2
; aφ := sin2
(
φn
M
−φs
M
2
)
; and aλ :=
(
cos
(
φˆ
)
sin
(
λe
M
−λw
M
2
))2
.
This equation is based on the haversine formula, which gives great-circle distances
between two points on a sphere from their longitudes and latitudes using a spher-
ical approximation of the earth. If more precision is required, these distances may
be calculated using the ellipsoidal approximation described in the geodetic system
WGS84 [145]. However, for most practical purposes, the spherical approximation is
sufficiently precise.
Then P creates the corresponding presentation token TP and sends it to S. If Equa-
tion 4.2 does not hold, TP includes a predicate proof attesting that AM ⊆ AS without
revealing the actual values of AM . Otherwise, i.e., if Equation 4.2 holds, TP may
choose to reveal these values.
6. S verifies the validity of TP and its conformance to ψS . If the verification succeeds,
then S has evidence that P is located within AS
If user authentication involves the phone, the following additional steps may need to
be performed:
1. Prior to 4.4.2.1, U authenticates to P , or provides user authentication information
to S.
2. With 4.4.2.2, S sends a challenge toU .
3. With 4.4.2.5, P sends a response to S.
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Figure 4.2: Boundary-Based Verification. The Service Provider gives the Reference Area AS . A match occurs when
theMNO reports the phone to be located in an area AM ⊆ AS , which is the case for A1M but neither for A2M nor A3M
(cf. Equation 4.1).
4.4.3. Distance-based verification
Tomore efficiently verify aUser’s location, circular areas can be used instead of quadri-
lateral ones. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The Service Provider gives the Ref-
erence Area AS := (LS ,δ), where δ corresponds to the maximum distance that the mobile
phone is allowed to be from LS . Similarly, the MNO provides the Reported Area AM :=
(LM ,ǫ), where ǫ corresponds to the estimated measurement error. Geographical coordi-
nates are normally handled as latitude-longitude pairs and it is thus necessary to convert
them to cartesian coordinates as described in Section 4.2 accordingly. In this setting, in-
stead of Equation 4.1, the phone proves the following relation in TP :
√
(xM −xS)2+ (yM − yS)2+ (zM − zS)2+ǫ≤ δ (4.3)
Correspondingly, rather thanEquation 4.2, the criterion for decidingwhether theReported
Area can be disclosed to the Service Provider would be ǫ≥ τM .
Using circular areas instead of quadrilateral ones can be proved more efficiently with
anonymous credential systems because rather than four, there is just a single inequality
proof to be included in TP . This is because Equation 4.3 can be reformulated as:
(
xM
2+ yM 2+ zM 2−ǫ2
)
+
(
xS
2+ yS2+ zS2
)
+
(−2xS)xM +
(
−2yS
)
yM + (−2zS)zM + (2δ)ǫ≤ δ2
(4.4)
If theMNO certifies the values
(
xM
2+ yM 2+ zM 2−ǫ2
)
, xM , yM , zM , and ǫ as attributes in the
Location Credential, then the left side of Equation 4.4 has the form
∑n
i=1 ciai where the ci
are constants known to the service provider and the ai are attribute values certified by the
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Figure 4.3: Distance-Based Verification. The Service Provider gives the Reference Area (LS ,δ). A location match
occurs when the MNO reports the phone to be located at (L 1
M
,ǫ1) because the latter is never farther from LS than
δ. Conversely, as the mobile phonemay be farther than δ in all cases forL 2
M
or in some cases forL 3
M
, locations do
not match in these two cases (cf. Equation 4.3). Note that L 1
M
may not be disclosed to the Service Provider because
it violates the privacy parameter: ǫ1 < τM . In contrast L 2M may be disclosed because ǫ2 ≥ τM .
MNO. Given that all values are encoded as integers, this form can efficiently be proved with
anonymous credential systems (cf. Section 4.3.1).
When circular areas are used as per Equation 4.3, the shortest distance between the
expected and reported locations is calculated. This distance, however, does not follow the
curvature of the earth, as the arc-distance does. For distances below 100 km the difference
is within a meter. For distances of about 1’000 km the shortest distance underestimates
arc-distance by about 1 km, and for distances of about 10’000 km the underestimation
grows to about 1’000 km. Hence, the distance-based approach should not be used when
the locations are more than about 1’000 km apart. Even though it would be desirable to
replace the shortest distance with the arc-distance on an ellipsoidal approximation better
fitting the shape of the Earth [145], calculating these arcs (geodesics) involves trigono-
metric functions for which it is not known how to prove them in reasonable time with
anonymous credential systems.
4.4.4. Grid-based verification
Another method to control the degree of privacy when verifying a User’s location is
by using a coordinate system as basis, and letting the MNO certify each digit of the User’s
coordinates separately in Cloc . This way, the granularity of the location learned by the
Service Provider can be controlled by the number of digits disclosed in TP by the phone.
The more disclosed digits, the more accurate the location is.
There are a number of aspects to consider for this method. One aspect is the number
system in which the coordinates are represented. Assume one uses a u-ary system. Then,
the highest order digit splits an area in u parts, the second-highest order digit splits each
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of those parts again in u parts, etc. Of course, one could also use a mixed number system
to represent the coordinates, i.e., each digit could use a different u. Another aspect is
the coordinate system. For example, one could use the Universal Transverse Mercator
(UTM) coordinate system [186] or the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) [144], where
the latter uses east/north coordinates with different u values for the individual digits. In
particular, MGRS coordinates are represented as e1n1 e2n2 e3n3 where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,60}, n1 ∈
{C, . . . ,X}, e2 ∈ {A, . . . ,Z}, n2 ∈ {A, . . . ,V}, and e3,n3 ∈ {0, . . . ,99999}. The pair e1n1 is called
Grid Zone Designator (GZD), representing areas that are 6◦ latitude by 8◦ longitude. The
pair e2n2 represents 100 km squares within a GZD. Similarly, the pair e3n3 are squares of
up to meter precision within these squares. The precision depends on the numbers of
digits (between 0 and 5) and must be the same for both e3 and n3.
Compared to the two methods described previously, grid-based location verification
is more efficient because no predicate proofs about the attribute values need to be done.
Instead, the Reported Area is disclosed only to the granularity necessary so that the Service
Provider can rest assured that themobile phone resides within the Reference Area. In turn,
a disadvantage is that the grid is fixed, i.e., the Reference Areawill typically not be centered
around the location expected by the Service Provider. This also means that, depending on
the scenario, the Reference Area may have to be defined in terms of multiple grid sectors.
In this case, the Usermust disclose in which of the sectors he resides, which is detrimental
for the User’s privacy.
To use grid-based verification, the policyψS specifies the Reference Area by including
a description of the grid cell in which it expects the mobile phone to be located (instead
of requiring Eqs. 4.1 or 4.3 to be proved). For example, with the MGRS, this could be the
10km-precision grid cell 13S ED 0 9 in the city of Denver, Colorado, U.S. Subsequently, the
MNO certifies the Reported Area inCloc , e.g., as 13S ED 0085 9968, being a 10m-precision
grid cell. The phone then verifies whether the Reported Area is contained within the Ref-
erence Area. If so, it selectively discloses (cf. Section 4.3.1) only the minimally necessary
coordinate digits fromCloc in TP . For example, by disclosing the position only up to the
10km-precision grid cell 13S ED 0 9, the Service Provider can rest assured that the phone
is within the Reference Area.
4.4.5. Subscription billing
MNOsmay apply differentmodels of billing to their location certification service. In one
model, the costs of the location service are covered by the users (directly, or indirectly).
In another model, the benefiting service providers are charged for the service. Interest-
ingly, our privacy properties make it challenging to apply the latter model because of the
Service Unlinkability property (cf. Section 4.1). Nevertheless, anonymous credentials can
solve this problem if the MNO is willing to implement a subscription-based billing model:
service providers buy subscriptions for the location service and the MNO serves location
certification requests only if they are accompanied by a proof of ownership of a valid sub-
scription credential, without learning which service provider created the proof. For this,
a periodic setup phase is required in which M provides S with a Subscription Credential
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Csub and a template presentation policy ψM . Csub certifies an attribute expdate corre-
sponding to the expiration date of the subscription. After this date,Csub is no longer valid
and needs to be renewed by running the setup again. ψM requires a non-expired Sub-
scription Credential and contains placeholders for an unpredictable number and a date.
Our protocol described in Section 4.4.2 would then be extended as follows:
1. With 4.4.2.2, S instantiatesψM with an unpredictable number and the current date.
Then it creates a presentation token TS fulfillingψM and sends it to P .
2. With 4.4.2.3, P forwards TS toM .
3. With 4.4.2.4, Cloc is issued to P iff TS is valid, fulfills ψM , the random number that
it includes has not been previously used by any token previously received byM , and
the date in TS is current.
4.4.6. Implementation andmeasurements
In this section we present the description and performancemeasurements of our pro-
totype implementation of the operations involving anonymous credentials. Using these
measurements, we then provide formulas for calculating the total time for location verifi-
cation including other operations such as communication overhead and the actual local-
ization of the mobile phone by theMNO.
Measurement setup
All credentials in our setup are based on Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures and
a 2048 bit RSA modulus. The measurements were performed on a Virtual Machine (VM)
with 8 GB RAM in a local OpenStack compute cloud with a KVM hypervisor, which VM
had assigned an Intel Xeon E5-2620 v2 processor clocked with 2.1 GHz. We used the ABCE
v1.1.38, which in turn uses IBM Identity Mixer v3.0.38, which are both single-threaded.
For boundary-based location verification, we use the U.S. state of Colorado as Refer-
ence Area, i.e., (41◦,37◦,−102.05◦,−109.05◦). The Reported Area was chosen such that it
contains the approx. 170 squaremeter block of houses in which theMarriott hotel in Den-
ver, Colorado, U.S., is located, i.e., (39.747708◦,39.746153◦,−104.989776◦,−104.991797◦).
For distance-based verification, we use (LC ,δC ) as Reference Area, where LC cor-
responds to the center of the U.S. state of Colorado, i.e., the location obtained from the
latitude-longitude pair (39◦,−105.55◦), and δC to 371’920m (the distance fromLC to each
of the four state’s corners). Thus, (LC ,δC ) corresponds to the smallest circular area that
fully encompasses Colorado. For the Reported Area we use (LM ,170m), where LM is
the location obtained from the latitude-longitude pair (39.747033◦,−104.989982◦), corre-
sponding to the location of the previously mentioned hotel. Unfortunately, for the ex-
pressions
∑n
i=1 ciai supported efficiently in inequalities (cf. Section 4.3.1), the latest im-
plementation of the ABCE only supports n = 1. Therefore, we could not measure the cor-
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Figure 4.4: Computation times for the steps in our protocol related to anonymous credentials. The depicted num-
bers are the median from 1’000 samples.
responding times precisely. However, because the computational cost of proving an in-
equality with n = 6 (cf. Equation 4.4) is only negligibly larger than for n = 1, we provide the
timings for the latter case.
For grid-based verification, as done in the example in Section 4.4.4, the Reported Area
is the 10m-precision MGRS grid cell 13S ED 0085 9968, corresponding to the cell where
the previously mentioned hotel is located. In total, for the Reported Area, the Location
Credential certifies seven easting digits and seven northing digits according to the MGRS
specification, where the unused ones are set to a designated null value. This allows for
precisions up to meter level. For the measurements, the first two coordinate digits from
the Reported Area (i.e., 13S ED) were disclosed.
Timings andmessage sizes
The results of our measurements for 1’000 samples are given in Figure 4.4. Credential
issuance takes around 1.6s. User Credential issuance is about 0.3s slower as it involves a
blind carry-over of the phone identifier from the Phone Credential.
When the Reported Area is not disclosed, credential presentation takes 2.7s for the
distance-based approach, and 5.7s for the boundary-based one. The latter is slower be-
cause it involves four inequality proofs (cf. Equation 4.1) rather than one (cf. Equation 4.4).
When the Reported Area is disclosed to the Service Provider, presentation takes about 2.0s
for the grid-based approach, and 1.6s for the other two approaches. In the grid-based
approach, the difference in timing when disclosing just one coordinate digit compared
to disclosing all seven digits is 0.1s. The timings for the grid-based approach could be
improved by several hundred milliseconds by encoding the coordinate digits as prime
numbers, rather than as integers and strings as we did. This is because such prime en-
coding [22] allows for a more efficient selective attribute disclosure. However, the Identity
Mixer version that we used does not support prime encodings.
Proving possession of a valid Subscription Credential from the Service Provider takes
around 1.8s. Validity here means that the credential’s expiration date is proved to be
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greater than (i.e., after) or equal to the current date.
In our setup, the total amount of data transferred in an issuance transaction of a single
credential is approx. 25 KB. The presentation policies are all around 6 KB in size. The
presentation tokens are between 20 and 175 KB. The more inequalities are proved by a
token, the larger it is.
Total timings
To determine the total time of our location verification mechanism, recall that an is-
suance transaction consists of four messages (cf. Section 4.3.1). A credential presentation
transaction simply consists of two messages (a request, and a response). Thus, location
verification accounts for sending six messages (one for providing the mobile phone with
the presentation policy containing the Reference Area, four messages to issue the Loca-
tion Credential containing the Reported Area, and one for providing the Service Provider
with the presentation token), plus the time it takes theMNO to locate the phone. Let send-
ing a message take tm and locating the phone tl seconds, both of which are expected to
be in the order of a few hundred milliseconds. Then, location verification takes in total
1.6+ tv +6tm + tl seconds, where tv = 5.7 for the boundary-based approach, tv = 2.7 for
the distance-based approach, tv = 2.0 for the grid-based approach, and tv = 1.6 when the
Reported Area is fully disclosed (for the distance and boundary-based approaches).
Depending on the scenario, some of the time-consuming steps may be done in paral-
lel with other tasks (e.g., initialization of a payment transaction). Also, we expect that us-
ing a parallelized implementation of the ABCE would speed up the anonymous credential
computations. For more accurate timings, all computation steps pertaining to the phone
would have to bemeasuredwith a dedicatedmobile platform ABCE implementation, which
does not yet exist. Even though we have performed our empirical measurements in the
environment described above, we do not expect the performance results obtained with
mobile devices to be significantly different. This is because current smartphones have
very capable processors and even cryptographic co-processors that can be leveraged to
speedup operations with anonymous credentials.
4.5. Usage scenarios
Point Of Sale (POS) payments
The Reported Area can be compared with the location of the POS, validating whether
the user’s mobile phone is in the vicinity of the POS.
Cash withdrawals
During a cash withdrawal, the location of the cardholder’s phone is expected to match
that of the cash machine. Otherwise it is likely to be a fraudulent transaction.
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Internet banking
It can be checked whether the location where the user connects from, e.g., obtained
using IP geolocation from the internet banking session, matches the Reported Area. This
works both when the user accesses the Internet banking application from her mobile
phone as well as from a secondary device, e.g., a PC. The location granularity may be large,
but of importance is only the trustworthiness of the Reported Area.
Physical access control
Allowing a person to physically enter some premises, e.g., a building, only if she is in
possession of her mobile phone and the phone is in the vicinity of the premises as indi-
cated by the Reported Area.
Car sharing/rental
A car only unlocks (potentially involving a remote car management center) when the
mobile phone of the person currently renting it is in its immediate vicinity.
Self-servicemail boxes
The mail box only allows opening if the mobile phone of the box’s user is in its imme-
diate vicinity.
Location-based data filtering
Due to privacy regulations, access to certain information may need to be restricted,
even for authorized parties, whenever they are outside of office premises or in a foreign
country. The location of their phone can be used to filter the data sent to them.
4.6. Communication
Message exchanges between themobile phone and the Service Provider in ourmecha-
nism can take place via the Internet, which can be accessed using themobile (cellular) net-
work or WiFi. Exchanges between the mobile phone and the MNO can also take place via
the Internet. Communication approaches such as Unstructured Supplementary Service
Data and binary short messages are unsuitable for our mechanism because the amount
of data that can be carried in a single message is insufficient for our purposes (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4.6). In the case of roaming, visited networks can be oblivious to operations involv-
ing anonymous credentials since these operations would be handled by the home MNO,
which in turn obtains the location information from the visited network using the estab-
lished roaming infrastructure, e.g., via Signaling System #7 messages [73].
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4.7. Location sources
There are several sources that can be used to resolve the location of a mobile phone:
IP geolocation, a GPS module, the WiFi infrastructure, and the mobile network infrastruc-
ture [19, 21]. Given that mobile users are frequently behind a router performing Network
Address Translation, IP geolocation is rather ineffective to precisely locate their phones.
The GPSmodule is the most accurate location source given that it is capable of provid-
ing location accuracy within a couple of meters from the actual location [209]. However,
for our purposes using the GPS has a set of drawbacks. From a security point of view, it
is known that the GPS satellite signals can be spoofed, leading the GPS module to report
invalid locations [120, 194]. Additionally, in situations where the GPS module was off, it
is necessary to wait tens of seconds to minutes for the first position fix after turning it
on (time-to-first-fix) [19]. This situation is slightly improved with assisted GPS (A-GPS),
but it nevertheless remains in the order of a few tens of seconds. To efficiently use (A-
)GPS, the GPSmodule must be active well in advance, which uses a considerable amount of
power and requires user intervention. Additionally, GPS inaccuracy is known to be large in
dense urban environments—andmore importantly—indoors, where getting a fix may not
be possible at all.
When the WiFi infrastructure is used as a location source, the phone gathers the list
of detected WiFi Access Points (APs) and sends this list along with the corresponding sig-
nal strength to a location server. Such a server contains a database of AP locations, thus
being able to estimate the location of the mobile phone, e.g., Skyhook [184]. The median
accuracy of this location source is empirically reported to range between 40 and 90m in
urban environments, being highly dependent on the density of APs and their inclusion in
the database [213]. In these environments, as well as indoors, WiFi positioning has been
found to provide better accuracy than GPS [212]. However, existing research casts doubts
on the trustworthiness ofWiFi positioning since it has been shown that APs can be spoofed
easily and the database of APs can be poisoned [195]. Additionally, the density of APs in the
vicinity of themobile phone, which albeit large in urban environments, decreases consid-
erably in rural or semi-rural environments.
When using the cellular network as a location source, there are two families of location
methods: handset-based and network-based [19, 21,209]. With handset-based, the phone
uses the signals received from a set of Base Stations (BSs) to calculate its own position. This
calculation is performed in the baseband processor, as opposed to the application pro-
cessor, where traditional apps are executed. With network-based, the signals sent by the
phone are used by one or several BSs to locate it. Crucially, the phone is involved in a fully
passive way since the application processor or other potentially compromised hardware
or software are not used. For instance, Uplink TimeDifference of Arrival (U-TDOA) is a stan-
dardized network-based location technique where the time difference of arrival of signals
sent from the phone and received by a set of neighboring BSs is used to locate the phone [1].
Given that the same signal is used by all involved BSs, this localization mechanism is hard
to subvert by compromising the phone. Additionally, using the location provided by the
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MNO is beneficial because cellular coverage is usually wider than WiFi, especially in rural
and semi-rural areas [212]. Also, cellular positioning usually works indoors and with vir-
tually any kind of mobile phone as neither a GPSmodule nor a WiFi radio are required. On
the downside, using the mobile network entails rather large inaccuracies, particularly in
rural areas with sparse coverage, where median accuracy is reported to be in the order of
hundreds of meters [209, 212]. In urban environments, especially if microcells are used,
the median accuracy can be in the order of tens of meters [139].
Location information is aggregated for app consumption by themobile phone OS from
different location providers using one or several of the aforementioned location sources.
This poses a threat not directly related to the sources themselves, but to the APIs to ac-
cess them. In particular, an attacker can include a location provider reporting fake lo-
cations [128, 174], create a fake virtual GPS module [104], install an app providing bogus
locations [43], or enable mock locations normally used for debugging purposes [49]. If
the attacker is able to take control of the mobile OS then location information can be tam-
pered with ease irrespective of the number of sources [214]. Interestingly, using any of
these strategies to feed fake location data to apps may actually be purposefully done by
legitimate users to protect the privacy of their location information from nosy apps [174].
To mitigate this threat, our mechanism obtains the Reported Area directly from the MNO,
effectively bypassing the location APIs.
4.8. Mechanism properties
Location unforgeability is of crucial importance since location information is only use-
ful as an authentication factor if it is trustworthy. Consequently, it is imperative that the
Reported Area cannot be spoofed or tampered with. To achieve this property, we rely on
the security properties of MNO-based localization, as well as the security properties of
anonymous credentials, both of which have been discussed already. To prevent replay
attacks, the Location Credential certifies a timestamp, which is also included in TP . An at-
tackermay try to influence location determination by compromisingmobile phone. Since
localization is being conducted by the MNO using the cellular signals, such a compromise
needs to target the baseband processor, which is harder to reach than the readily accessi-
ble application processor. We are aware of research where particularly crafted messages
sent using rogue BSs crash the receiving baseband processor [207]. However there are no
reported exploits leading to execution of arbitrary code, whichwould benecessary in order
to gain some influence in the computation of the mobile phone location MNO. However,
if a network-based localization technique such as the recommended U-TDOA is used, the
influence of such an attack is marginal at best because no computation takes place at the
mobile phone. Amore likely scenario consists of an attacker surreptitiously sending TP to
the Service Provider, either directly via the victim’s mobile phone, or relaying it from the
attacker’s phone. However, for this to work, the attacker has to (1) trigger the generation of
TP , (2) impersonate the victim in the user authentication protocol, and (3) for the victim’s
phone to be within the Reference Area, as otherwise AM 6⊆ AS . In fact, for small reference
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areas the attacker has to be in close proximity to the victim and the physical locationwhere
authentication takes place, thus potentially making the attack conspicuous and risky.
User binding is achieved by blindly carrying over the pid from the Phone Credential
into the User Credential, without the Service Provider learning it. Then, when the phone
generates the presentation token (cf. message 5 in Figure 4.1), it also proves that it owns
the User Credential, discloses the uid certified therein, and proves that pid in the User
Credential is the same as the one in the Location Credential—without actually disclosing
it. Our proposed approach effectively binds the Location Credential to the User Creden-
tial, and at the same time maintains Phone Identifier Privacy. Technically, this property is
maintained even in situations when the Service Provider and theMNO collude, because the
issuance and later usage of anonymous credentials is cryptographically unlinkable. Tim-
ing attacks, i.e., correlating the timing of the Location Credential issuance and the authen-
tication transaction to the Service Provider, however, are not prevented. In fact, if such a
collusion is intended, then it does not make sense to implement a privacy-preserving sys-
tem as described in this chapter and then make the effort to subvert it. Instead, the raw
(signed) location data can be used, which would achieve Location Unforgeability without
any of the privacy properties.
Reported area privacy is achieved by disclosing the values of the Reported Area to the
Service Provider only when such an area is within the Reference Area and its granularity is
larger than the one defined by the Minimal Disclosure Threshold. If the latter condition is
not met, then the mobile phone generates a predicate proof attesting that the Reference
Area is contained within the Reported Area without revealing the values of the Reported
Area itself.
Service unlinkability is achieved since the MNO does not obtain any information re-
garding the Service Providerwhen the LocationCredential is requested. In the subscription-
based model (cf. Section 4.4.5), this property is also achieved because TS only indicates
that it is related to a non-expired subscription without identifying the Service Provider.
The subscription-based model has the disadvantage that it does not allow imposing a
quota on how many location certification requests can be performed. Because of this,
in the next section we discuss a scheme based on e-coins that can be used to realize fine
grained billing while preserving the Service Unlinkability property.
If the mobile phone OS or its apps are compromised, then all information flowing
through it may be disclosed to unintended parties. Correspondingly, the privacy-related
properties (Reported Area Privacy, Reference Area Privacy, Phone Identifier Privacy, and
Service Unlinkability) could be broken, but the security-related ones (Location unforge-
ability and User binding) would be preserved.
There is an alternate—and simpler—way of performing location verification without
using anonymous credentials. Namely, the Service Provider would request a certificate
with the user’s mobile phone (coarse) location from the MNO. It would assert the validity
and freshness of the location certificate’s signature and check that it matches the Refer-
ence Area. However, this approach has two drawbacks: first, the Service Provider would
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need to know the user’s phone number to request the location certificate. Consequently,
the phone identifier privacy property would not be fulfilled. Second—and perhaps more
importantly—a malicious Service Provider could track the user by continuously request-
ing location certificates, thus failing to achieve the reported area privacy property. Such
tracking could be prevented by (1) seeking authorization from the user prior to issuing a
location certificate, and/or (2) including the Reference Area in the location certificate re-
quest received by the MNO. The MNO would only issue the location certificate if (the user
agrees and) the locations match. With the first alternative, the reported area privacy prop-
erty would be better achieved, but the usability one would be impaired. With the second,
the reported area privacy property would be fully achieved, but the reference area privacy
would not, given that the MNO would learn where the Service Provider expects the user to
be. In summary, our proposed mechanism based on anonymous credentials achieves the
full set of desired properties unlike the alternate solution based on simple digital signa-
tures.
4.9. Related work
We identify four proposals that are related to our mechanism. Marforio et al. [137] de-
scribe a smartphone-based mechanism using a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to
securely store a private key, which is used to sign the location of the mobile phone when
requested for verification. Their proposal builds on a TEE-based enrollment protocol [136],
and it is heavily focused on using location verification during payments, although other
usage scenarios such as transportation and building access are also mentioned. Their
proposal is similar to ours in that no user involvement is required for location verification,
it takes in the order of a few seconds to complete (making them unsuitable in practice
for applications requiring high throughput), they require Internet connectivity to perform
location verification, and are designed to withstand a powerful attacker capable of com-
promising the mobile phone OS, but fail when the adversary is in close proximity since
local relay attacks become possible. In this context, it is important to distinguish between
local relay attacks, where the attacker has to be physically close to the victim, thus facing
a higher risk of detection, and remote relay attacks, where the attacker can be arbitrarily
far, and is thus not facing such a risk. Unlike our proposal, theirs relies on the GPS mod-
ule with the advantages and disadvantages already discussed in Section 4.7. Furthermore,
their mechanism requires a phone architecture where the GPS module can be directly ac-
cessed by the TEE, which may not be the case if the only way to obtain location informa-
tion is via the untrusted OS location APIs. More importantly, we consider that requiring a
TEE is too strong a requirement based on our discussion about TEEs in the context of NFC
payments (cf. Section 2.4, page 19). Finally, while their proposal does not provide any
technical mechanism to protect the users’ privacy, ours incorporates a privacy-by-design
approach.
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Park et al. [156] propose a mechanism where credit card companies query the MNO
for the user’s current location to be subsequently forwarded to the mobile phone for user
verification. Similar to the work of Marforio et al. [137], their proposal is focused on pay-
ments and uses the GPSmodule to obtain the current location that is shown to the user for
verification. Unlike the work of Marforio at al. [137] and our proposal, their protocol fails
when the attackermanages to compromise themobile phone, e.g., usingmalware to spoof
the current location, or simply bypassing the verification prompt altogether. Furthermore,
their proposal requires the user to manually verify the location provided by the MNO with
the one provided with the GPSmodule. We consider this disadvantageous as it contradicts
the Usability property and, more fundamentally, because unnecessary and obtrusive user
prompting is distracting and counterproductive to security [79]. Finally, unlike our pro-
posal, theirs provides little privacy protection.
The proposals by Saroiu et al. [175] and by Luo et al. [131] are also related. They both
depend on neighboring WiFi APs to issue location proofs. These are signed statements of
the location of the AP, used as trustworthy approximations of the phone’s location. Both
proposals depend on the availability of APs capable of generating such proofs. In Saroiu’s
proposal, the location proof consists of a traditional digital signature, while in Luo’s it is
based on group signatures [47]. In both cases, the app running on the mobile phone is
responsible for validating the location proof and is therefore vulnerable to attackers able
to compromise apps or the phone’s OS. Similarly, both schemes are also vulnerable to
local and remote relay attacks. Saroiu’s proposal does not provide a clean distinction be-
tween user authentication and (location-based) device authentication and has no privacy-
preserving features. In this regard, Luo’s proposal seems better since it preserves the pri-
vacy of both the user and the WiFi infrastructure.
There is a large body of literature suggestingmechanisms to prevent cheating in geoso-
cial networks. Users of these networks receive rewards from frequenting certain places,
e.g., shops or restaurants. Therefore, it may be beneficial for the users to gain the rewards
without being in those locations, which gives them amotivation to cheat. Mechanisms to
prevent such cheating have beenproposed, where peers in the vicinity vouch for the actual
location of the users’ phones [86, 216]. While these mechanisms are useful for geosocial
networks, we deem dependence on neighboring peers as too strong a requirement for our
purposes. Furthermore, collusion attacks in these schemes are possible when the num-
ber of confederates surpasses a certain threshold. Some other mechanisms leveraging the
WiFi infrastructure orQuick Response (QR) codes thatmust be read by themobile phone to
ensure physical presence [42,104], are vulnerable to local and remote relay attacks. Finally,
widely usedmechanisms to ensure privacy in geosocial networks such as coarse granular-
ity, relative distance and localization coverage limit have been shown to be vulnerable to
rather simple attacks (such as iterative trilateration and space partition) without requiring
attackers more powerful than any other network user [128].
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4.10. Future work
Privacy and efficiency can be further improved by letting the user influence the size of
AM so that the MNO generates the largest AM such that AM ⊆ AS . The challenge here is to
influence AM such that both the User’s privacy requirements (e.g., as defined by τM ) and
the Service Provider’s location requirements are met.
Location accuracy could be improved by leveraging (but not requiring) other location
sources when requestingCloc . If themobile phone has access to a precise location source,
it can send the corresponding location data to theMNO as part of the location certification
request (cf. Section 4.4.2.3). Although this data should not be trusted by the MNO, it can
be used to reduce the error of the Reported Area if it falls within the accuracy error of the
calculated location.
Both the service unlinkability property and performing fine grained billing could be
achieved by implementing a scheme based on e-coins [38]. The general idea consists of
the Service Provider purchasing untraceable e-coins from the MNO. Then, when a mo-
bile phone requests the Location Credential, it sends a coin that it has received from the
Service Provider along with ψS . Upon receiving this information, the MNO issues the cor-
respondingCloc iff the coin has not been used before.
Finally—on the implementation side—the IBM IdentityMixer library and theAttribute-
Based Credential Engine (ABCE) need to be ported and optimized for mobile platforms.
This will allow obtaining precise performance and location accuracy measurements by
involving an MNO and using off-the-shelf mobile devices. We are unaware of any ABCE im-
plementation on mobile platforms even though the IBM Identity Mixer (Java) library can
be used on the Android platform with little modification, as done by Maganis et al. [133].
Chapter 5
Companion device-based
transaction security
Abstract. Widespread usage ofmobile devices in conjunction withmalicious software
attacks calls for the development of mechanisms that ensure both strong authentica-
tion and transaction security. This means that the entities participating in a transac-
tion convincingly prove to one another that they are who they claim to be, and that
transaction information cannot be changed or reused by a malicious entity.
This chapter focuses on these areas, which constitute the second main topic of this
doctoral thesis. In particular, we contribute the design of a trusted companion device,
the Mobile ZTIC, intended to detect and prevent attackers from changing or injecting
transactions, even if they manage to compromise the mobile device. We discuss and
evaluate various options for the communication between mobile and companion de-
vices in terms of technical feasibility, usability and cost. Finally, we describe the de-
velopment of our two prototypes and the results that we obtained with them towards
demonstrating the feasibility of our approach*.
W
E start this chapter describing the Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC) in
Section 5.1. Then we define ourMobile ZTIC concept as an extension of the ZTIC
in Section 5.2. In particular, we state its goals and constraints in Section 5.2.1,
possible ways to connect it to the mobile device in Section 5.2.2, and related work in Sec-
tion 5.2.3. Then we describe the Touch ZTIC, our first prototype based on the optical and
haptic (i.e., touch) interfaces, in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 we present the Audio ZTIC, our
second prototype based on the connected audio interface. We conclude this chapter by
outlining future work in Section 5.5.
5.1. The Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC)
The ZTIC provides a physically separate trusted and tamper-evident secure commu-
nication endpoint. The ZTIC is a device about the size of a memory stick consisting of a
System-on-Chip (SoC), an embedded display, two buttons (confirm/reject), a rotary wheel,
* The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: Ortiz-Yepes, D., Hermann, R., Steinauer, H., Buhler,
P. Bringing strong authentication and transaction security to the realm of mobile devices. In: Cybersecurity for a
Smarter Planet © 2014 by International Business Machines Corporation, IBM J. RES &DEV. VOL. 58 NO. 1 PAPER
4 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2014 [154].
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a smart card reader, and a USB device interface. It is used by several banks to ensure that
their eBanking services can be securely used from PCs [205, 206]. The ZTIC was developed
by members of the BlueZ Business Computing group at ZRL. The author is affiliated with
this group as a software engineer, thus being actively involved at later stages of the devel-
opment of the ZTIC. In particular, hemade some contributions to its firmware, architected
and developed the automated firmware testing framework; supported customer (i.e., usu-
ally banks) integrations, and built a usage mode where the ZTIC is used to validate the
integrity of documents that are then digitally signed using the ZTIC.
The ZTIC firmware consists of a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) wrapping the drivers
for the display, buttons, rotary, smart card reader, and USB interface. On top of the HAL,
service components, such as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) engine, Custom File Sys-
tem (CFS), graphics engine and secure persistent store, provide the building blocks for the
application logic. The ZTIC firmware implementation intentionally forgoes the use of an
embedded OS to minimize the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
When connected to a PC, the ZTIC presents itself as a USB Mass Storage Device (MSD).
The CFS hosts two files: a read-only ZTIC Proxy executable, which can be run on the PC,
and a file enabling the execution of the proprietary protocol between ZTIC Proxy and ZTIC
via read/write operations. Any other operations on the CFS are ignored, in particular, any
attempts to create or delete files. As a result, attacks on the ZTIC via its external interface
are infeasible.
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User PC 
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Figure 5.1: Operation of the ZTIC (left) and the Mobile ZTIC (right). Components, connections and interfaces
shaded in green are trusted whereas those shaded in red may be compromised by an attacker.
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The ZTIC is capable of establishing mutually authenticated TLS sessions to the server
(cf. Section 6.1, page 92), thus protecting against phishing, Man In The Middle (MITM) at-
tacks, and malware such as Man In The Browser (MITB) attacks [199]. The TLS sessions
can be used to securely interact with security-critical remote services, such as application
services (e.g., an eBanking service) and maintenance services (e.g., provisioning of new
firmware and/or certificates).
The components involved when the ZTIC is used are illustrated on the left-hand side of
Figure 5.1. Neither the connection between the web browser and the eBanking Server nor
what is shown on the PC display can be trusted because the User PCmay be compromised.
The connection between the ZTIC and the eBanking server cannot be compromised by the
attacker because both endpoints are outside of his control. Therefore, the server can use
the ZTIC to explicitly ask the user to confirm the integrity of sensitive pieces of information
received via the browser connection. In case of an attack, the user will notice that the
information that she entered on the PC does notmatch the information shown on the ZTIC,
thus preventing the attack from completing successfully.
From a data-flow point of view, there are two possible modes of operation: in-stream
and side-stream. With in-stream operation all application data is exchanged via TLS ses-
sions ending in the ZTIC, with any parts concerning the application running on the PCbeing
forwarded to the PC by the ZTIC and any security-critical parts retained and processed in
the ZTIC. With side-stream operation, application data is exchanged via two logically sep-
arate paths: the TLS session between PC and remote server and the TLS session between
ZTIC and remote server. When the application enters a security-critical part, such as the
confirmation of a transaction, the server uses the TLS session to the ZTIC to interact with
the user. In the remainder of this chapter this type of operation is used on security and
efficiency grounds. Since the ZTIC only focuses on the security-critical part of the infor-
mation exchange, its software is simpler to understand, audit, and maintain (a security
advantage). Since the bulk of the data exchange between the PC and the EBS bypasses the
ZTIC, the channel between the ZTIC and the PC is used frugally. In the case of USB efficiency
is not so important since bandwidth is abundant. However, it is paramount when using
interfaces such as haptic, optical and audio (as with the Mobile ZTIC) since they provide
very limited bandwidth.
The prototypical usage of ZTIC is as follows:
1. The user connects the ZTIC to her PC via the USB interface and starts the ZTIC Proxy
residing on the ZTIC file system. The ZTIC Proxy relays data packets between the ZTIC
and the EBS providing the ZTICwith network connectivity.
2. The ZTIC Proxy commands the ZTIC to establish a TLS session with the EBS using mu-
tual authentication based on server certificates previously provisioned to the ZTIC
(pinned certificates). As the TLS session endpoints are the EBS and the ZTIC, eaves-
dropping or purposefully manipulating the exchanges in the user’s PC or anywhere
in the network is prevented.
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3. The ZTIC requests the user to insert her eBanking smart card into its smart card
reader and to enter the smart card PIN. Upon correct entry, it opens a session to
the card and sends the card number to the server.
4. The browser establishes a TLS connection to the EBS. In contrast to the TLS session
terminating in the ZTIC, this TLS session is vulnerable to locally or remotely executed
MITM or locally executedMITB attacks.
5. The user performs the login operation via the browser interface using her user ID.
Then, the EBS sends a challenge to the ZTIC, which interacts with the smart card to
compute a response to the challenge and sends the results back to the EBS. If the re-
sponse validates, the EBS accepts the eBanking application session from the browser
and binds the two TLS sessions using the card number and the user ID. Otherwise, it
terminates both sessions.
6. When the user submits a transaction via the browser’s eBanking interface, the EBS ex-
tracts the relevant transaction details and sends them to the ZTIC for user authoriza-
tion, which involves displaying the transaction details on the ZTIC display and asking
the user to verify them. If the user agrees and presses the confirm button, a crypto-
graphic signature is computed on the smart card and sent back to the EBS as evidence
of the user’s acceptance. If the user notices a discrepancy between the transaction
details entered via the browser and those displayed on the ZTIC, she presses the reject
button, which is reported to the EBS and aborts the transaction.
Malware might eavesdrop and even attempt to manipulate bank transfers submitted
by the user, but these would be detected during the authorization step (6). In particular, it
is impossible for the attacker to mask his manipulations in the authorization request sent
from the EBS to the ZTIC, because any such attempt would break the TLS connection and
implicitly abort the transaction.
For PIN entry, several mechanisms exist that vary in terms of security versus usability:
the safest is PIN entry on the ZTIC using the rotary wheel. Alternatively, a scheme could be
used where the user encrypts her PIN and enters it on the PC. At each occasion, she uses a
different substitution cipher, whose code table is displayed on the ZTIC [129]. As another
alternative, the PIN can be entered in the clear on the PC, but its use must be explicitly
approved by the user by pressing the confirm button on the ZTIC.
5.2. TheMobile ZTIC
Security-sensitive operations performed on mobile devices deserve the same level of
protection as those performed on PCs, and therefore the use of an additional trusted de-
vice like the ZTIC is equally justified. Particularly, given that malware inflicting detrimental
consequences for users—often financial—is increasingly present in mobile devices [4, 45,
81, 100, 119, 135]. The concept of the ZTIC can readily be adapted for mobile devices as il-
lustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 5.1. There we show an architecture in which the
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Banking apphandles both connections to the EBS. User interactionwith the EBS is executed
within that app by theBanking view (Webview), and the relay function—provided in the PC
by the ZTIC Proxy—is accomplished by the ZTICHandler. The fundamental course of action
during a user login or bank transfer operation remains as described above for the ZTIC, as
does the integration with the EBS. Like the PC, the mobile device is considered untrusted.
The server can use theMobile ZTIC to explicitly ask the user to confirm the integrity of sen-
sitive pieces of information received via the untrusted connection to themobile device. In
case of an attack, the user will notice that the information she entered on the mobile de-
vice does not match the information shown on theMobile ZTIC, thus preventing the attack
from completing successfully.
5.2.1. Objectives
Security objectives
The main goal of the Mobile ZTIC is to provide strong authentication of entities and
information exchanged between them in the presence of a local active attacker capable of
compromising the PC or the mobile device [124]. This implies that any ongoing attack can
be detected by the user and the operation interrupted and aborted prior to any damage
occurring. In other words, the attack is not eliminated, but it is prevented from running
to successful completion. This main goal can be decomposed into the following set of
objectives, which consider the user (U ) accessing the server (S):
1. User Authentication: S can ensure thatU is actuallyU and notU ′, withU ′ being an
attacker trying to impersonateU towards S.
2. Server Authentication:U can ensure that S is actually S and not S′, with S′ being an
attacker trying to impersonate S towardsU .
3. Integrity of sensitivemessages S→U : If S sends a sensitive piece of information ISU
toU , andU receives I ′SU , then ISU = I ′SU .
4. Integrity of sensitive messagesU → S: IfU sends a certain piece of sensitive infor-
mation IUS to S via her computing device, and S receives I
′
US , then IUS = I ′US .
5. Freshness of messages: Messages are structured in a way that enables the recipient
to detect whether the samemessage IUS or ISU has been sent more than once.
The combination of the latter three goals, e.g., integrity of sensitive messages (in both
directions) and freshness of messages, are what we refer to as transaction security.
TheMobile ZTIC satisfies these goals as follows: User authentication (1) is achieved by
requiring the user to enter a PIN to unlock the smart card credentials involved in the log-in
operation. Server authentication (2) is achieved by the validation of the server certificate
taking place on the Mobile ZTIC. Integrity of sensitive messages S → U (3) and freshness
of messages (5) follow from the integrity and freshness properties of the TLS connection
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between theMobile ZTIC and the server. Integrity of sensitivemessagesU → S (4) is achieved
by letting the server show I ′US on the Mobile ZTIC’s display for the user to ensure that it
matches IUS .
Additional objectives
Aside from security, also convenience and usability are important when developing a
security mechanism [2,79,87]. Specifically, the operation needs to be easy and must have
a straightforward interaction pattern.
Requiring the user to carry and handle an additionalMobile ZTIC to achieve the desired
level of security is challenging. Care must be exercised to make the companion Mobile
ZTIC ergonomic. Absolute and relative size matters: it cannot be expected that users carry
a companionMobile ZTIC the same size of the mobile device. A good and sufficiently large
display readable under daylight conditions is imperative. It should accommodate the val-
idation of security-relevant transaction information without needing to scroll. As the user
must alternate between the mobile device and the companionMobile ZTIC, it is desirable
that the companion Mobile ZTIC attaches itself firmly to the mobile device in such a way
that the user does not need to hold it and that its display is always readable. Such attach-
ment must be mechanically stable, avoiding a Mobile ZTIC that dangles from the mobile
device. The orientation of the displayed content shown in the companion Mobile ZTIC
should match that of the mobile device. Ideally, the companion Mobile ZTIC should be
visually appealing, and feel robust and of high-quality-build.
Additionally, for the Mobile ZTIC to be successful in the market cost constraints must
be met. Typically, the user will get this companion Mobile ZTIC from her bank for free or
at reasonable cost. In either case, there is considerable pressure from the bank to keep
Mobile ZTIC cost low. In the first case, the cost to the bank for rolling-out a solution scales
linearly with the number of clients using internet banking. In the second case, it is also in
the bank’s interest to offer theMobile ZTIC at a price that will be widely accepted by clients
for the benefit of increased security and usability.
Finally, it is important for theMobile ZTIC to work with as many mobile device makes
and models as possible. Developing a niche solution customized for a certain manufac-
turer or mobile device model would reduce the effectiveness of the security solution by
restricting the set of mobile device users that can profit from it.
5.2.2. Communication options
The crucial issue when bringing the ZTIC concept into the mobile device realm lies in
how the communication between the mobile device and theMobile ZTIC is accomplished.
The nature and quality of service of this communication link directly impact the security
mechanisms that can be implemented on top of it. For instance, it may not be feasible
to run a TLS connection on top of communication links that operate only intermittently
(e.g., NFC) or that offer limited bandwidth (e.g., on the order of hundreds of bytes per sec-
ond). In these cases, a message-based security protocol must be used to ensure integrity,
5.2. TheMobile ZTIC 63
authenticity and confidentiality of the data exchanges between EBS and Mobile ZTIC. For
instance, a protocol relying on pre-shared keys using symmetric cryptography could be
used.
A bidirectional connection between Mobile ZTIC and EBS can be established either di-
rectly or via the mobile device. A direct connection would offer the highest versatility be-
cause the Mobile ZTIC could be used with all mobile device models, even with traditional
PCs. Such a direct connection could be achieved by fitting theMobile ZTIC with a Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) or cellular radio. In both cases, a dependence on signal/net-
work availability results. Also, the price of these radios is in the range of tens of dollars,
which is an order of magnitude higher than the price of the most expensive ZTIC compo-
nents . These radios would require theMobile ZTIC to be fitted with a large battery or the
user to frequently recharge the battery, thus diminishing the convenience of the mecha-
nism. In the case of a WLAN connection, no recurring costs arise, but configuring it on the
Mobile ZTIC can be cumbersome owing to the limited user interface of the Mobile ZTIC. A
connection over the cellular data network requires little to no configuration, but would
entail additional recurring costs to be borne either by the user or the server provider.
Instead of a direct connection betweenMobile ZTIC and EBS, an indirect connection can
be established through themobile device as illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 5.1.
Such a connection enables the mobile device’s Internet link to be reused to reach the EBS.
Thus only a local communication link between Mobile ZTIC and mobile device needs to
be implemented. It is important therefore to assess possible interfaces to be used by the
Mobile ZTIC to realize this link. In particular, we consider:
Universal Serial Bus (USB)
Increasingly mobile devices have USB host or USB On-The-Go (OTG) functionality, al-
lowing them to handle USB devices. Some of these mobile device models have propri-
etary “dock" connectors instead of standard USB connectors, requiring custom cables or
adapters, which imposes a usability penalty. However, themajority of mobile devicemod-
els still do not provideUSB host functionality. In the case of one of themost popularmobile
device manufacturers, access to the USB APIs is subject to legal agreements [8].
Bluetooth
The Bluetooth Serial Port Profile (SPP) can be used to exchange information between
Mobile ZTIC and mobile device. High power consumption and the prerequisite of device
paring—formanyusers a cumbersomeprocess—negatively affects the convenience of this
mechanism. Even though Bluetooth is widespread, there are mobile device models that
ship without it, do not support the SPP, or–in the case of onemobile device manufacturer–
requires legal agreements and additional hardware to access the Bluetooth functionality.
Furthermore, having an unattached companion device creates usability problems when
the user needs to simultaneously hold and operate the mobile device and theMobile ZTIC
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without a surface to rest at least one of the devices. The Bluetooth 4.0 specification con-
tains a feature called Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) addressing the high power consumption
typically associated with traditional Bluetooth (cf. Section 7.1, page 114). This feature is
appealing for our purposes not only because it is designed to save power, but also because
it requires neither legal agreements nor additional hardware on any platform. Unfortu-
nately, at the time this work was performed Bluetooth 4.0 was rather new and supported
only by the newest mobile device models.
Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC provides a standardized contactless interface for bidirectional communication.
Despite the increase in NFC-enabled mobile devices shipped in the past few years [15],
there are many mobile devices that do not support it, or support it but do not provide APIs
to use it from apps. Additionally NFC requires the devices to be held in close proximity
which can be cumbersome over long periods of time. Furthermore most mobile devices
have the NFC antenna in the back which makes it difficult to simultaneously observe the
displays of the mobile device and theMobile ZTIC.
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
The mobile device can share its cellular data Internet connection with theMobile ZTIC
viaWLAN (connection tethering). Besides the drawbacks ofWLAN already outlined, this has
the additional disadvantage that it only works when the mobile device connects to the
Internet via cellular data.
Magnetometer
Information can be transmitted from theMobile ZTIC to the mobile device by perturb-
ing the magnetic field in the immediate vicinity of the mobile device. This mechanism is
strongly susceptible to environmental conditions.
Haptic interface
TheMobile ZTIC can communicate with themobile device via the touch interface (hap-
tic communication) by stimulating certain spots in the mobile device’s touch screen sen-
sor. Touch screens are pervasive on mobile devices, and therefore this interface is an in-
teresting candidate for implementing theMobile ZTIC.
Optical interface
Information can be transmitted from themobile device to theMobile ZTIC by rendering
images on the mobile device’s display. A wide variety of still image information encodings
exist including the ubiquitous bar codes and the increasingly popular Quick Response (QR)
5.2. TheMobile ZTIC 65
codes. This method is typically used to transmit a fixed amount of information in a single
exchange, and therefore is not suitable for streaming of information.
Flickering in contrast canbe achievedusing simple and low-cost sensors such as photo-
transistors to detect luminance changes on the surface of a display. Information can be
encoded in many different ways the simplest being “on-off"-keying changing display ar-
eas between black andwhite. The dynamic behavior of flickering enables the transmission
of arbitrary sizes of information limited only by the bandwidth and available time.
The optical interface can be combined with an interface in the other direction (Mobile
ZTIC→mobile device), e.g., magnetometer or the haptic interface, to achieve bidirectional
communication between these devices.
Audio
The audio interface is the most pervasive human-to-machine interface in mobile de-
vices. It is essential for making calls, playing/recording sounds, and gathering voice com-
mands. The audio interface can be used in two distinct modes: coupled and connected.
Coupled mode entails fitting the Mobile ZTIC with a microphone and a speaker, plac-
ing it in the vicinity of the mobile device and allowing them to exchange information by
playing and recording sounds without connecting them. As it is undesirable for the au-
dio conversation to be actually heard, high frequencies (ideally around or above 20 kHz)
have to be used. This mode has the advantages that it requires no physical connection
and is available on virtually any mobile device. On the other hand, the communication
channel is subject to environmental interference/noise in the frequency band used. Also,
even though somemobile device speakers andmicrophones are known to have frequency
responses beyond 20 kHz, some audio-processing circuits or firmware may discard such
frequency components to reduce noise and aid the compressibility of the signal.
Using the connected audio interface to exchange data betweenmobile device andMo-
bile ZTIC entails physically connecting these devices. The mobile device receives informa-
tion from the Mobile ZTIC using its microphone input and send information via its head-
phone output. The mobile device’s microphone input and headphone output are most
frequently combined in the 3.5-mm Tip-Ring-Ring-Sleeve (TRRS) audio jack. Establishing
such a physical connection provides isolation from the environment. Moreover, the audio
interface on theMobile ZTIC side can be built with inexpensive components.
A comparison of possible interfaces to connect Mobile ZTIC and mobile device is pre-
sented in Table 5.1. The rows of the table contain the communication options discussed
below, and the columns rate them with respect to a selected set of relevant criteria to ob-
tain an overall comparative scoring. The rating indicated by ‘+’s and ‘–’s expresses to what
extent a communication option achieves the desired criteria. Security is not taken into ac-
countwhen evaluating the choice of interfaces becausewe assume the communication in-
terfaces to be untrusted and, therefore, all security shall be built on top of them. Columns
should not be compared, considering that rankings are qualitative and relative. There is no
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clear “winner" from the information provided in the table. The best-scoring alternatives
are USB and connected audio. We decided against USB because at the time of writing the
support for this interface was incipient on mobile devices and it was our goal to achieve
the largest possible mobile device coverage, even with our prototype. Consequently—due
to the their pervasiveness—we decided tomake use of the haptic and optical interfaces on
our first prototype (the Touch ZTIC, described in Section 5.3), and connected audio on our
second prototype (the Audio ZTIC, described in Section 5.4).
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USBHost/
USB-OTG
+ – – + + + + ++
WLAN + + – – + + – – – –
Bluetooth + + – – + + – – – –
BLE + – – + + – –
NFC + – – + + + – +
Haptic/
Optical
– + – – – – + +
Magneto-
meter/
Optical
– + + – – – – +
Connected
audio
– ++ + + – + ++
Coupled
audio
– +++ + – – – + +
Table 5.1: Comparison of the interfaces considered to connect Mobile ZTIC andmobile device.
5.2.3. Related work
Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) tokens, which generate a digital signaturewhen a button on
the token is pressed, were initially designed to be connected to PCs via USB. Due to the in-
creasing relevance of mobile devices, the FIDO specifications have recently added support
to use Bluetooth, BLE, andNFC to connect these tokens tomobile devices [85]. Other tokens
that generate One Time Passwords (OTPs), e.g., SecurID [68], do not need to be connected
to the PC/mobile device since the user is expected to type in the OTP. The main shortcom-
ing of any of these tokens is that they provide insufficient protection against MITM/MITB
attacks [149, 176]. Furthermore, they do not provide transaction security since it is pos-
sible for malware to intercept the signature (or OTP) bound to one, valid, user-initiated
transaction, and use it with a malicious one. Similarly, Mobile TANs (mTANs), i.e., OTP sent
to mobile devices via SMSs or other push mechanisms, have been shown to be vulnerable
to malware running on the mobile device [81,119].
Mechanisms that generate responses to a given server-generated challenge, such as
5.3. The Touch ZTIC 67
Mastercard’s Chip Authentication Program (CAP) and Visas’s Dynamic Passcode Authen-
tication (DPA), have the drawback that in most cases the relationship of the challenge to
the transaction details is not evident to the user, making these mechanism vulnerable to
MITM/MITB attacks [149]. Naturally, if all the relevant transaction details are re-entered
to compute the response, the feasibility of such attacks is dramatically reduced, but this
comes at the price of diminishing convenience.
Other mechanisms aim to provide transaction security by displaying a machine read-
able code containing encrypted details of a transaction, which can be read using a sec-
ondary device. The secondary device has a built-in camera to scan the code, which it
then decodes and shows on its display. If the additional device consists of a mobile de-
vice provisioned with the code-reading app [190], then the mechanism is not usable if the
user accesses the remote service from that mobile device. Moreover, it also fails to pro-
vide transaction security under the working assumption that the mobile devices running
the code-reading app is under control of the attacker. If a dedicated device is used, e.g., a
CrontoSign Device [55], then the level of security is comparable to that of our solution. In
terms of convenience this mechanism has the drawback that the user is required to man-
ually type the response on the mobile device, as the Machine-to-Machine (M2M) channel
is unidirectional from the mobile device to the dedicated device.
Square is a credit card magnetic stripe reader that enables the mobile device to re-
ceive credit card payments [188]. It sends the magnetic stripe information to the mobile
device using the 3.5-mm TRRS audio interface. It can be used with most iOS andmany An-
droid devices, but it is known not to work with several mobile devicemodels [187]. During
late stages of our work in this area we became aware of UniMate Flex from SecuTech, ad-
vertised as a two-factor authentication token with a hybrid audio/USB interface featuring
“PKI based digital certificate and private key storage" [179]. TheUniMate Flex pursues sim-
ilar goals as the work presented in this chapter. However, beyond the illustrations in the
website and marketing materials, we are not aware of the existence of an actual device.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be any information about developments using it or
piloting it.
5.3. The Touch ZTIC
The main goal of implementing a Mobile ZTIC prototype was to demonstrate the fea-
sibility of achieving the objectives described in Section 5.2.1. We focused on developing
a solution working with Apple iOS (version 5.0 or higher) and a set of four popular device
models running Android (version 4.0 or higher). In addition, we strove to design and de-
velop a solution that demonstrates that the resultingmechanismworks using only publicly
available APIs, without requiring native code or rooting/jail-breaking the mobile device.
Communication between the Touch ZTIC and the mobile device was implemented us-
ing the mobile device’s touch screen: the touch sensor (haptic interface) for input, and
the display (optical interface) for output. The rationale for this approach is the ubiquity,
accessibility and intuitive usability of touch screens in mobile devices. Simply placing the
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Touch ZTIC on the touch screen of the mobile device is a compelling interaction model as
compared to the inconveniences of having to use cables in the case of USB or having to pair
devices in the case of Bluetooth.
We started the development of the Touch ZTIC by studying the involved interfaces in
detail. Haptic interfaces are implemented in a number of different technologies including
capacitive, resistive, Surface-acoustic wave (SAW), infrared and optical. Mutual capaci-
tance touch screens—themost common type inmobile devices, and the ones we targeted
in our prototype—consist of an orthogonal mesh of drive lines and sense lines that span
the area of the screen. At each crossing point of a drive line and a sense line, a mutual
capacitance is formed between drive and sense line. The fringing field of the capacitance
extends beyond the surface of the touch screen. Objects brought in proximity and/or con-
tact with the touch screen surface influence this fringing field and effectively change the
value of the mutual capacitance at the crossing point. Provided there is an AC-coupling
return path into the mobile device through these objects, they change the charge distri-
bution across the mutual capacitance by “stealing" some of the charge, thus changing the
value of the mutual capacitance. These changes are evaluated by the touch screen driver
to decide whether a user has touched the display and higher-level algorithms interpret
the raw touches to decide the nature of the user’s interaction, such as discerning touches,
drags, and gestures.
There is a very important difference between a human and an object, such as theTouch
ZTIC, imitating finger touches. In the former case the user’s finger is in contact only while
interactingwith the touch screen, i.e., the humanuser provides the AC-coupled return path
from finger via its body and environment back to the mobile device only when the finger
actually touches the screen. In contrast, an object on the screen interacts with the touch
screen sensor as long as it conductive and remains on the screen. A mechanical system
can be used to lower/raise the conductive parts to physically make/break contact with the
screen to exert/interrupt a touch. To increase the possible bandwidth by exertingmultiple
touches simultaneously, these conductive parts (i.e., contact pads) need to be indepen-
dently controlled. Such a mechanical system would be complicated, delicate, slow, and
expensive. As a consequence, we decided to exert/interrupt touches electronically using
switches: coupling the return-path to a contact pad to exert a touch, and decoupling it
to interrupt it. This way, there is no need for any moving parts and the Touch ZTIC should
remain “invisible" to the touch screen sensor whenever no pads are electronically coupled
to the return-path.
In summary, we determined the following four requirements for the Touch ZTIC design
to work with existing touch screen drivers:
1. Have an arrangement of contact pads of sufficient size imitate the human fingertips.
2. Have an AC-coupled return path to the mobile device when touches are exerted.
3. Use a set of controllable switches of sufficiently low capacitance connecting the con-
tact pads to the AC-coupled return path.
4. The overall ground area of the Touch ZTICmust fit the size of smart-phone screens.
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5.3.1. Description
We decided for the Touch ZTIC to have 6 touch channels, all sharing the same design
as depicted in Figure 5.2. At the front end, the design consists of the contact pads (J6 in
Figure 5.2) that can be switched to the Return Coupling Plane (RCP) via a digital control
(Finger 6 in Figure 5.2). The RCP is a solid copper plane of about 40mm x 48mm provid-
ing the AC-coupled return coupling path to the mobile device. The return-coupling path
established by the RCP can be complemented by the natural coupling via the user when
connected for instance to Touch ZTIC ground by touching the battery holder.
The switch is implemented via the biased series connection of collector-base junctions
of two high-performance bipolar transistors. This particular design was chosen to keep
the parasitic capacitance of the switch below the sensitivity of the touch-sensor driver,
which we found to interpret changes in mutual capacitance above about 5 pF as touches.
The chosen bipolar transistors exhibit a collector-base capacitance of only 0.04 pF, two
orders of magnitude below the threshold change.
Figure 5.2: Touch channel schematic.
At the transmitter side the optical channel there is the display, e.g., an LCD or OLED.
At the receiver side, there is a photo-detector and comparator that translates the binary
(black-to-white) luminance changes generated by the display into a digital signal suitable
for processing in the micro-controller. We decided for the Touch ZTIC to use flickering
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Figure 5.3: Optical channel schematic.
with simple on-off-keying for data transmission on 6 optical channels from the mobile
device to the Touch ZTIC. These channels implemented the design depicted in Figure 5.3,
whose front-end exhibits the classical non-inverting photo-detector circuit consisting of
a photo-transistor in series with a resistor. Light intensities of mobile device displays are
only moderate and therefore the operating current of the photo-transistors remain on the
order of micro-amperes. In order to translate these small currents into useable voltage
changes, the load resistor (R26 in Figure 5.3) has to be chosen high in the MΩ range. The
comparator-stage decouples the high-impedance front-end from the output and enables
adjustment of the triggering threshold via the voltage divider (R24 and R32 in Figure 5.3),
giving maximum flexibility for tuning the circuit.
The Touch ZTIC consists of the following set of stacked boards (shown in Figure 5.4):
Contact pad board The dimensions of this Printed Circuit Board (PCB) are 39mmx 47mm.
On one side, it has copper plates at the locations where the conductive rubber pads
are placed. Each plate has a plated-through via-hole to the other side of the PCB
where there is a solder point that is connected to the output of the switch on the
Control board. For the optical channels, holes through the PCB filled with plexiglas
pillars providing a light guide from the surface of the display screen through the
Contact pad board and up to the domes of the photo-transistors, which aremounted
on the bottom layer of the Control board.
Control board The dimensions of this board are 40mm x 48mm. Apart from the foot-
print of the photo-transistors and holes for wire-connecting the electrodes to the
switches on the top layer, the bottom layer of the PCB is all copper plated. This cop-
per area constitutes an AC-coupling plane back into the mobile device and thus
constitutes the RCP. The upper side has the electronics for the optical and touch
channels, the microcontroller (AVR32), and some sockets to match the headers on
the Power board. It has a push-button on one side that allows resetting the micro-
controller and a 3-way switch on the other that selects the power source (battery or
external power).
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Figure 5.4: Board stack (above); Unpopulated Control board and Touch ZTIC case (below).
Power board The dimensions of this board are 40mm x 48mm. The upper side of the PCB
has a cell battery holder, the buttons and the status LEDs. The lower side has some
headers that match the sockets on the Control board. These headers are used to
provide power to the Control board as well as connections to themicrocontroller for
programming and debugging. A Molex connector allows it to be connected to the
Debug board.
Debug board This board allows connecting the Touch ZTIC to an external power supply,
the JTAG interface and an RS-232 serial interface. The board is optional and used for
development only.
The Touch ZTIC consists of stacking the Contact pad board, Control board, and Power
board together frombottom to top. The stack can be inserted in a plastic case with holes at
the bottomwhere the rubber pads and the plexiglass pillars leading to the photo-transistors
protrude. Figure 5.4 shows the Touch ZTIC board stack (above) and the assembled Touch
ZTIC (below).
5.3.2. Experiments
Even though the optical channel worked as expected, we did not achieve reliable com-
munication using the haptic interface on several mobile devices, i.e., we could tune it to
a particular mobile device but then it would stop working with others. Despite the Touch
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ZTIC prototype not having worked as expected, we have shown the limits of the haptic
interface with our experiments. By doing so, we are able to contribute valuable lessons
regarding usage of this interface to anyone intending to use it forM2M communication.
Readers interested in the “big picture" of this chapter can skip up to Section 5.3.4 (page
85), which presents a short summary of the issues encountered with the Touch ZTIC. In
the rest of this section we describe the most significant experiments conducted with the
Touch ZTIC. We used an iPad 1 (IPD), a Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 (SGT), an LG Optimus
Prime (LGOP), and a Samsung Galaxy Nexus (SGN) to conduct the tests. We defined three
test configurations, C1–C3, described in Table 5.2.
C1 C2 C3
Distance between
Contact pad board
and Control
board(mm)
6.7 0.9 6.7
Pad
arrangement
Semi-diamond pat-
tern; 8mm pad di-
ameter; 1mm pad
thickness.
L-pattern; 8mm pad diameter; 1mm
pad thickness (isolated pad at the lower
right not electrically connected to any-
thing, only provides stability when
placed on the mobile device surface)
Pad
pattern
Table 5.2: Test configurations.
All configurations used 2xAAA batteries in series connected on top of the Touch ZTIC
via button-cell adapter and were used outside the plastic enclosure. With respect to the
RCP, we have considered two scenarios:
• Stand-alone RCP: There is no connection between the user and the Touch ZTIC.
• Aided RCP: the user touches either the Touch ZTIC ground or coupling plane.
Pad design
The pad shape was defined a priori to be circular based on the contour of a fingertip
touching a flat surface. To determine the optimal size and separation of the pads, pairs
of metal disks with a thickness of 1mm, diameters of 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8mm; and axial stubs
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Figure 5.5:Metal disks used to determine a suitable pad size using the “Mirror" application on the IPD: activation
area with disks (above), resulting touches in the mirror area (below). Two 6mm discs (with their axial stubs) are
shown on the screen’s edge.
of 1mm x 10mm were used. The disks were placed at different distances of one another
(using a plastic matrix) on several mobile devices while touching their axial stubs with a
finger. An app was developed to display an activation area to place the disks (Figure 5.5,
above) and an equally sizedmirror area (Figure 5.5, below) to observe the touches detected
in the activation area.
It was found that the diameter of the contact pads should be at least 8mm to con-
sistently generate touche events across all mobile devices. The minimum separation be-
tween the disks creating distinct touch events was found to be about 4mm for disk sizes
of 8mm. Placing the disks closer runs the risk that the two touches are combined into a
single touch event.
The copper plates at the bottom of the Contact pad board (cf. Section 5.3.1, page 70)
have been covered with 1 mm thick conductive rubber pads [33], usually cut in circles
of 8mm diameter. These pads mediate between the plates and the mobile device touch
screen surface.
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Exercising single pads in sequence
In this experiment the pads were exercised in sequence, one after the other. Initially
all pads were off, i.e., all switches were open. Then the switch for pad 0 was closed for 125
msec and then opened again. After a pause of 125 msec the switch for pad 1 was closed
for 125 msec and then opened again, etc. Thus, touches across all pads were generated at
a frequency of 4 Hz with a touch duty cycle of 50%. When all pads had been exercised, all
pads were kept off for 2 seconds and then, the sequence was repeated.
When this experiment was run on the SGT in the stand-alone RCP scenario, frequently
not all touches registered on the screen of themobile device irrespective of the test config-
uration in use, the location of the Touch ZTIC on the screen, or its orientation. Some results
obtained with this experiment are illustrated in Figure 5.6.
Expected pattern Observed patterns (samples)
Figure 5.6: Results on the SGT, stand-alone RCP scenario. The patterns are horizontally mirrored with respect to
the arrangements shown in the figures of Table 5.2 because in these figures the pads face up, but when the Touch
ZTIC is used, they face down.
In the aided RCP scenario the results are consistent amongst themselves and better
than those in the stand-alone RCP scenario. Namely, in most cases the obtained touch
pattern matched the expected ones. These results suggest that establishing a conductive
path between the Touch ZTIC and the user, thus providing an additional return-coupling
path, improves touch reliability in a noticeable way on the SGT.
In some runs of the experiment it was observed that when the Touch ZTIC was lifted
from the screen, a “phantom touch" remained at theTouch ZTIC location. Such a “phantom
touch" persisted on the screen making it necessary to kill and restart the app. In some
cases it was even necessary to reboot the SGT because the user interface would become
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totally unresponsive due to the persistent “phantom touch".
Running this experiment on the IPD in the stand-alone RCP scenario yielded similar
results to the respective experiment with the SGT. Namely, not all the nominal touches
registered on the screen of the mobile device as expected, as illustrated in Figure 5.7.
Expected pattern Observed patterns (sample)
Figure 5.7: Results on the IPD, stand-alone RCP scenario.
In the aided RCP scenario (Figure 5.8) the registered touch patterns matched the ex-
pected ones in most cases. However, instead of appearing as single discrete touches, each
touch appeared as a touch begin event followed by one or several touch move events,
e.g., instead of discrete touches, the app registered drag events.
In Figure 5.8, the green cross-hairs represent the touch begin events and the red ones
the touch move events. With both configurations, the touches register in the vicinity of
their respective causative rubber pads forming clusters of touch events. In Figure 5.8a,
the touchmove clusters at locations 2 and 4 overlap, i.e., there are touchmove events that
fall far outside of the perimeter of their causative rubber pads. Discrimination between
touches under these circumstances becomes impossible. In Figure 5.8b most touches
also register in clusters at about the location of their causative rubber pads. However,
in both configurations the touch events corresponding to some locations fall far outside
the perimeter of their corresponding rubber pads. Discrimination between these touches
is problematic at best. To observe this, see the yellow circles in Figure 5.9.
Moreover, it is evident in figures 5.8b and 5.9 that not all touch locations have a unique
touch begin (green cross-hair). Particularly locations 2, 3 and 4 have two touch begins
each. Furthermore, there is a touch begin occurring far above pad 3 (circled in purple)
outside the confines of the Touch ZTIC itself. To further complicate things, it has also been
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observed that sometimes spurious touches appear on the screen even before the exercis-
ing sequence is executed, i.e., touches are registered with the switches being open.
Exercising pads in two groups of three
This experiment was executed using configuration C3. It consisted of the Touch ZTIC
turning on three pads (1, 4 and 6 as numbered in Figure 5.8b) leaving them in that state for
two seconds. Then they were turned off for one second after which the other three pads
(2,3 and 5) were turned on for two seconds. Then they were all turned off for one second,
repeating the cycle. Figure 5.10a shows the steps of this sequence.
When performed on the SGT in the stand-alone RCP scenario, not all touches registered
on the screen, consistent with the results of the previous experiment. In the aided RCP
scenario the sequence of touches registered was consistently as depicted in Figure 5.10b,
where it is evident that the registered second and fourth steps of the touch sequence fail
to match the corresponding phases of the expected sequence (Figure 5.10a). Evidently the
touches are not removed at the point in time where the one second pause starts but only
at the point where the new group of pads is turned “on". We believe this has to do with
the way the SGT handles multi-touch events: obviously different algorithms are at work
than when sequencing through single touches. While such human-centric interpretations
of touch patterns make sense for the use cases that touch screens are designed for, they
get in the way of using touch screens for M2M communication. Indeed, closer inspection
confirmed that three touches can always be observed on the screen regardless of the corre-
sponding switches being open. This phenomenon can be further confirmed by recording
all touches during a few runs of the test sequence, as depicted in Figure 5.11a. In this case,
only three discrete touches (red cross-hairs) are being reported to the application. Each of
these touchesmoves between two contiguous pad locations (gray cross-hairs) as the active
(a) C1. (b) C2.
Figure 5.8: Touch patterns registered on IPD, aided RCP scenario.
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Figure 5.9: Pad arrangement in configurations C2 and C3 (overlay).
(a) Expected touch phases
(b)Observed touch phases on the SGTand IPD, aided RCP scenario.
Figure 5.10: Exercising the electrodes in groups of three.
pads are changed, a behavior that clearly does not match the sequence being generated
by the Touch ZTIC.
When this experiment was executed on the IPD in the stand-alone RCP scenario, not
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all touches registered on the screen, consistent both with the SGT under this experiment,
as well as the IPD under the previous one. In the aided RCP scenario, the expected se-
quence (Figure 5.10b) was observed. However, while the locations of the touches in the
SGT are stable, in the IPD they tend to “wobble" (albeit seemingly within the perimeter of
the respective rubber pads). In any case, the “blank" phases between the groups of three
electrodes were also not observed. Figure 5.11b depicts a couple of runs of the experi-
ment on the IPD. It evidences that some of the touch transitions seem to be interpreted as
touch moves (lines between the cross-hairs), particularly some transitions between pads
3, 4 and 5. Locations 1 and 6 seem to be always interpreted as discrete touches, but are not
switched off until the Touch ZTIC has actually activated a pattern different than the previ-
ous one. Additionally, it has been found that after some iterations of the touch pattern,
the touches fail to be registered altogether by the mobile device. Most likely, this may be
attributed to the compensation algorithms implemented by the touch sensor controller.
Influence of the Contact pad board on themobile device
As a consequence of the results of the previous two experiments, we decided to assess
the isolated impact of theContact pad board (cf. Section 5.3, page 67) on themobile device
without the influence of any other electronic components such as the other boards and
the battery pack. For this purpose several Contact pad boards with different pad count,
arrangement and size were manufactured. The layouts of the boards used in the exper-
iment are shown in Figure 5.12. The copper pads on the bottom layer of the boards (in
contact with the mobile device) appear in blue, and the connecting via holes on the top
layer appear in red.
During the experiment (depicted in Figure 5.13) each board was placed on top of the
IPD and connected via a thin wire to a cardboard box measuring 60mm x 60mm x 10mm
wrapped in copper foil placed beside the mobile device. The expected outcome was that
upon placing the board on the screen, only the connected pad should generate a touch
event. Furthermore, as long as the board was on the screen, the touch should not disap-
pear.
(a)On the SGT. (b)On the IPD.
Figure 5.11: Observed touch sequence when exercising the electrodes in groups of three.
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When some test boards (e.g., APB1-8, APB2-8) were placed on the screen, the touch
generated by the connected pad was registered. The touch stayed—as expected—for as
long as the board remained on the screen. In contrast, when some other boards were
used (e.g., APB3-6, APB3-8), the corresponding touch was registered but after some time
(in the order of 10 seconds), it disappeared even though the board was still on the screen.
These results provide incontrovertible evidence that some boards with passive pads fail to
appear “invisible" to the touch screen sensor. Without such “invisibility", it is very difficult
to achieve a reliablemechanism to transmit information from the Touch ZTIC to themobile
device with more than two pads.
Flickering experiments
The flickering channels have been used in an initial data transmission experiment by
employing one of the channels as the clock line and the other ones as the data lines to
transmit a parallel bit stream. This transmission scheme has been used across several
devices as part of a simple challenge-response protocol run between mobile device and
Touch ZTIC. Execution of the protocol was successful for clock cycles of at least 160 msec.
This value was empirically obtained based on the mobile device with worst performance.
While the experiment did not formally assess the attainable bit-error rate, the achieved
clock rate nevertheless provides an indication of the data rate per channel rate of 6.25 bps
(1/160 msec), which translates to a raw bit rate of 31.25 bps (or 3.9 Bytes/second) using
5 parallel channels. These initial results suggested that further experiments and a more
in-depth analysis of the behavior of the channel were required to improve achievable data
rates.
The primary focus of our experiment was to understand the nature of the signals at
the output of the photo-transistor and at the output of the comparator of a single flicker-
ing channel, as well as the temporal coherence of these signals across multiple channels
(i.e., the observed time difference of a change that is triggered with a single software call).
To do this, measurement circuits for two channels were implemented to observe the emit-
ter voltage and thus the collector-emitter current of the photo-transistor in Figure 5.3. A
(a) APB1-8 (b) APB2-8 (c) APB3-8 (d) APB3-6
Figure 5.12: Test contact pad boards: Pad arrangements. All pads have a diameter of 8mm, except on APB3-6
(6mm)
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Figure 5.13: Contact pad board test (APB2-8). One of the pads is connected (via the orange wire) to a small card-
board box wrapped in copper foil.
square area of the mobile device’s display of 47mm x 47mm was toggled between black
and white at a frequency of 4 Hz. The photo-detectors of the two channels are placed on
different areas of the blinking square on the mobile device screen. Figure 5.14 shows the
results of this experiment.
The emitter voltages of the photo-transistors of the two channels, which are inputs to
the comparators, are shown in yellow and violet, the outputs of the comparators in green
and blue. The plots in the upper row correspond to the transition fromwhite to black, and
the ones at the bottom to the transition from black to white.
It is evident that the rise and fall times of the emitter voltage exhibit a pronounced
exponential behavior with correspondingly flat tailing slopes. As a result, care must be
exercised when setting the threshold of the comparators in order to avoid regions where
the noise floor of the signals can lead to significant bouncing and, as a result, considerable
timing jitter. When comparing the exponential slopes between the two mobile devices
it is evident that display technologies exhibit a significantly different dynamic behavior.
Moreover, the relative timings between the two channels is significantly different. Such a
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(a)White to black on LGOP. (b)White to black on SGN.
(c) Black to white transition on LGOP. (d) Black to white transition on SGN.
Figure 5.14: Flickering experiment results. The emitter voltages of the photo-transistors of the two channels, which
are inputs to the comparators, are shown in yellow and violet, the outputs of the comparators in green and blue.
difference can be directly influenced by the relative positioning within the square of the
photo-transistors. In the case of the LGOP, the rise time difference between the two chan-
nels is 7.8 msec and the fall time difference is 5.22 msec. For the SGN, the correspond-
ing values are 3.7 msec and 2.78 msec. These values represent the worst-case and were
obtained by varying the arrangement of the photo-detectors across the blinking square.
Consequently, within the confines of the blinking square, non-negligible differences are
perceived in terms of the rise and fall times of different channels depending on the loca-
tion of the photo-detectors. Moreover, such differences vary from one mobile device to
the other. This is an important factor when determining the relative locations of photo-
detectors on the touch screen surface.
5.3.3. Analysis
This section presents an analysis and observations of the results of the experiments
performed with the Touch ZTIC described in the previous section.
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Pad design
The contact between the pads and a flat surface has been investigated in a separate
study using microscopic imaging [122]. The results reveal that for moderate pressure (less
than 200g, resulting from the weight of the Touch ZTIC and additional weights), pads ex-
hibit different amounts of contact with the surface, i.e., the whole surface of the pad is not
in contact with the surface. However, the registration of a touch (or lack thereof) by the ap-
plication does not correlate with the amount of conformal contact between the pad and
the screen. Notwithstanding, it may be worthwhile exploring other materials for the pads
such that any pressure exerted on the mobile device display by the Touch ZTIC is equally
distributed among the pads and the conformal contact is maximized for each pad and
consistent across different pads.
Haptic interface
As proprietary technologies, mutual-capacitance touch screen interfaces are neither
formally specified by standards bodies nor documented by their manufacturers. While
the basic operating principles of state-of-the-art mutual capacitance touch screens as de-
ployed in themobile devices of interest are known, the actual implementations differ con-
siderably both in terms of hardware and firmware. Mobile device manufacturers either
use their in-house touch screen technology or get the technology from an outside vendor.
As a result, a wide variety of different technologies is presently deployed across brands
and models of mobile devices. Moreover, the technology is still evolving which but fur-
ther increases the variety. Disruptive technology changes may invalidate a chosen M2M
communication approach within a relatively short time.
Touch screens are highly optimized for human user interaction and consequentlyM2M
interaction via touch screens was certainly beyond their intended use. The human-centric
approach noticeably influences how certain touch situations are interpreted. Touch
screens are capable of distinguishing between situations such as a user’s palm and/or
thumb resting on the border of the screen (as she holds the device), a single finger touch to
tap, select or drag an object and multiple finger touches to input gestures such as “pinch-
ing". The algorithms implemented in the touch screen drivers go far beyond recognizing
“raw" touch events by interpreting the sequence of observed events in a temporal context.
While this sophistication and optimization is desirable from a human user’s point of view,
it has adverse effects regarding M2M interaction by putting constraints on the geometry
(number, arrangement) of simultaneously active touches.
In the case of the IPD, we think that the spurious touches that have been observed at
locations not matching the position of any of the pads can be explained as follows: the
mere presence of the Touch ZTIC biases the sensor and the post-processing algorithms,
thus “distorting" the profile of touch clusters and shifting their centers to produce and
report the dislocated touch events. In a similar fashion, the plurality of touchmove events
reported to the application at the place where a single touch has been exercised can be
seen as the product of the samemechanisms at work.
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Operation of the touch screen by a human user fundamentally differs from the M2M
interaction envisioned for Touch ZTIC. With human interaction, the fingertips approach
the touch screen surface and interact with the touch sensor only when fingers touch the
screen. In contrast, the Touch ZTIC device is put on the touch screen and remains there
irrespective of whether the switches are open, which causes unwanted interaction with
the touch sensor. Ideally, the Touch ZTIC device should remain “invisible" to the touch
sensor as long as the switches are open. The physics behind touch screen operation as
well as experimental evidence shows that this is not the case. The subtle ways in which
the presence of the Touch ZTIC device affects the operation of the touch-sensor can not
be determined at the application layer because the required low-level information is only
available to the touch screen driver, which only outputs high-level touch events.
The mere presence of the metal or rubber pads on the surface of the touch screen
affects calibration algorithms trying to compensate parasitic capacitances [211] or filtering
algorithms to reduce “touch-noise" [108]. The effects may be that the detection threshold,
i.e., the amount of capacitive change necessary to trigger the registration of a touch may
change over time. The consequences can be that touches do no longer register, touches
that have registered vanish after some time or, touches are still reportedwhen they actually
have been deactivated.
For instance, the results of the experiment described in Section 5.3.2, whereby touches
are reported to the application even after the corresponding pads have been turned “off"
could be explained by post-processing algorithms that work adaptively depending on the
number of touches on the screen. In other words, the post-processing algorithms may be
different when there is a single area of interest in the screen (detailed tracking) or where
there may be several areas of interest (gesture tracking). Similarly, the same experiment
performedon the IPD provides further evidence for the effects of “biased post-processing":
a touch pattern that is actuated indefinitely fails to register any touches after a while. It
must be assumed that calibration and/or filtering through integration eventually biases
the system in a way to ignore actually actuated touches.
Our ignorance about the algorithms at work leave only room for speculative reason-
ing which at best can lead to suggest new experiments to confirm our guesses. For in-
stance, it may be advisable to exercise a single touch only at any given time andmaximize
the distance between pads. The former can help avoiding running into unknown gesture
tracking interpretations interfering with the reporting of basic raw touch events. Further-
more, exercising several touches at the same timemay trigger an unintendedOS response,
especially in the presence of “ghost touches".
Finally, maximizing the distance between pads can cater to noise generated by the
footprint of the Touch ZTIC on the mobile device resulting in noisy or ghost touches. Noisy
touches can appear asminute touchmove events or touch begin events offset with respect
to the location of the pad. Such noise could be controlled then by associating each touch
to the nearest pad in the device geometry (noisy touches), or discarding it if it is too far
from all pads (ghost touches). However, all these measures and actions remain attempts
at alleviating the impacts of the fundamental problem: the presence of the Touch ZTIC on
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the touch screen surface. They may improve the situation on one device and deteriorate
it on another, and worst of all, their effect on future mobile devices is completely unpre-
dictable. Some phenomena cannot be avoided at all, e.g., there does not seem an obvious
way to prevent the phantom touches experienced on the SGT leading to the touch screen
becoming unresponsive and requiring to power-cycle the device (cf. Section 5.3.2, page
74). In fact, it remains unclear what exactly causes this behavior.
Return coupling path
Establishing a contact between the Touch ZTIC and the user and thus augmenting the
effective return-coupling path (aided RCP scenario) has been found to improve the detec-
tion of touches by the mobile device. It may therefore be advisable to always establish
contact between the Touch ZTIC and ground and the user, e.g., via a suitable design of the
Touch ZTIC case. The return coupling plane needs to be at a voltage of 3.3V for proper op-
eration of the switches and should not be directly connected to the user. Since there is suf-
ficient AC-coupling between ground and 3.3V, establishing the additional return-coupling
path via ground works just as well.
Power consumption
The overall power consumption of the Touch ZTIC as operated during the experiments
is about 30mA. This current clearly exceeds the sustained current that the designed-in cell
battery can provide, which is about 8 mA. As a workaround, an adapter with 2 x AAA bat-
teries fitting on the cell battery holder has been used in order to provide power for stand-
alone operation during experiments. This issuemust be addressed by optimizing both the
circuitry and the firmware in order to perform efficient power management. For instance,
the present SoC could be replaced by a simpler version, and the logic of the comparator
output could be inverted to reduce the quiescent current in the dark state.
Optical interface
The results of our experiment on the optical channel indicate that it cannot be as-
sumed that all points of the screen are updated at the same time. This has implications
regarding the location of the channels used for optical communication. The closer these
channels are, the higher the chances that the update lag between them will be small. For
this reason, it is suggested to consider packing these channels as close as possible in order
to minimize the update lag between channels. Naturally, it must be observed that some
leeway must be preserved as it cannot be assumed that the Touch ZTIC will be positioned
at a pixel-exact position on the screen and that packing the channels too closemay lead to
crosstalk.
The intensity of displays varies amongmobile devices. Measurements across a diverse
sample of devices must be performed in order to calibrate the sensitivity of the optical
channels. Alternatively, an adaptive scheme can be used whereby dedicated channels
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provide information about the ambient light conditions (i.e., minimum level), and/or the
maximum/average light intensity level.
5.3.4. Results
Information can be reliably transmitted from the mobile device to the Touch ZTIC us-
ing the optical channel. Beyond considering the observations presented above regarding
this channel, using it has been encountered to be feasible and unproblematic. In fact,
given the close proximity between the Touch ZTIC and the mobile device, ambient light
and source intensity are not an issue. In settings where photodetectors are far away from
the display/screen, these factors can dramatically impact—an even hamper altogether—
the reliability of data transmission.
Unfortunately, we were not able to achieve reliable data transmission from the Touch
ZTIC to the mobile device using the haptic interface. The main issues that prevented us
from doing so are summarized below:
Phantom touches Removal of the Touch ZTIC can sometimes cause a persistent “phantom
touch" that can only be removed by restarting the app, sometimes even requiring to
reboot the mobile device.
Missing touches Touches get lost when exercised in sequence irrespective of the contact
pad pattern or mobile device.
Spurious touches Simultaneous spurious touches appear on the screen even before tou-
ches have actually been actuated.
Noisy touch clusters Locations of registered touches fall far outside the perimeter of the
causative contact pads, thus hindering discrimination.
Gesture interpretation Multi-touch patterns are treated differently from single-touch ac-
tuations. As a consequence, “interpretations" of the touch sequence rather than the
“raw" touch sequence are reported.
Reproducibility Considerable variation in the outcome of experiments, sometimes for
the samemobile deviceand in particular across the range of mobile devices.
5.4. The Audio ZTIC
After conducting a through examination of the problems preventing the Touch ZTIC
from operating as expected (cf. Section 5.3.3, page 81), we decided to work on the Audio
ZTIC, our second prototype based on the connected audio interface. Given the popularity
of the 3.5-mm TRRS interface (shown in Figure 5.16d), we started by looking for the spec-
ification of this interface. Surprisingly, we found that its electrical layout is not formally
specified. On the contrary, we found that the majority of mobile devices use the sleeve for
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the microphone line and the ring for the ground line, while some others (minority) assign
them the other way around.
According to our empirical findings, some mobile device models fade outgoing audio
signals to smooth the transitions from and to silence, which may adversely affect the op-
eration of modulation schemes. In addition, we noticed that at maximum volume level,
the amplitude of the audio output signal would vary by a factor of 2 to 3 across different
mobile device models. This output was found to have a typical frequency range between
5.0 Hz and 15 kHz.
The microphone input of mobile devices supplies a DC-bias to power the attached
microphone. To distinguish whether the connected device has a microphone, the mo-
bile device senses the circuit between the last ring and the sleeve. The specifics of such a
circuit are not standardized and differ across mobile device models. Some mobile device
models interpret signals on themicrophone line in the formof short circuits as commands
to accept phone calls, change radio stations, skip audio tracks, and so on. Some mobile
device models also change the phase of themicrophone input signal, which would render
the use of phase-modulation schemes difficult. Furthermore, we found that some mobile
device Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) exhibit transients after a frequency shift in the
input signal. Most devices scale the microphone input level to accommodate potential
future increases in the dynamic range of the audio signal, which would adversely affect
amplitude modulation schemes. Compared with mobile device audio output signals, mi-
crophone inputs exhibit a narrower frequency range: some mobile device models were
found to attenuate the amplitude above 8 kHz, others as low as 4 kHz. Also, some mo-
bile devices apply signal processing techniques to reduce background noise, limit input
amplitudes, or even mute the input when the signal level drops below a certain level.
5.4.1. Description
Our prototype consists of the building blocks shown in Figure 5.15. Most of these
blocks are inherited from the ZTIC, with the notable exceptions of the Power&BatteryMan-
agement, the OLED Display, and the Audio Interface blocks. The Power & Battery Manage-
ment component is particularly advanced as it senses the USB lines to determine whether
a standard USB port, a USB charging port, or a wall-plug charger is connected. While full
compliance with the USB specification is maintained at all times, any power that is not
consumed by our circuit charges the battery. This block also contains DC/DC converters,
which can be individually shut down to reduce power consumption. After our experience
with the Touch ZTICwe decided to devote a fair amount of attention to powermanagement
in order to minimize the battery size and frequency of recharge cycles. Beyond recharging
the battery, the USB interface can be used to connect the Audio ZTIC to a PC, thus also being
able to replace the ZTIC in its traditional role [205,206].
The OLEDDisplay blockwas adapted to fit a square display instead of a rectangular one,
which is better suited for the mobile device scenario as its contents can easily be rotated
to match the orientation of the mobile device screen [13].
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The Audio Interface block was added to communicate with the mobile device via the
audio interface. We decided to run all modulation/demodulation processing on the SoC
used in the ZTIC and inherited by the Mobile ZTIC. Alternatively, Digital Signal Proces-
sors (DSPs) could be employed, but these would add complexity and increase cost without
much gain towards achieving our main goal. The mobile device audio outputs generate
an AC-coupled signal, whereas the corresponding ADC inputs in the Mobile ZTIC expect a
DC-coupled signal. Therefore, a signal-conditioning stage was added in front of the ADC
input, as illustrated in Figure 5.15. This stage shifts the signal to the middle of the ADC
range and amplifies it to make the best use of that range. In the opposite direction, the SoC
categorizes themobile device (majority/minority) by sensing themicrophone and ground
lines, and sets the switches to route the microphone lines accordingly. The output signal
generated by the SoC is conditioned to adjust its levels before it is AC-coupled to the mi-
crophone input of the mobile device. Our resulting prototype implementation (without
the case) is shown in Figure 5.16, where the main components are identified.
Based on the results of our channel exploration, ourmodulation scheme of choice was
Binary Frequency Shift Keying (BFSK). BFSK is a frequency modulation scheme that uses
a pair of discrete frequencies, the keying frequencies, to encode and transmit the 0s and
1s of a binary data message. During idle periods, when no message is being transmitted,
theMobile ZTIC outputs a fixed low-frequency signal sufficiently separated from the keying
frequencies. This will prevent adverse effects generated by fade-ins and fade-outs, enable
frame detection, and allow the mobile device to detect the presence of theMobile ZTIC, ef-
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Figure 5.15: Main components of the Mobile ZTIC prototype using the 3.5-mm Tip-Ring-Ring-Sleeve (TRRS) con-
nected audio interface.
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fectively distinguishing it fromother devices—notably headsets—that could be connected
via the 3.5-mm TRRS audio socket. As a consequence of the modulation scheme chosen
and the keying frequencies selected, communication between the prototype and the mo-
bile device yields a maximum theoretical throughput of 500 bytes/second. Given this lim-
ited throughput, a TLS handshake with mutual authentication would take several seconds
(depending on the size of the certificates) to complete, which may be considered unac-
ceptable. Therefore, as illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 5.1, we replaced TLS
by a message-based security protocol that meets our security objectives using symmetric
cryptography based either on pre-shared symmetric keys or on ephemeral keys derived
from asymmetric entity key pairs. Being able to use TLS instead motivated our work pre-
sented in Chapter 6 [152].
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Figure 5.16: The Audio ZTIC prototype: (a) Smart card, (b) 32-bit microcontroller, (c) 96x96 high-contrast OLED
display, (d) 3.5-mm TRRS audio interface, (e) Micro-USB connector, (f) OK/Cancel buttons, (g) Battery.
5.4.2. Results
Figure 5.17 shows our prototype in operation during a transaction confirmation. The
3.5-mm TRRS connector is integrated into the prototype, rendering a cable betweenMobile
ZTIC andmobile device unnecessary. Such a physical connection firmly anchors theMobile
ZTIC to the mobile device, preventing it from dangling and ensuring that the Mobile ZTIC
display always faces the user. In addition, we have implemented functionality in both the
mobile device app and the Mobile ZTIC firmware to enable these devices to synchronize
their display orientation.
Even thoughwe restricted our target set to four devicemodels (iPad 1, SamsungGalaxy
Tab 10.1, LG Optimus Prime, and Samsung Galaxy Nexus), we were curious to see how our
prototype fared with other mobile devices.
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Figure 5.17: TheMobile ZTIC prototype attached to the mobile device using the 3.5-mm TRRS audio jack. A trans-
action is awaiting explicit confirmation by the user.
For this purpose, we developed a test app that tested whether communication could be
achieved between ourMobile ZTIC prototype and Android mobile devices. We distributed
this app to volunteers among IBM employees in Zürich and collected information from 94
distinct mobile devices. These mobile devices were grouped based on model and oper-
ating system version, yielding a raw set of 47 groups. Of these, 5 were discarded because
the corresponding models did not have a microphone input on their 3.5-mm TRRS audio
socket. Using the resulting set of 42 groups, it was found that the Mobile ZTIC prototype
consistently worked on all devices of 32 groups or about 75%. It worked intermittently
on devices of four groups or about 10%, and failed to work on the devices of 6 groups or
about 15%. The results suggest that more work is needed towards improving mobile de-
vice device coverage for the solution to be considered viable. Nevertheless, our Audio ZTIC
prototype successfully confirmed the feasibility and viability of the Mobile ZTIC solution.
For the sake of demonstration, we have shown that strong authentication and transac-
tion security from mobile devices are feasible in the context of eBanking. However, such
a mechanism can also be used in other contexts, such as electronic document signing by
extracting and showing key parts of the document on theMobile ZTIC for explicit approval,
administration of remote systems frommobile devices by confirming sensitive commands
using theMobile ZTIC, etc.
90 5. Companion device-based transaction security
5.5. Future work
We have presented some ideas and alternatives to increase the reliability of the haptic
channel for the Touch ZTIC in Section 5.3.3. However, there does not seem to be a system-
atic way to overcome the challenge of obtaining a consistent output in terms of the touch
events delivered to the application running on the mobile device when faced with touch
screen sensors that operate differently and have their signals processed in different un-
known ways depending on the particular device in use. Therefore it is presently unlikely
to generalize and conceive a robust design that guarantees that the Touch ZTIC will work
with any mobile device with a mutual capacitance touch screen. For this reason, and de-
spite not having had any major problem with the optical channel, we are of the opinion
that improving the Audio ZTIC is a muchmore viable option rather than making the Touch
ZTICwork.
The development of a product based on connected audio capable working with more
devicemodels is a challenging task because of the peculiarities of the audio channel,many
of which can only be discovered empirically on a device-by-device basis. The audio hard-
ware (which may not even necessarily be the same across devices of the same model),
firmware, drivers, operating system version or some software interactions on the mobile
device may prevent proper operation of potential communication schemes. These uncer-
tainties are exacerbated by the dynamics and the consumer-oriented nature of themobile
device market, producing new devices at ever increasing rates. Therefore, more work is
needed to design a reliable and robust scheme catering for such an unpredictable chan-
nel. Clearly, the connected audio approach cannot support devices without amicrophone
input. Device coverage could be increased by equipping the Mobile ZTIC with an addi-
tional communication interface, e.g., BLE (cf. Section 7.1, page 114). However, this would
increase both cost and complexity, and still not guarantee one hundred percent coverage.
Performance gains could be achieved by exploiting the asymmetry of the audio chan-
nel, particularly the stereo nature of the mobile device audio output. In addition, more
elaborate modulation schemes implemented on DSPs might increase the achievable data
rate.
Chapter 6
Optimizing TLS for low
bandwidth environments
Abstract. In this chapter we present various ways to minimize the overhead of TLS
with the aim of making it usable in bandwidth-constrained environments*. First, we
identify several areas where overhead can be reduced while remaining fully compat-
ible with standard TLS. The most relevant (and straightforward) approach consists of
moving from RSA to Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in the certificates, which reduces
the overhead of the TLS handshake between 22% and 60%, depending on the chosen
security level.
Second, we contribute two extensions beyond standard TLS that further reduce the size
of the handshake: using a compact certificate format and certificate caching. Using
compact certificates instead of ECC-based X.509 certificates reduces the overhead of
the handshake between 11% and 20%, depending on the security level. Using certifi-
cate caching avoids exchanging certificatesmore than once irrespective of the number
of times the handshake is performed.
T
HE research described in this chapter is motivated by our work on theMobile ZTIC
presented in the previous chapter. We found that the theoretical bidirectional band-
width that can be reliably achieved using analogue interfaces across different types
of mobile devices was rather low, in the order of a few hundred bytes per second (cf. Sec-
tion 5.4.1, page 86). Therefore, we decided to use an ad-hoc light weight message-based
security protocol ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data exchanges
between theMobile ZTIC and the server instead of Transport Layer Security (TLS).
However, it remains an interesting questionwhether TLS could be used on top of such a
low bandwidth channel as it would allow reusing existing ZTIC backendswithoutmodifica-
tion. More fundamentally, it would allow using a widely studied and established protocol
instead of an ad-hoc one, which is considered good security practice.
The applicability of this research goes far beyond the Mobile ZTIC since low band-
width environments are increasingly encountered, e.g., in sensors and smart electrity me-
ters. Moreover, such environments are expected to be more prevalent in the Internet-
of-Things (IoT), where security should not be neglected [177]. Even mobile phones and
* The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: D. Ortiz-Yepes. Optimizing TLS for low bandwidth
environments [152]. With kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: © Springer International
Publishing Switzerland 2015, F. Cuppens et al. (Eds.): FPS 2014, LNCS 8930, pp. 147–167, 2015.
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tablets with fast Internet connections can benefit from a bandwidth optimized TLS set-
ting because it would help them preserve power and possibly allow for security-sensitive
network-enabled applications to be executed more efficiently.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 describes themain features
of TLS, which will be referred to through the rest of the chapter. Section 6.2 suggests op-
timizations to avoid overhead during the TLS handshake without deviating from the pro-
tocol specification. Section 6.3 describes our two complementary extensions aimed to
reduce the certificate related overhead. Section 6.4 reviews existing related approaches.
Section 6.5 provides a summary the research presented in this chapter.
6.1. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The TLS protocol suite, specified in RFC 5426 [61], aims at providing confidentiality
and integrity between a client and a server—the end points—communicating over an un-
trusted network.
This section summarizes the most important elements of TLS for the purposes of this
chapter. Focus will be given to the latest version (i.e., TLS v. 1.2). We refer to [61, 163] for
more authoritative and detailed descriptions of TLS.
6.1.1. TLS goals
End point authentication
The client can authenticate the server to make sure that it is not communicating with
a third party trying to impersonate the server. This authentication takes place using an
X.509 [54] public key certificate provided by the server, which the client must validate.
Once the client has validated the server certificate, it authenticates the server by request-
ing it to prove possession of the associated private key. The servermay request the client to
authenticate using an analogousmechanism. Such validation consists of ensuring that the
server certificate has been issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)—or that there is
a path between such a CA and the server certificate—, that the server certificate has not
been tampered with, i.e., by checking its digital signature, and that the server certificate is
within its validity period.
The roots of trust for end point authentication are the trusted CAs, whose certificates
must be provisioned to each end point. These trusted certificates need to be distributed or
configured by some offline means. Additional intermediate certificates in the certificate
chain can be either provisioned using the samemeans, or sent during the handshake.
End point authentication is not mandatory in TLS. It is possible—albeit rare—to find
anonymous TLS connections providing only confidentiality and integrity (but not entity
authentication). Usually in TLS the client authenticates the server. The connection is said
to be mutually authenticated when both client and the server have authenticated to one
another.
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Data confidentiality and Integrity
Once established, TLS protects the integrity and confidentiality of the application data
exchanged between the end points. This is achieved by encrypting the application data
exchanged using the record protocol (cf. Section 6.1.5, page 96) and adding a Hash-based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), using key material derived during the handshake
(cf. Section 6.1.4, page 93).
The secure tunnel that TLS provides not only guarantees integrity of the individual
messages exchanged, but also of the session, i.e., the sequence of messages. This is an
important benefit, as weaknesses in security protocols due to so-called Man In The Mid-
dle (MITM) attacks where an attacker replays, reorders, or manipulates some individual
messages are not uncommon, even in security-critical protocols used for financial trans-
actions [16,25,63].
6.1.2. TLS requirements
To use TLS a bidirectional, reliable link is required. If the link is not reliable, then TLS
can be used only on top of a protocol ensuring reliability. Additionally, the end points
must be able to perform cryptographic operations, including public key cryptography. If
they do not have resources to perform such operations, then TLS is not suitable unless the
Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) extension is used (cf. Section 6.4, page 107).
6.1.3. Benefits of using TLS
Using TLS is advantageous because there are existing and well maintained implemen-
tations. In addition, these implementations and the protocol itself receive wide scrutiny
from the security community. TLS is very flexible regarding the security levels that can be
achieved. There are known attacks, e.g., [159, 164], but most of them can be avoided by
fine tuning the implementations and enabling only essential extensions. In the case of
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication, the focus of this chapter, MITM and imper-
sonation attacks can be prevented by having certificate checks strictly and automatically
enforced.
6.1.4. TLS handshake
Execution of the TLS handshake achieves the following three goals: the end points (1)
agree on a cipher suite, (2) calculate a master secret, and (3) may have authenticated to
each other.
A cipher suite is a combination of the following four algorithms:
Key exchange, used by the end points to agree on the pre-master secret, a shared bit
string only known by the end points. There are fundamentally three key exchange
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mechanisms: RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic CurveDiffie-Hellman (ECDH) (the
latter two used in conjunction with Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [146]). The
pre-master secret is used in conjunction with random values generated by the end
points to generate the master secret, which is then used to derive the keys that will
subsequently be used to encrypt the application layer data and generate the HMAC
to protect its integrity.
Server authentication, used by the server to authenticate to the client. The most
frequent are RSA and DSS.
Bulk encryption, used to encrypt the application layer data, e.g., RC4, 3DES-EDE,
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Digest, used to hash the application layer data, e.g., MD5, SHA1.
A full handshake is illustrated in Figure 6.1a. It is initiated by the client, who sends the
❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦ message to the server. This message lists the cipher suites and extensions
supported by the client. It also includes a client-generated random value.
Upon receiving the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦, the server responds with a ❙❡r✈❡r❍❡❧❧♦message.
This message selects the cipher suite and a subset of the extensions that shall be used
during the rest of the session, along with a server-generated random value and a server-
assigned session identifier (Session ID). If the server is to authenticate to the client (which
is usually the case), it sends its X.509 public key certificate in a ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡message. It
may send more than one certificate in the chain to allow the client to properly validate its
certificate. The server sends a ❙❡r✈❡r❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡message to provide the client with its
public key to be used for deriving the pre-master secret. This message is only sent when
(EC)DH is used for key exchange. The key included in the ❙❡r✈❡r❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡message
is signed by the server using the private key associated to the public key included in the
server certificate that was sent to the client. If the server requires the client to also authen-
ticate (to the server), then it sends the ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡❘❡q✉❡stmessage. The server signals
the end of its messages by sending a❙❡r✈❡r❍❡❧❧♦❉♦♥❡message.
The client checks the messages received from the server. It makes sure that the ci-
pher suite and extensions are actually supported and that the server certificate is valid. If
the server sent a ❙❡r✈❡r❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡message, it checks that the signature of the server’s
public key is valid. If the server requested the client to authenticate, then the client sends
its X.509 certificate in a ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡message. The client then sends the ❈❧✐❡♥t❑❡②❊①✲
❝❤❛♥❣❡message. If RSA is used for key exchange, this client generates a random bit string
(the pre-master secret) and encrypts it using the server public key included in the server
certificate. Then it includes the result of the encryption operation in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❑❡②✲
❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡message. If (EC)DH is used, it just sends its DH public key to the server using this
message. Upon receiving the ❈❧✐❡♥t❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡ message, in the RSA case, the server
can decrypt the pre-master secret (thus implicitly proving possession of its private key).
In the (EC)DH case, the server can simply use the client public key to derive the shared
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secret, which is then used as the pre-master secret. In either case, after receiving this mes-
sage, the client and the server share the pre-master secret, which can then be used to
derive themaster secret, and subsequently the shared key material that is later to be used
to protect the application layer data. If client authentication takes place, the client sends a
❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡❱❡r✐❢②message to the server. This message includes a signature (using the
client’s private key) of all the handshake messages exchanged so far. The client sends the
❈❤❛♥❣❡❈✐♣❤❡r❙♣❡❝message (which strictly speaking is not a message but a protocol, but
for the purposes of this description, it can be seen a message sent during the handshake)
to the server, to signal that from this point forth the negotiated cipher and derived keys
shall be used. The client notifies the server that it has finished the handshake by sending
the ❋✐♥✐s❤❡❞message. This is the first message to be actually encrypted and includes a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) of all handshake messages up to and including the
❈❤❛♥❣❡❈✐♣❤❡r❙♣❡❝.
Client Server
ClientHello
ServerHello
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
ServerHelloDone
Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
(a) Full.
Client Server
ClientHello
ServerHello
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
(b) Resumed.
Figure 6.1: TLS handshake.
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To terminate the handshake, the server sends the ❈❤❛♥❣❡❈✐♣❤❡r❙♣❡❝ followed by the
❋✐♥✐s❤❡❞message to the client. Thesemessages have the converse semantics as the ones
received from the client. Once the server initiated ❋✐♥✐s❤❡❞ message is received by the
client (and its MAC has been validated), the end points can start exchanging application
data using the record protocol, as described in Section 6.1.5.
Resumed handshake and Rehandshake
A full handshake (as described so far) marks the beginning of a new session. A ses-
sionmay span several connections between the client and the server. For example, when
accessing a web site using HTTP on top of TLS (HTTPS), each object is fetched using a dif-
ferent connection, but most of these connections belong to the same session.
When a new connection is established, the client may indicate to the server its will-
ingness to reuse an existing session by including the Session ID field in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦
message. If the server accepts, it echoes the same Session ID in the ❙❡r✈❡r❍❡❧❧♦message.
In this case a resumed handshake as illustrated in Figure 6.1b takes place.
The resumed handshake reuses the master secret that has been previously calculated,
but uses the new random values exchanged in the ✯❍❡❧❧♦messages to calculate new ses-
sion keys. Clearly, the resumed handshake is muchmore efficient than the full handshake
because neither certificates are exchanged nor public key operations are performed.
When the client wants to negotiate a new cipher suite or refresh the session keys, it
can request a rehandshake by simply sending a ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦ to the server. Conversely, if
the server decides to initiate the rehandshake, it may do so by sending a ❍❡❧❧♦❘❡q✉❡st
message to the client. Whether the subsequent handshake is full or resumed depends on
the Session ID being present in the ✯❍❡❧❧♦messages.
6.1.5. TLS record protocol
Application layer data is split into fragments by the TLS record protocol. Each of these
fragments is appendedwith anHMAC, which is used to protect the integrity of the fragment
and the stream. The fragment payload and the HMAC are then encrypted in order to ensure
confidentiality (cf. Section 6.1.1, page 93). A record is then built by prepending a header
(record type = application data, protocol version, length) to the encrypted fragment. Once
assembled, the record is handled to the lower (transport) layer for delivery to the receiving
end point.
6.1.6. TLS alert protocol
Whenever an anomaly is detected by one of the end points, the alert protocol is used
to signal it to the other one. The alert protocol builds on the record layer and includes
a level (warning or fatal) and an alert code. If the level is fatal, the connection must be
terminated.
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6.2. Optimizing the TLS handshake
6.2.1. Resumed vs. full handshake
The goal of the resumed handshake is to reduce CPU processing and the number of
required round trips required during the full handshake [163]. There is however a clear
tradeoff between the efficiency gains of using resumed handshakes and the security pro-
vided by the full handshake, which is required when starting a new session. Indeed, a
maximum session length of 24 hours is suggested in [61]. In practice, most web servers
use sessions of a few minutes [6]. For embedded applications something in between
should be considered as the prospects of successfully performing an attack increases with
the amount of transmitted data. A hint towards a “reasonable" amount of data to be ex-
changed during a single session of five megabytes is provided in [32]. For embedded ap-
plications the amount of data exchanged may be relatively low, and therefore the session
length can be allowed to span for a longer amount of time. In fact, instead of having a
relatively short fixed maximum session length, it would be best to allow the server to per-
form a full handshake whenever a certain amount of data has been exchanged during the
session.
6.2.2. ClientHello
Each listed cipher suite uses a couple of bytes. Therefore, the client should include the
minimum possible number of cipher suites in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦message.
Support for compression [59] is only worthwhile when large volumes of data are ex-
changed. It only makes sense to include the compression method in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦
message when exchanges are expected to be large and contain low-entropy data. If mes-
sages are short and/or contain high-entropy data—which is likely with data produced
by sensors—using compression can actually increase processing time, and in some rare
cases, expand rather than compress input data [107]. This is because running the com-
pression algorithms is a CPU intensive process whose execution on short messages may
take longer than actually transmitting the full uncompressedmessage. Similarly, data with
little internal redundancies will not compress significantly but still take CPU time to run
the compression/decompression algorithms. Furthermore, using compression is prone to
implementation errors [107] and is a precondition for the CRIME attack [164]. Therefore,
unless there is a clear benefit in terms of bandwidth savings by enabling compression, it
should be disabled.
It is recommended to avoid listing non-essential extensions. For example, the mech-
anism enabling the TLS server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session
state [171] should be avoided because it adds a few hundred bytes to the handshake. Sim-
ilarly, it is recommended to list as few curves and as few point formats as possible in the
❡❧❧✐♣t✐❝❴❝✉r✈❡s and ♣♦✐♥t❴❢♦r♠❛tsmessages when the ECC Cipher Suites for TLS ex-
tension is used [24].
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6.2.3. Certificates
Encoding overhead
Most of the TLS handshake overhead is in the certificates exchanged during the hand-
shake protocol. Standard TLS servers use X.509 certificates [54]. These certificates are con-
structed and stored usingASN.1 and exchangedusingDistinguishedEncodingRules (DER).
Consequently, each certificate contains metadata describing its structure as well as the
types of each primitive data element constituting it. The amount of overhead that the
certificate encoding brings is non-negligible, for example the server certificate of ❤tt♣s✿
✴✴✇✇✇✳❣♦♦❣❧❡✳❝♦♠ is 1151 bytes long, of which 310 bytes (27%) are encoding overhead.
Section 6.3.2 (page 103) provides an alternative which suggests using Card Verifiable Cer-
tificates (CVCs) instead of X.509 certificates to avoid this issue.
Server certificates
Sending a server certificate chain should be avoided. If possible, clients should be
provisioned with all required certificates to validate the (single) server certificate.
Certificate keys and signature schemes
RSA keys and signatures have been traditionally used in X.509 certificates [54]. How-
ever, using ECC keys and signatures (fully compatible with X.509) is more appropriate on
computational and transport efficiency grounds. For a given security level the ECC key and
signature lengths are smaller than their RSA counterparts as a consequence of the most
efficient attack on RSA keys (Number Field Sieve method) having sub-exponential com-
plexity, while the best attack method for ECC keys (Pollard-ρ) has exponential complex-
ity [103, 193], thus resulting in smaller certificates taking less time to transport. ECC keys
and certificates are supported by many browsers [217] and smart card applications, par-
ticularly by ePassports [31] and (chipped) driver licenses [117]. The study of ECC based
cryptosystems is certainly younger than the study of RSA, but mature enough to be used
with confidence.
The first and second columns of Table 6.1 present a rough comparison between ECC
key sizes and RSA moduli sizes for a comparable security level followed after the slash by
RSA Key Length (bits)/ ECC Key Size (bits)/
Certificate Size (bytes) Certificate Size (bytes) Savings
1024 / 589 160 / 291 51%
2048 / 845 224 / 315 63%
3072 / 1101 256 / 331 70%
Table 6.1: Comparison between RSA and ECC keys and the resulting certificates.
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the resulting certificate sizes (Without changing certificate fields other than s✐❣♥❛t✉r❡✲
❆❧❣♦r✐t❤♠, s✐❣♥❛t✉r❡❱❛❧✉❡, and s✉❜❥❡❝tP✉❜❧✐❝❑❡②■♥❢♦ [54]). The third column
shows the substantial savings in certificate size when ECC is used instead of RSA.
Issuer and Subject
The Issuer and Subject fields identify the entities issuing and being issued the certifi-
cate, respectively. It is useful for these fields to have a well-defined structure that can be
used to automatically index them in a directory service and “manually" checked. In most
situations involving M2M communication and embedded devices, such as considered in
this chapter, certificates are not intended for human validation. Hence, these fields can
still be constructed following the conventions in [115], yet making them as short as possi-
ble, e.g., each consisting of a single attribute pair, ◆❆▼❊ ❂ P❑■❞, where ◆❆▼❊ correspond
to the common name attribute, and P❑■❞ is the public key identifier of the corresponding
entity, e.g., a digest of the public key object encoded, for example, as a ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧❙tr✐♥❣.
We note that using ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧❙tr✐♥❣s is discouraged in [102]. However, they allow the
most succinct encoding of a public key identifier (binary data) andmust be supported [54].
Alternatively a ❯❚❋✽ or ❚❡❧❡t❡①t string could be used, but then a printable and expanded
representation of the public key identifier would be stored.
Certificate revocation
When an entity receives a certificate during the handshake, it must check that the cer-
tificate’s signature is valid, that it has been issued by a trusted CA, that it is within its validity
period, and that it has not been revoked. In order to check the revocation status of the cer-
tificate, the entity can either retrieve the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and check that
the certificate in not included in it [54], or submit a query to the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) server, which will indicate whether the certificate is revoked [173]. Given
that less information is exchanged andmost of the processing is done by the (OCSP) server,
it is suggested to use this mechanism instead of CRLs.
6.2.4. Certificate Request
Distinguished names
The number of trusted CA root certificate names should be kept to a minimum. The
names themselves should be kept as short as possible, e.g., following the optimization
presented in Section 6.2.3. Furthermore, if a single trusted CA root is supported by the
server, then this field should be omitted altogether. Even when there is more than one
supported trusted CA root, this field can be omitted by configuring clients to implicitly
signal the server which client CA they are planning to use, e.g., by using a certain port or a
specific suffix in the url.
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Key Exchange Algorithm
There are three key exchange mechanisms: RSA, DH and ECDH. It is suggested to use
ECDH instead of RSA or DH given that ECDH is based in ECC, while RSA and DH are based
in Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) [146]. The size of ECC keys are smaller and the as-
sociated public key operations take less time to compute than using comparable RSA or
DH keys [103]. Thus, by using ECDH not only the sizes of the ❈❧✐❡♥t❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡ and
❙❡r✈❡r❑❡②❊①❝❤❛♥❣❡ can be reduced (with respect to DH), but also the computation of
the pre-master secret can be performedmore efficiently using less resources.
6.2.5. Combining the handshake optimizations
A base handshake size can be estimated by adding the sizes of themessages exchanged
during this phase and excluding those pertaining certificate exchanges and cryptographic
related extensions, e.g., ECC extensions [24]. The base handshake size (about 630 bytes) can
be used to estimate the size of several handshake scenarios using different cryptosystems
in the X.509 certificates. Table 6.2 shows these estimations under the following handshake
scenarios (last four columns):
• Handshake (only server authentication, no chain): The client authenticates the
server. The server sends its certificate. The server does not authenticate the client.
• Handshake (only server authentication, chain): The client authenticates the server.
The server sends its certificate and the certificate of its issuer. The server does not
authenticate the client.
• Handshake (mutual authentication, no chain): The client authenticates the server.
The server sends its certificate. The server authenticates the client. The client sends
its certificate.
• Handshake (mutual authentication, chain): The client authenticates the server.
The server sends its certificate and the certificate of its issuer. The server does au-
thenticates the client. The client sends its certificate.
For calculating the certificate sizes, each of the two entities (i.e., client and server) are
assumed to have a key of the size indicated in the first column. The signature of the cer-
tificate uses a key of the size indicated in the first column of the next row. In practice CAs
tend to have larger keys than the entities that they certify, so it makes sense incorporating
this consideration in the size estimation model.
Table 6.2c compares the values in Table 6.2a and Table 6.2b showing the bytes saved
with ECC as a percentage relative to the base RSA. Note that the savings in Table 6.2c in-
crease with the security level in a similar way than the savings in Table 6.1. This is not
surprising because the savings are directly related to the certificate, and ultimately to the
differences of the key and signature sizes.
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6.3. Reducing TLShandshake certificate exchange overhead
Wehave already pointed out thatmost of the TLShandshake overhead canbe attributed
to the exchanged certificates. We contribute in this section two complementary exten-
sions towards reducing such overhead while preserving the ability and flexibility of the
end points to mutually authenticate using Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). These exten-
sions require—by definition—both the client and the server to support them as otherwise
they cannot be used with a standard TLS implementation. The first extension consists of
End-point certificate caching (Section 6.3.1); and the second of Replacing X.509 with CVCs
(Section 6.3.2).
RSA X.509 Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
Key Cert (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
Size Size authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
(bits) (bytes) no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
1024 589 1225 2073 1817 2665
2048 845 1481 2585 2329 3433
3072 1101 1737 3097 2841 4201
4096 1357 1993 3353
(a) Handshake sizes (in bytes) using X.509 certificates with RSA.
ECC X.509 Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
Key Cert (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
Size Size authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
(bits) (bytes) no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
160 291 959 1277 1253 1571
224 315 983 1317 1301 1635
256 331 999 1349 1333 1683
288 347 1015 1365
(b) Handshake sizes (in bytes) using X.509 certificates with ECC.
Key Sizes (bits) Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
RSA→ ECC (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
1024→ 160 22% 38% 31% 41%
2048→ 224 34% 49% 44% 52%
3072→ 256 42% 56% 53% 60%
(c) Handshake savings from replacing RSAwith security-comparable ECC.
Table 6.2: Using X.509 certificates: RSA vs. ECC.
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6.3.1. End point certificate caching
The goal of this extension is to minimize the number of times that a certificate is ex-
changed. Ideally, a certificate should be sent only once over the network and then cached
by the receiving end point. Initially, each of the end points would start with an empty
cache and a list of trusted certificates. When a given end point receives and validates an
entity certificate, it caches it. The next time that a full handshake occurs, using the exten-
sion would proceed as follows:
❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦ The client indicates support for the End point certificate caching extension
by including at least one of the following two elements:
❈❛❝❤❡❞❙❡r✈❡r❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s Hashes of the server certificates that the client has
received and validated in previous handshakes. Note that this list only contains
entity certificates.
❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s Lists the hashes of the client certificates. If the client does
not support client authentication, it does not include this element.
❙❡r✈❡r❍❡❧❧♦ The server indicates support for the End point certificate caching extension
by including at least one of the following two elements:
❯s✐♥❣❙❡r✈❡r❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡ Offset in ❈❛❝❤❡❞❙❡r✈❡r❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s of the certifi-
cate that shall be used by the server to authenticate itself to the client. If this
is not a valid offset, the client shall terminate the connection sending a ❍❆◆❉✲
❙❍❆❑❊❴❋❆■▲❯❘❊ alert (or a custom alert defined by the extension). If this mes-
sage is included, then the Server shall not send any ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡ handshake
message to the client.
❯s✐♥❣❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡ Offset in ❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s of the certificate that
the server expects the client to use for client authentication. If this is not a
valid offset, the client shall terminate the connection sending an appropriate
alert. If this message is included, then client authentication shall take place
during the handshake and the client shall use the certificate signaled by the
server. Note that the semantics of this element is that the server already has
the certificate. Consequently, if it is the first time that the client intends to use
the certificate, the server shall not send this element, i.e., to allow the client
to send the certificate (chain) to the server for the first time. In this case, the
server shall send a ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡❘❡q✉❡st▼❡ss❛❣❡.
When this extension is used there may be an initial lengthy handshake. However all
subsequent handshakes will be quick as they will not include any certificate. When the
server rolls its certificate over, it would simply not send a ❯s✐♥❣❙❡r✈❡r❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡ ele-
ment. Instead it would send its new certificate as traditionally done. Conversely, if a client
is rolling its certificate, it would not include the old certificate hash in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐✲
❢✐❝❛t❡s list.
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❈❛❝❤❡❞❙❡r✈❡r❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s and ❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s can be seen as white-lists
leveraging the dynamism and flexibility of PKIs, while at the same time avoiding wasteful
certificate exchanges and checks. Managing the caches is left to each of the end points.
At the client side, there is little need to have more than a single client certificate and as-
sociated private key, resulting in a succinct ❈❧✐❡♥t❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡s containing a single ele-
ment. Caching server certificates may prove difficult for embedded devices (clients) with
limited memory. We note that end points do not need to store the full certificate: just the
certificate hash, expiration date and associated public key. For embedded devices that
communicate repeatedly with the same set of known servers, this solution would bring
large overhead savings. At the server side, implementing the cache should be easier to
accommodate due to larger amounts of resources being available.
Note that certificate caching does not reduce the level of security already attained with
the TLS handshake: ultimately each of the end points has to prove possession of the corre-
sponding private keys. The extension merely avoids duplicated certificate exchanges.
6.3.2. Using Card Verifiable Certificates (CVCs) with TLS
A large part of the TLS handshake overhead is a consequence of X.509 certificates being
represented in ASN.1 and encoded using DER. Besides the actual certificate information,
there is a non-negligible amount of structuring data (e.g., tags and lengths), as well as data
type descriptors for each of the primitive certificate fields. To address this issue, we now
describe a TLS extension replacing X.509 certificates with CVCs in order to not just make
certificate exchanges less frequent, the goal of the end point certificate caching extension,
but also smaller.
CVCs are widely used in smart card based applications. They have been designed to
have a small footprint to enable them to be sent to the smart card in as few—if possible,
just one—Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs). A single APDU can carry at most 255
bytes of application data, and even less when a secure channel [90] is established. There
aremechanisms to allow longer payloads, e.g., extended length APDUs and APDUs chaining,
but these mechanisms are not necessarily supported by all smart cards. Consequently,
these certificates are very good candidates to replace X.509 certificates in the context of TLS
authentication. The main components of a CVC are defined in [114]. However, this stan-
dard falls short of providing a concrete certificate format. Consequently, there are several
not necessarily interoperable CVC formats. The most widely used formats are Extended
Access Control (EAC) and Extended Access Protection (EAP) certificates, briefly described
below.
Extended Access Control (EAC) certificates
EAC certificates are defined in [31]. They are used by Machine Readable Travel Docu-
ments (MRTDs)—commonly known as electronic passports—to check the entitlements of
a terminal to read sensitive biometric information. The main mechanism for checking
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such entitlements is Terminal Authentication, a protocol in which the terminal must sign
a challenge sent by the passport using the private key associated to the certificate that it
sends to the passport. The basic components of an EAC certificate are shown in Figure 6.2,
where it is evident that the structure is rather shallow.
CV Certificate
Certificate Body
Certificate Profile Identifier
Certification Authority Reference
Public Key
Certificate Holder Reference
Certificate Holder Authorization Template
Certificate Effective Date
Certificate Expiration Date
Certificate Extensions
Signature
Figure 6.2: EAC certificate format (all fields mandatory except “Certificate Extensions").
EAC certificates may use RSA for keys and signatures [31], but in practice ECC is al-
ways used because it is possible to fit the certificates in a single APDU when using rela-
tively small curves, e.g., less than 256 bits. It would be possible to use EAC certificates
out-of-the-box with TLS. The main advantage being that existing PKI management tools,
such as JMRTD [62], Entrust Consolidated Certificate Issuance andManagement [74], and
EJBCA [160] could be used to create and manage them. However, the following peculiari-
ties —and to some extent, limitations—would need to be considered:
References The structure and semantics of both the Certification Authority Reference and
the Certificate Holder Reference are prescribed: a 2 letter country code, a variable
length (at most 9 characters) holder mnemonic, and a 5 digit sequence number [31].
Sticking to this convention does notmake sense in the context of TLS authentication,
but not doing so would break compatibility with existing PKImanagement tools.
Hierarchy A 3-layer hierarchy (Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)→ Docu-
ment Verifier (DV)→ Inspection System (IS)) not related to TLS authentication is de-
fined in [31]. It could be kept providing the TLS entities (servers and clients) with
IS certificates. For server authentication, depending on the setting, clients could be
provided beforehand with the CVCA certificate, the DV certificate (or both), which
would act as the roots of trust for authenticating the server. For client authenti-
cation, the Server could send the Certification Authority Reference(s) of any of the
certificates that it trusts in the ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡❘❡q✉❡stmessage. It would be recom-
mended to provide a single reference, or at most two, in case of rollover periods.
Certificate Holder Authorization Template This field would need to be ignored. It uses
up only a few bytes, which does not make it problematic.
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Certificate Body
Certificate Format Version
Authority Key Identifier
Public Key
Subject Key Identifier
Certificate Holder Authorization
Certificate Effective Date
Certificate Expiration Date
Signature
Figure 6.3: EAP certificate format.
Extended Access Protection (EAP) certificates
EAP certificates are defined in ISO/IEC 18013 [117], which standardizesmechanisms to
control access to the information stored in electronic driver licenses. Particularly, these
certificates are used for the driver license (chip) to check the entitlements of a terminal to
read its sensitive information, in a similar manner as described in the previous section.
In fact, EAP is “derived fromand largely compatiblewith ExtendedAccess Control (EAC)" [117].
As it can be seen in Figure 6.3, the structure of an EAP certificate is rather similar to that of
an EAC certificate. Furthermore, again ECC is used for keys and signatures for the same
reason as with EAC certificates.
Unlike EAC certificates, however, EAP certificates do not use ASCII References as their
EAC counterparts do. This neatly avoids the References issue discussed for EAC certificates.
In order to identify the holder and the issuer of a given EAP certificate, public key identifiers
(in the guise suggested in Section 6.2.3, page 99) are used. Furthermore, EAP certificates do
not restrict the hierarchy to three tiers, which makes them more flexible than EAC certifi-
cates, thus overcoming theHierarchy issue alluded to when discussing EAC certificates.
On the downside, the Certificate Holder Authorization field also has information that
would need to be ignored. Besides, to the best of our knowledge, other than sample and
test implementations around ISO/IEC 18013, there are no tools geared to manage EAP cer-
tificates.
A TLS extension using CVCs
There does not seem to be a clean, nice way to either use EAC or EAP certificates out-
of-the-box for TLS authentication. The former are widely supported by existing tools that
could be used to create and manage them but are inflexible regarding the entity naming
conventions. The latter do not have such naming limitations but tools supporting them
are close to non-existent. In both cases, there are semantics in the holder authorization
field that would need to be ignored. Thus using them for TLS authentication is an abuse
since they were not originally designed for this purpose. Consequently in the context of
TLS entity authentication there is room for creating a TLS extension such that:
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• The client indicates support for the extension in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦message.
• The server acknowledges support for the extension in the ❙❡r✈❡r❍❡❧❧♦message.
• Any ❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡message contains a certificate following the TLS CVC format. Such
a format would be essentially the same as the EAP certificate format, except for the
fact that the Certificate Holder Authorization is replaced for a Object Identifier (OID)
indicating that it is a certificate to be used for generic public key remote authentica-
tion, followed by a single byte in which a path length restriction is encoded.
By simulating usage of an extension with the properties described above, we have cre-
ated Table 6.3a, which illustrates handshake sizes using CVCswith different ECC key/signa-
ture sizes. In Table 6.2a and Table 6.2b, the signature of the certificate uses a key of the size
indicated in the first column of the next row. In Table 6.3a that is not the case. Particularly,
ECC CV Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
Key Cert (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
Size Size authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
(bits) (bytes) no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
160 179 844 1026 1026 1208
224 211 876 1090 1090 1304
256 227 892 1122 1122 1352
288 243 908 1154 1154 1400
(a) Handshake sizes (in bytes) using CVC certificates with different (ECC) key lengths.
ECC Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
Key Sizes (bits) (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
X.509→ CVC authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
160 12% 20% 18% 23%
224 11% 17% 16% 20%
256 11% 17% 16% 20%
(b) Handshake reductions from replacing X.509 (ECC) certificates with CVCs.
Key Sizes (bits) Handshake Handshake Handshake Handshake
X.509 RSA→ (only server (only server (mutual (mutual
CVC (ECC) authentication, authentication, authentication, authentication,
no chain) chain) no chain) chain)
1024→ 256 31% 51% 44% 55%
2048→ 320 41% 58% 53% 62%
3072→ 384 49% 64% 61% 68%
(c) Handshake reductions from replacing X.509 certificates RSA keys with CVCs.
Table 6.3: ECC: X.509 vs. CVC.
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the key of the certificate and the one used to sign the certificate have the same size because
the whole CVC chain is expected to use the same curve. Table 6.3b compares the values of
Table 6.2a and Table 6.3a, corresponding to the savings resulting frommoving from X.509
to CVCs (both using ECC). Table 6.3c compares the values of Table 6.2a and Table 6.3b, cor-
responding to the savings resulting from moving from X.509 (RSA) to CV (ECC) certificates.
There is more improvement in Table 6.2c than in Table 6.3b because the former changes
RSA keys and signatures to ECC, while the latter just changes the certificate “format" (but
not the underlying cryptosystem).
The improvements in Table 6.3b are flat irrespective of increasing the security size,
while they grow with the security level in 6.2c. This follows from the fact that the gains of
changing the cryptosystem grow with the security level, whereas the gain from changing
the certificate format are constant and do not depend on the security level.
The combined improvement shown in Table 6.3c is quite substantial, especially when
mutual authentication takes place and with increasing security level.
Moving from X.509 ECC to CVC (Table 6.3b) brings modest improvement, but it is not
comparable to the gain when moving from X.509 RSA to CVC (Table 6.3c), which is much
larger. This is visible in Figure 6.4 by noting that the distance between orange and purple
lines is smaller than the distance between the blue and purple ones. Consequently, if X.509
ECC certificates are already in use, there is little gain, and possibly a lot of necessary work
to use CVCs instead. Nevertheless, if bandwidth is limited and a high level of security is
required, using CVCs for entity authentication may still be warranted.
6.4. RelatedWork
The closest related work is the TLS Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) extension [75], which allows
TLS entities to authenticate each other using symmetric keys shared in advance instead
of the traditional combination of private keys and X.509 certificates. The PSK extension
aims to avoid computationally expensive public key operations and certificate exchanges,
which result in faster handshakes. If no certificates are exchanged, the total handshake
size is in the order of the base handshake size described in Section 6.2.5 (page 100), which
is—not surprisingly—lower than any entry in the last 4 columns of Tables 6.2a, 6.2b, and
6.3a. Nevertheless, note that PSKs are better suited for “closed environments where the con-
nections are mostly configuredmanually in advance", and geared towards a “rather limited
set of applications, usually involving only a very small number of clients and servers" [75].
The specification of the PSK extension does not allude to the fact that traditional sym-
metric key derivation mechanisms could be used to improve its security. We note that if
each client c were provisioned with a Kc , with Kc = DERIV E(MK ,c), the single point
of failure represented by a single shared key (K ) distributed all over the place would be
avoided. Using the suggested derivation scheme, MK would only need to be stored and
protected at the server. Clients would only have diversified keys that, if broken, would only
compromise that particular device and not the whole system. Additionally, as opposed to
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just using K , using Kc to establish the secure channel provides some degree of client au-
thentication because the former is only known to the client c whereas the latter is known
to all clients. Unfortunately, the key derivation scheme suggested above does little to im-
prove scalability of a PSK based system. In particular, if there aremany serversMK would
need to be distributed among these servers, whichmay be cumbersome and pose security
risks associated to the way how keys are shared and distributed among multiple entities.
Alternatively, each server s may use a different MK s , but that would result on the clients
needing to securely store and manage a plurality of K sc , which may be difficult. Finding
optimizations to public key based TLS, as discussed in this paper, is warranted to allow
systems to scale without needing to bother too much with key distribution and storage
associated to symmetric cryptosystems.
There are situations where the level of authentication provided by a shared key may
be insufficient (even if based on a diversified key) and stronger, public key based alter-
natives are needed. When clients need to be authenticated, PSK does not provide cipher
suites allowing public keys to be used for that purpose. Therefore, “traditional" certificate-
based TLS still has to be used. In these cases, the handshake and certificate optimizations
discussed in this chapter remain fully applicable.
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Figure 6.4: Mutually authenticated handshake transport time as a function of a given bandwidth based on the
third columns of tables 6.2a, 6.2b and 6.3a. The blue lines illustrate using RSA X.509 certificates; the orange lines
using ECC X.509 certificates, and the purple lines using CVC certificates. The vertical difference between two
lines of the same dashing pattern, associated to the security level, represent the amount of time saved during the
handshake between the corresponding certificate/cryptosystem combination. Absolute time savings are higher
as bandwidth is decreased and the security level is increased. In these scenarios, applying the optimizations
presented in this chapter is highly advisable.
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MQ Telemetry Transport for Sensors (MQTT-S) [109] is a simple, light-weight messaging
protocol designed for M2M communication. It does, however, not provide any built-in se-
curity by itself [142]. Instead, it relies on security being provided either by the application
or the underlying networking stack.
Secure Messaging [90] is widely used to establish secure channels between a remote
entity and a smart card. To establish the secure channel (encrypted, authenticated, or
both), the remote entity and the smart card must share a set of symmetric, usually 3-DES,
keys. The overhead of SecureMessaging consists of a 8-byte MAC appended to each APDU,
plus a few bytes used to agree on the security parameters of the channel. Using secure
messaging may be an option, but server support for it is rare outside of the smart card
world. Furthermore, being based on symmetric cryptography, has the same shortcomings
as discussed for PSKs.
6.5. Summary
We have shown that there are areas where the TLS protocol overhead can be reduced
by following certain optimizations, summarized in Table 6.4:
Optimization Category
ä Listing as few cipher suites as possible in the ❈❧✐❡♥t❍❡❧❧♦message Client side
ä Using ECDH as the Key Exchange algorithm (instead of DH or RSA) Both sides
ä Not including certificate extensions Certification
Authority
■ Not listing support for additional extensions, e.g., TLS Session re-
sumption without server-side state [171]
Client side
■ Sending as few distinguished names as possible in the
❈❡rt✐❢✐❝❛t❡❘❡q✉❡stmessage
Server side
■ Only using compressionwhen largemessages of low-entropy data are
exchanged
Both sides
■ Listing as few curves and point formats as possible when the ECC ci-
pher suites for TLS extension is used
ECC support
■ Making the Distinguished Names or the Holder/Issuer references as
short as possible
Certification
Authority
■ Replacing X.509 certificates with CVCs Extensions
■ Performing full handshakes as sporadically as possible Server side
■ Sending at most one certificate in each direction Both sides
■ Using ECC cryptography with X.509 certificates ECC support
■ Using the End-point certificate caching extension Extensions
Table 6.4: Optimizations for reducing TLS overhead. The darker the color of the shading of the square in the first
column, the more overhead is saved by implementing the optimization.
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The “Client side", “Server side" and “Both sides" optimizations are easy to implement
and bring small to moderate reductions in the TLS handshake size. If supporting ECC is
an option, the “ECC support" optimizations can be implemented. These optimizations
bring moderate to large benefits. As the largest amount of handshake overhead is in the
certificates themselves, we found that just by using ECC X.509 certificates the total hand-
shake sizes can be shrunk between 22% and 60% depending on the chosen security level,
e.g., reduced from 1225 bytes to 959 bytes at the lowest security level (1024 bit RSA keys/160
bit ECC keys) and from 4201 bytes to 1683 bytes at the highest security level (4096 bit RSA
keys/288 bit ECC keys). Such a gain comes at relatively little “cost" and is therefore strongly
encouraged.
Chapter 7
Secure interaction with
Internet-of-Things sensors
Abstract. In this chapter we address the third—and last—main topic of this doc-
toral thesis by contributing a mechanism for secure interaction between mobile and
Internet-of-Things devices*.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is ideally suited to exchanging information between mo-
bile and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. It is supported by nearly all consumermobile
devices today and can be integrated into sensors that enable them to exchange infor-
mation in an energy-efficient manner. However, exchanged messages need to be suit-
ably protected when BLE is used to access or modify sensitive parameters, which may
not be possible with the security mechanisms defined in the Bluetooth specification.
Consequently we contribute Bluetooth Low Energy Application Layer Security Add-
on (BALSA), a set of cryptographic protocols, a BLE service and a suggested usage archi-
tecture in order to provide a suitable level of security. In this chapter we define and
analyze these components and describe our proof-of-concept, which demonstrates
the feasibility and benefits of using BALSA.
T
HE scenariomotivating the work described in this chapter is depicted in Figure 7.1.
It consists ofwireless sensors collecting some information and sending it to a Back-
end. The link between the wireless sensors and the Backend is mediated by con-
centrators and application routers (omitted in the figure for simplicity), which along with
the wireless sensors comprise the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The link between the
wireless sensors and the concentrators is usually realized using long-range ultra-low-duty-
cycle radio technology to maximize battery life and range. A particular example of such
a network consists of wireless sensors deployed in hospital rooms measuring movement,
temperature, humidity, lighting, air quality characteristics, etc, which are then reported
every couple of minutes. These readings can be aggregated and shown at an operator’s
console, or used to automatically regulate air conditioning, lighting, etc.
There are certain practical scenarios where giving wireless sensors a secondary inter-
face could be beneficial. For example, to reconfigure operational parameters, install a
patch, flash a new firmware, add new functionality, or run diagnostics (in case ofmalfunc-
tion), etc.
*The contents of this chapter have been adapted from: D. Ortiz-Yepes. BALSA: Bluetooth Low Energy Appli-
cation Layer Security Add-on. International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things 2015. IEEE. 2015 [151].
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Figure 7.1: A usage scenario for BALSA.
In some cases sensors have a USB or proprietary interface. To use those, the sensor
must be physically located and the diagnostic device connected to it. This may not be
straightforward when the sensor is difficult to reach. Alternatively, the long-range link
between the wireless sensor network infrastructure and the sensor could be used for trou-
bleshooting. There are however two issues with this approach: first, if the problem con-
cerns the radio application running on the sensor, a connection may be unstable—if pos-
sible at all—. Second, the link may be too slow. For example, in the case of Long Range
Signaling and Control (LRSC), one of such technologies, the theoretical bandwidth ranges
between 300bps and 50Kbps depending on the environmental conditions [110].
BLE turns out to be a very good candidate for the secondary interface because hard-
ware and applications can be tuned to be power efficient, which is paramount in wireless
sensors. Most recent consumer mobile devices support BLE so they can be used instead
of custom diagnostic hardware. Of course enforcing tight access control in this setting is
crucial to prevent unauthorized changes to operational parameters, applications or the
firmware running on wireless sensors. If sensors are provided with a BLE interface, it is im-
perative to put in place mechanisms providing strong access control as well as protection of
the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information exchanged using this interface.
The Bluetooth 4.0 specification defines three pairingmethods for BLE: JustWorks, Pass-
key Entry, andOut-of-Band (OOB) [27]. The goal of pairing is for the Sensor and themobile
device to end up sharing some keys used to protect exchanged information. In particu-
lar, the Long Term Key (LTK), an AES key that is used to encrypt and authenticate messages
using AES-CCM [208] at the link layer L2CAP. These keys are generated by the Sensor and
sent wrapped to themobile device using the Short TermKey (STK), which is in turn derived
from the Temporary Key (TK). The latter key is directly obtained from the association pro-
cess: with Just Works it is all zeros, with Passkey Entry it is derived from a six decimal digit
string, and with OOB it is exchanged using some other channel, e.g., Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC) [155].
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The Just Works pairing method provides no security at all. Consequently the only al-
ternatives left are Passkey Entry and OOB. Passkey Entry has two disadvantages: it provides
very limited security because the entropy of the passkey is too low. In fact it has been
shown that the LTK can be cracked within seconds [170]. Second, the pairing process is
handled by the mobile device OS, forcing the user to intervene and thus precluding au-
tomatic handling. OOB could be used to share a full 128 bit long key between the mobile
device and the sensor. Unfortunately, there are no APIs in iOS 7 or Android 4.3 to use this
pairing mechanism. If consumer mobile devices and tablets were replaced by custom de-
vices with a general purpose microcontroller and an attached BLE module, OOB could be
used. Albeit feasible, the elevated development costs and rather small market for such a
custom device make this option unappealing. Given this situation, we decided to develop
BALSA as an additional security mechanism to be used with existing BLE implementations
irrespective of the pairing method in place. BALSA is not only an interesting academic ex-
ercise, but proposes a practical solution to a problem in the area of IoT security [177,185].
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Table 7.1 describes the notation that
shall be used throughout the rest of this chapter. Section 7.1 presents the main back-
ground concepts related to BLE. Section 7.2 specifies the setting where BALSA can be used.
Section 7.3 provides a high level description of BALSA. Section 7.4 describes the BALSA Ses-
sion establishment protocol. Section 7.5 describes the BALSA data exchange protocol. Sec-
tion 7.6 describes our proof-of-concept and related findings. Section 7.7 summarizes re-
lated work. Section 7.8 outlines future work and possible refinements.
Symbol Description
{P }K Symmetric encryption of plaintext P using key K (block cipher).
{ctr,P }K Symmetric encryption of plaintext P using key K and counter ctr
(counter-based stream cipher).
[M ]K Message Authentication Code (MAC) of messageM using key K .
|| Concatenation.
|x| Bit length of x.
RIGHT(S, c) Extracts a binary string consisting of the rightmost c octets of S.
EXTRACT(S, i , l ) Extracts a binary string l octets long from S in the range [i , i + l ).
AES_ECB(K ,P ) AES-128 cipher in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode with key K and
plaintext P (cf. [65]).
AES_CBC(K , IV ,P ) AES-128 cipher in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with key K ,
initialization vector IV , and plaintext P
AES_CTR(K, C, P) AES-128 cipher in Counter (CTR) mode with key K , counterC ,
and plaintext P (cf. [65]).
AES_CMAC(K ,M) AES-128 Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) with key K
andmessage to authenticateM (see [66]).
Table 7.1: Notation.
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7.1. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
The Bluetooth specification version 4.0 defines two modes of operation: Bluetooth
Classic and Bluetooth Smart, which is also known as BLE [27]. In BLE the Attribute Pro-
tocol (ATT) is the onlymechanism used to exchange data between the client and the server.
It defines a single data structure, the attribute, on top of which everything else is built.
Figure 7.2: Structure of a BLE attribute.
An attribute, whose structure is illustrated in Figure 7.2, has:
• a handle: assigned by the server and used by the client to reference it,
• a type: Universal Unique Identifier (UUID),
• a value: the actual “contents" of the attribute (up to 512 bytes), and
• a set of permissions: determining the attribute’s access permissions (readable/writa-
ble), authentication and authorization requirements.
The Attribute Protocol also defines themethods to find, read, write, notify and indicate
attributes. The first three are initiated by the client, while the last two are initiated by
the server. A notification consists of the server “pushing" a given attribute value to the
client whenever it changes. An indication is similar, but the server expects to receive a
confirmation by the client.
The Generic Attribute Protocol (GATT) defines the hierarchical structuring of attributes
in profiles as illustrated in Figure 7.3. Profiles are a collection of services. Services are a de-
fined as a collection of characteristics, along with some optional references to secondary
services that must also be present in the server. Characteristics are the most important
data structures to exchange data between the client and the server. A characteristic is de-
fined by at least two attributes: the characteristic declaration and its value. A characteristic
may have additional attributes called descriptors. GATT provides methods for discovering
services and characteristics, as well as for exchanging characteristics values (READ, WRITE,
NOTIFY and INDICATE).
Communicationbetween a client and a server using BLE achieves low energy consump-
tion by running at low clock cycles [93], using a simple protocol, and preventing client
polling by using notifications/indications. Unfortunately, there is no profile providing a
bidirectional stream to exchange application layer data, such as the Serial Port Profile (SPP)
of Bluetooth Classic. Instead, all BLE profiles must use GATT READS, WRITES, NOTIFICA-
TIONS and INDICATIONS on characteristics to exchange information.
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Figure 7.3: Structure of a BLE profile.
7.2. BALSA Setting
This section describes the setting where BALSAmay be used. In particular we define the
actors, channels, assumptions, attacker model, goals and constraints.
7.2.1. Actors
Sensors Embedded devices fulfilling the Bluetooth Peripheral (server) role. They have
limited computing and battery resources. A generic instance is denoted by S.
Clients Consumer mobile devices, e.g., phones and tablets, fulfilling the Bluetooth Cen-
tral (client) role. They have comparatively larger computing resources than Sensors.
A generic instance is denoted byC .
Backend (Authentication Server) Entity ultimately responsible for authorizing a given
Client to establish a new connection to a given Sensor. It is denoted by B .
User The human who interacts with the Client. A generic instance is denoted byU .
Backend (B) 
 
Client (C) 
 
Sensor (S) 
 
User (U) 
 
HCI BLE 
Internet 
LoRa
 
Figure 7.4: BALSA Actors and Channels.
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7.2.2. Channels
Client – Sensor (BLE) Bidirectional BLE communication channel. Depending on the par-
ticular scenario, a given Clientmay have concurrent connections withmultiple Sen-
sors, albeit in separate channels, e.g., ChBLECSi ,ChBLECS j , .... Similarly, a given
Sensor may accept concurrent connections from multiple Clients, also in separate
channels, e.g.,ChBLECoS ,ChBLECpS , ....
Client – Backend (Internet) Bidirectional communication channel, e.g., the mobile de-
vice’s internet connection.
User – Client (HCI ) Bidirectional communication channel. Usually consists of the mo-
bile device touchscreen, keys and other I/O sensors.
Sensor – Backend (LoRa) (Uni/bi)directional LongRange communication channel (long-
range links illustrated at the right side of Figure 7.1).
7.2.3. Assumptions and attackermodel
Insecurity of BLE BLE is under full adversarial control.
Reliability of BLE The BLE channel is considered reliable. Corrupted or lost packets are
retransmitted by lower layers of the Bluetooth communication stack. Connections
are terminated when environmental conditions prevent maintaining a stable link.
Security ofB,C andS B , C and S are outside of the adversary’s control. Information
and keys stored in these entities cannot be retrieved by an adversary. Similarly, the
adversary cannot force a legitimate B ,C or S to deviate from the BALSA protocols. On
the other hand, the attacker may attempt to introduce rogue Backends, Clients and
Sensors.
Security of Internet C and B are capable of establishing a secure tunnel on Internet .
We expect some suitable mechanism such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to be
used for this purpose.
Security of LoRa S and B are capable of establishing and using a secure tunnel on LoRa.
7.2.4. Security goals
Secure tunnel on BLE After a BLE connection has been established betweenC and S, they
shall create a secure tunnel on BLE . We distinguish between two types of character-
istics: regular and sensitive. Values of the latter type shall only be exchanged on top
of the secure tunnel, while values of the former may be exchanged directly on BLE
using the appropriate ATT commands. The secure tunnel, also referred to as BALSA
Session, shall be finished and renegotiated whenever the underlying BLE connection
is terminated.
7.3. High level description 117
Tight Backend-based access control Only aC authorized by B should be able to success-
fully establish a BALSA Sessionwith S.
7.2.5. Additional goals and constraints
Implementability It should be possible to use existing consumermobile devices running
Android 4.3 (or newer) or iOS 7 (or newer) to implement the Client. Similarly, it
should be possible to implement the Sensor using existing BLE modules. In both
cases, no deviations from the BLE specification are permitted. The payload of mes-
sages exchanged on BLE must be at most 20 bytes long in order to satisfy the mini-
mal Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) specified in [27].
No Public-key operations Cryptographic operations should be restricted to symmetric
primitives due to resource constraints on Sensors.
Overheadminimization Data overhead should be minimized on BLE , i.e., the smallest
volume and frequency of transmission, the least battery consumption by Sensors.
Preserve existing services BALSA should not require changing existing BLE service defini-
tions.
Concurrent client connections Restricting Sensors to serve a single client at a time in
some scenarios is not only acceptable, but also desirable as it avoids potential ill
effects of concurrent modifications to operational parameters. Notwithstanding,
supportingmultiple clients simultaneouslymay be useful in other scenarios. There-
fore, it is desirable for BALSA to allow Sensors to support multiple concurrent Client
connections.
No reliance on LoRa Achieving the goals presented in this section should not depend on
the availability of the long range channel. The owner/operator of the WSN may not
want to incur in derived additional charges. Furthermore, the Sensormay be unable
to access it, or the channel may be too slow.
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Establishing a BALSA Session between the Client and S should be explicitly authorized
by B . Once such authorization is granted, sensitive characteristic values can be exchanged
across BLE until the BLE connection is terminated.
7.3.1. BALSA Session establishment
The goal of the BALSA Session establishment phase is forC and S to share a secret KS . To
do this B and S are required to share two keys: KBS_ENC and KBS_MAC . These keys are used
to protect a ticket granted by B to C entitling the latter to communicate with S. Once the
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BLE connection betweenC and S has been established using JustWorks pairing,C requests
a nonce from S, which is passed to B along with the identities of S and C . Upon receiving
this information, B grants the ticket, which includes the shared secret KS in plain for C
and encrypted/authenticated for S. C extracts KS from the ticket and forwards the rest to
S, who can then check its authenticity usingKBS_MAC and extractKS usingKBS_ENC . In the
end, bothC and S share KS (as generated by B), which will be used to protect information
exchanged during the BALSA Session. The protocol used to establish the BALSA Session is
described in detail in Section 7.4 (page 122).
The keys KBS_ENC and KBS_MAC must be available to S prior to executing BALSA. This
can be achieved by storing them along with the firmware during sensormanufacturing, or
as a separate process performed by the entity operating the sensor prior to its deployment.
In fact, sensors such as those implementing LRSC already store key material to protect in-
formation exchanged over LoRa. Thus the requirement to store and protect KBS_ENC and
KBS_MAC is not unrealistic. Also, the Backend does not need to keep a database of these
keys (which could potentially grow very large). Instead, standard key derivation schemes
can be used to compute these per-sensor keys using a single, or a small set of master keys.
It is up to theBackend to authenticate theClient and possibly theUser prior to granting
the ticket. We expect some sort of user/device authentication mechanism to be deployed.
In fact, given the sensitivity of the operations that we are considering (e.g., reconfiguration
of the Sensor operational parameters), we expect strong authentication mechanisms to
be in place. In particular, we consider that this is a scenario where two-factor NFC based
authentication [149] would be a very good fit.
The BALSA Session establishment scheme uses key transport rather than key agreement:
KS is generated by the Backend, transported to the Client and then to the Sensor. We have
decided to avoid key agreement schemes to minimize computational resource consump-
tion at the Sensor side. If Sensors were capable of executing public key cryptography op-
erations, it would be better to use asymmetric cryptography instead of shared symmetric
keys between the Backend and the Sensor, as well as key agreement (possibly offering per-
fect forward secrecy) instead of key transport. In this scenario, the secure tunnel could be
created using an existing protocol such as TLS optimized for low bandwidth environments
as presented in Chapter 6.
The establishment of the BALSA Session is independent of the association method used
to secure the underlying BLE connection at the link layer (L2CAP). We have suggested using
Just Works because it is simple from the User’s perspective and security is provided at the
application layer within the BALSA Session. However, Passkey entry would need to be used
if operations are performed on characteristics that require authorization at the ATT layer
because fulfilling such a requirement is handled by themobileOS. In this case, the required
passkey could by retrieved by the Client from the Backend and shown to theUser prior (or
during) pairing.
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7.3.2. Data exchange
The secret KS shared between the Client and the Sensor is used to derive keys for en-
cryption and authentication: KENC and KMAC , respectively. For regular characteristics it
suffices to send the plain characteristic value v . For sensitive characteristics, in princi-
ple the tuple 〈c := {v}KENC ,m := [c]KMAC 〉 could be sent instead. This would allow the
receiving party to ensure the authenticity of c, as well as maintain the confidentiality of
v . However, note that it is also required that the encryption primitive does not expand v ,
i.e., |v | = |c| to ensure that c can be sent in lieu of v . This precludes using a block cipher be-
cause overhead would be introduced in the form of padding. For common characteristic
data types spanning only a few bytes, the padding size would surpass the actual plaintext
size. Therefore we have opted to use a counter-based stream cipher, which avoids such
overhead. Consequently, the tuple 〈c,m〉 is actually calculated c := {ctr, v}K ,i.e., the en-
cryption primitive takes the counter ctr as a parameter; andm := [ctr || c]KMAC , i.e., the
counter is included in theMAC computation to ensure the integrity of the sequence ofmes-
sages within the session. In the computation of the 〈c,m〉 tuple we “encrypt-then-MAC",
which is the most secure authenticated encryption construction [20]. The protocol used
to exchange data is described in detail in Section 7.5 (page 125).
Instead of the 〈c,m〉 tuple, a single authenticated encryption structure cm could be
generated incorporating both the ciphertext and the authentication field. A scheme such
as Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [208] could be used, simplifyingMACmanagement at the
expense of requiring services to be redefined to accommodate the authentication field. As
we would like to preserve existing service definitions, we have decided not to follow the
CCM approach but instead send theMAC using an ancillary characteristic.
Generating and transmitting the MACs introduces some overhead, which is tolerated
since it ensures authenticity and prevents injection, tampering, and reordering of packets
on BLE .
KS and the derived keys used during the data exchange phase are only valid for the
duration of the BLE connection. They are non-reusable across sessions and of little value if
extracted from the mobile device.
7.3.3. The BALSA Service
The characteristics required to establish the BALSA Session as well as those required to
exchange the MACs are grouped in a BLE service called the BALSA Service. These character-
istics are listed in Table 7.2. Once the BALSA Session has been established by reading and
writing the appropriate characteristics of the BALSA Service, a set of four keys: {KENC_CS ,
KMAC_CS , KENC_SC , KMAC_SC } is derived and used as follows:
• To write a value v to a sensitive characteristic Ch, the Client computes the tuple
〈c, m〉, with c = {ctr,v}KENC_CS , and m = [ctr || c]KMAC_CS . Then it WRITEs m to
the SetWriteMAC characteristic. Then it WRITEs c to Ch.
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Name Used by Purpose
GetSensorID Client READ the Sensor’s identifier.
GetSensorNonce Client READ the per-session Sensor nonce.
SetClientData Client WRITE data to the Sensor
GetSensorResponse Client READ data from the Sensor
(a) To establish the BALSA Session.
Name Used by Purpose
NotifyMAC Sensor INDICATE to the Client theMAC of its notifications/
indications.
GetReadMAC Client READ theMAC of the last characteristic read.
SetWriteMAC Client WRITE theMAC of the characteristic that it will
WRITE to the Sensor.
(b) To exchange theMACs.
Table 7.2: The BALSA Service characteristics.
• To read a sensitive characteristic Ch, the Sensor computes the tuple 〈c, m〉, with
c = {ctr,v}KENC_SC , andm = [ctr || c]KMAC_SC . It storesm in theGetReadMAC char-
acteristic, and sends c in the response to the READ operation. Upon receiving c, the
Client READsm from the GetReadMAC characteristic.
• To notify/indicate a value v of a sensitive characteristic Ch, the Sensor computes the
tuple 〈c, m〉, with c = {ctr,v}KENC_SC ,m = [ctr || c]KMAC_SC . Then it INDICATEsm
using theNotifyMAC characteristic, and NOTIFYs/ INDICATEs c using Ch.
The number of keys derived from KS has been determined after careful consideration.
An initial approachwould be to useKS directly to encrypt andMAC. We reject this approach
because it violates the principle that keys should not be reused for multiple purposes (in
this case encryption and authentication). Therefore, there should be at least two keys: one
for encryption (KENC ) and another one for authentication (KMAC ).
With stream ciphers a key should never be used with any given counter value more
than once as otherwise the confidentiality of the stream cipher is broken. Consequently
a different set of ciphers/keys per direction is being used: one pair for S→C and another
for C → S. Note that the same key is being used to encrypt characteristic values READ by
the Client and characteristic values NOTIFYed/INDICATEd by the Sensor (as both flow in
the direction S→C ). The need for at least two ciphers is further justified by the fact that
both theClient and the Sensormay send information to the other party without an explicit
request. If a stream single cipher (and counter) were to be used in this context, it would be
possible for it to run out of sync. In fact, even using two ciphers, the implementation needs
to be careful to avoid a situation in which the counters runs out of sync. For instance, if
the Sensor sends a notification to the Client at the same time that the Client unsubscribes,
and then C reads another characteristic, then—depending on the implementation—the
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Figure 7.5: Suggested architecture.
counter expected by the Client might not match the counter used by the Sensor. To avoid
such a situation, the Sensor shall only commit the counter used for notifications/indica-
tions when the corresponding messages have been effectively sent; and the Client shall
only stop processing notifications and indications that it has unsubscribed to when the
unsubscribe request has been effectively sent.
7.3.4. Architecture
We propose the architecture depicted in Figure 7.5. When the Client accesses regular
characteristics, it interacts with the BLE controller, which in turn operates directly on its
local Attribute Database or with the Host controller to satisfy the Client’s requests. Con-
versely, when the Client accesses sensitive characteristics, then it must have established
a BALSA Session by interacting with the BALSA Service. Once the BALSA Session has been es-
tablished, ATT operations on existing services can be used to transport the encrypted char-
acteristics values, while ATT operations on the BALSA Service can be used to transport the
correspondingMACs.
Establishment of the BALSA Session, generation/verification ofMACs and encryption/de-
cryption of characteristic values are handled by theApplication layer securitymanager. On
the Client this component mediates between the OS BLE APIs and the mobile device App.
On the Sensor, it handles commands received from the BLE controller, generating appro-
priate responses either to be sent back to the Client via the BLE controller, or to be for-
warded to the Sensor app. The Application layer security manager must be made aware
which characteristic are sensitive, and therefore require the protection afforded by BALSA.
It is responsibility of the Sensor app to provide such configuration, possibly at boot time.
Conversely, at the Client side, such information can be retrieved from the Backend, or by
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reacting to the error message elicited when a sensitive characteristic is accessed outside
the context of a BALSA Session. It is however preferable to create new services including
the BALSA Service as a secondary service to indicate that its usage is mandated. This has
the advantage that no configuration beyond the service definitions is required and can be
applied unless it is not possible to define a new service, or not all characteristics included
in the service are to be treated as sensitive.
7.4. Session establishment protocol
7.4.1. Generic protocol
0. C → S : ini t
C indicates to S that a new BALSA Session should be established.
1. S→C : S ID , Snonce
Snonce is changed by S every time a valid Btoken is received (cf. Message 4).
2. C →B : C ID , S ID , Snonce
C forwards the information received from S to B , along with its ID.
3. B→C : KS , Brnd , Btoken ,Btoken_mac . With:
Btoken := {KS ||Snonce ||C ID ||Brnd }KBS_ENC
Btoken_mac := [Btoken]KBS_MAC
B randomly generates the shared secret KS and the random value Brnd .
4. C → S : Btoken , Btoken_mac , Ctoken . With: Ctoken := {Snonce }KS
S can validate the integrity of Btoken using Btoken_mac . Then it can decrypt it and
check that the extracted value of Snonce corresponds the one in Message 1, which
ensure fresh involvement of B . S authenticates C by checking that decryption of
Ctoken using KS yields Snonce . C ID is recovered from Btoken , which ensures that B
has vouched for C to communicate with S in the BALSA Session identified by Snonce
using KS .
5. S→C : {Brnd }KS
C authenticates S by comparing the decryption of Message 5 with the value of Brnd
received from B in Message 3.
Upon decrypting Btoken as received in Message 3, S could check that the extracted
Snonce matches the corresponding value sent in Message 1. If that is not the case, then
Btoken was tampered with or corrupted. Consequently, Btoken_mac in Message 3 appears
superfluous. We have decided to include it on the grounds that authenticity should be ex-
plicitly asserted and not obtained as a by-product of decryption.
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Security properties. The security of the tunnel onBLE is based on the confidential-
ity of KS , which is generated by B and shared between C and S at the end of the session
establishment protocol execution. KS is freshly generated at random on every such proto-
col execution.
An attacker needs to compromise at least one of these entities or Internet to gain
access to KS , neither of which is possible according to the attacker model described in
Section 7.2.3. Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks are similarly prevented by the inability of
the attacker to access KS .
Generation of a spurious Btoken is prevented by generating and sending Btoken_mac
along in messages 3 and 4. A valid Btoken_mac implies fresh involvement of B .
C does not authenticate directly to S. Instead it is “vouched" for by B to whom it must
authenticate prior to receiving Btoken (tight Backend-based access control).
Even though Snonce is public information, only an entity with which B has shared KS ,
in this caseC , is able to generateCtoken inMessage 4. As a consequence, attempting to re-
play a round of the session establishment protocol will fail becauseCtoken is derived from
Snonce , which changes with every valid Btoken received by S. Conversely, S authenticates
to C by being able to encrypt Brnd using KS in Message 5. By doing so, S demonstrates
possession of KBS_ENC .
7.4.2. BALSA Service-based protocol
(1.1q) C → S : READ(GetSensor ID)
(1.1a) C ← S : S ID
1.2q C → S : READ(GetSensorNonce)
1.2a C ← S : Snonce
These two reads (and responses) correspond toMessages 0 and 1 in the generic pro-
tocol. 1≤ |S ID | ≤ 20×8; |Snonce | = 128;
2 C →B : C ID ,S ID ,Snonce
3 C ←B : KS , Brnd , Btoken , Btoken_mac . With:
Btoken := AES_CBC(KBS_ENC , #»0 , KS || Snonce ||C ID || Brnd ), and
Btoken_mac := AES_CMAC(KBS_MAC , Btoken)
Thismessage corresponds to the information that theClient receives from theBack-
end. The details of how this information is received is out of scope for the purposes
of this protocol definition. What is important is that KS , KBS_ENC , and KBS_MAC are
128 bit AES keys, and |Brnd | = |C ID | = 128.
4.1 C → S : WRITE(SetCl ientData, 1 || EXTRACT(Btoken ,0,16))
4.2 C → S : WRITE(SetCl ientData, 2 || EXTRACT(Btoken ,16,16))
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4.3 C → S : WRITE(SetCl ientData, 3 || EXTRACT(Btoken ,32,16))
4.4 C → S : WRITE(SetCl ientData, 4 || EXTRACT(Btoken ,48,16))
4.5 C → S : WRITE(SetCl ientData,5 ||Ctoken || TBtoken_mac )). With:
Ctoken := AES_ECB(KS ,Snonce ), and
TBtoken_mac := RIGHT(Btoken_mac ,3).
These messages correspond to Message 4 in the generic protocol. It is sent to the
Sensor by doing repeated writes to the SetClientData characteristic.
5.1q C → S : READ(GetSensorResponse)
5.1r C ← S : AES_ECB(KS ,Brnd )
These messages correspond to Message 5 in the generic protocol.
6.1 C → S : SUBSCRIBE(Noti f yMAC )
To terminate, C subscribes to the NotifyMAC characteristic, which will be used by S
to send theMACs of the notifications/indications sent to the client.
READing the GetSensorID characteristic (messages 1.1_) is not essential and it is per-
mitted to skip it. In particular, when the Client already knows the identity of the Sensor,
which may be the case when the Client can resolve S ID from the Bluetooth address, or it
has cached such an identifier from previous connections.
Upon receiving Message 5.1q, the Sensor will validate that all expected messages have
been received and that their contents satisfy its expectations. If a deviation or failure is
encountered, all remaining checks and validations will be executed, but the contents of
Message 5.1r will contain a random 128 bit string that will terminate the protocol in fail-
ure at the Client side.
Security properties. The implementation requires Btoken (Message 4) to be split in
five messages when sent from the Client to the Sensor as a result of the payload size limi-
tation. This does not have any consequence in terms of security as this channel is assumed
to be under full adversarial control. Messages 4.x do not necessarily need to be sent in or-
der, but are expected to have been all sent prior to Message 5.1q.
There is a limit on how many sessions can be established with a given Sensor deter-
mined by the bit length of Snonce . If the Sensor advertises a Snonce after it has already been
used in a previous BALSA Session, replaying such a session becomes possible. In our current
proposal the number of sessions is limited to 2128, which is acceptable for the envisioned
usage scenarios.
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7.5. Data exchange protocol
After executing the BALSA Session establishment protocol, the Client and the Sensor
share KS , which is used to derive the encryption and authentication keys (Section 7.5.1)
that shall be used to exchange information in subsequent GATT operations (Section 7.5.2).
7.5.1. Key derivation
The keys used during the BALSA Session shall be derived using a Key Derivation Func-
tion (KDF) in countermodewith AES-CMAC as its PseudorandomFunction (PRF) in a similar
way as described in Section 4.1.5 of the Secure Channel Protocol ’03’ (SCP03) specifica-
tion [92]. The pseudocode for the derivation routine is presented below:
for k in
{
KENC_CS , KENC_SC , KMAC_SC , KMAC_SC
}
switch k
case KENC_CS : label := ✵①✵✶
case KENC_SC : label := ✵①✵✷
case KMAC_CS : label := ✵①✵✸
case KMAC_SC : label := ✵①✵✹
end switch
context := RIGHT (Snonce , 6) || RIGHT (Brnd , 6)
k := AES-CMAC (KS , ✵①✵✶ || label (k) || ✵①✵✵ || context || ✵①✵✶)
end for
Using either a CMAC or an HMAC as a PRF is recommended by NIST for key deriva-
tion [48]. While KDFs are often based on an HMAC, e.g., [17, 113], the underlying hash
function may not be available in embedded devices. The chosen key derivation scheme
uses AES-CMAC, which not only does without a hash function, but is also used in BALSA to
calculate the MACs (cf. Section 7.5.2). Consequently, by using this scheme we purposefully
strive to avoid additional requirements on the Sensors. As an alternative to the key deriva-
tion scheme described above, CMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
(CKDF) could be used [127]. CKDF is fundamentally identical to the widely used HKDF [123],
with the HMAC being replaced with AES-CMAC. Even though CKDF is slightly simpler, we
have opted not to use it since it is based on a draft version of a standard.
7.5.2. GATT operations
The cipher to encrypt information flowing from the Sensor to the Client (S→C ) uses
counter ctrSC initialized to Snonce . The cipher to encrypt information flowing from the
Client to the Sensor (C → S) uses counter ctrCS initialized to Brnd . Once this initialization
has been performed, the tuples 〈c,m〉are computed as follows:
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S→C (READS, NOTIFICATIONS, INDICATIONS):
c = AES_CTR(KENC_SC , ctrSC , v), m = AES_CMAC(KMAC_SC , ctrSC || c).
C → S (WRITES):
c = AES_CTR(KENC_CS , ctrCS , v), m = AES_CMAC(KMAC_CS , ctrCS || c).
Security properties. The counter value has been prepended to the encrypted char-
acteristic value to the input to theMAC to prevent the adversary from removing, replaying,
or reordering messages in BLE . If an attacker removes a message from the session, the
counters of the sender and the receiver will no longer be synchronized. The next time that
a message is sent in the same direction, the receiver will reject it because the verification
of the MAC will fail since its version of the counter will be behind that of the sender. If the
attacker attempts to reply a message, the receiver will reject it because its version of the
counter will be ahead of that used to calculate the (valid)MAC of the repliedmessage. Con-
versely, if an attacker attempts to reorder messages in a given direction, the counters will
not match and the verification of theMACwill fail.
Care must be taken when using AES_CTR such that counter values are not reused with
the same key [65]. Within the same BALSA Session, counter reuse is prevented by the Ap-
plication layer security manager, which terminates the BALSA Session whenever any of the
counters of the CTR ciphers wraps around and reaches its initial value. This scenario is
highly unlikely since a very large amount of data (and/or exchanges) need to take place
within a single BALSA Session for any of these 128-bit counters to wrap around.
Across different sessions, it is responsibility of B not to provide a given KS more than
once (irrespective of the requesting C and the target S). This is not difficult since B can
generate KS using a PRF, e.g., feeding a monotonically increasing 16-byte counter into an
AES cipher using a device-local key. If KS is not to be reused, there is a consequential
global limitation on the total number of sessions that can be granted by theBackend (2128),
which is large enough not to be problematic in practice.
7.6. Proof-of-concept
This section describes the two stages of our proof-of-concept: simulating the Sensor,
and implementing the Sensor on an actual embedded device. In both cases, the Client has
been written for Android 4.3. We have not implemented a Backend as we do not consider
it critical for the proof-of-concept. Instead, its functionality has been subsumed by the
Client.
Additional to the BALSA Service, we have defined a Test Service with six characteristics:
three regular (READ, WRITE, and NOTIFY) and three sensitive (idem). We expect that upon
establishing the BLE connection with the Sensor, the Client can access any of the regular
characteristics of the Test Service. To access any of the sensitive characteristics, it should
be required to execute the BALSA Session establishment protocol. The logic for doing so is
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handled by our implementation of the Application layer security manager as described in
Section 7.3.4.
7.6.1. Simulating the sensor
The initial version of the Sensor has been written for Apple devices running iOS 7 or
MacOS 10.9. Based on the combination of the Android Client and the Apple Sensor, we
have confirmed that it is possible to implement BALSA using existing devices and APIs.
We have found that the Android API lacks certain functionality otherwise available in
iOS. Particularly, it cannot be used to implement the Sensor, it does not seem to support
long writes, and the BLE connection drops suddenly without evident reason. Implement-
ing the Sensor in Android was not necessary for our proof-of-concept, but for other appli-
cations it might be essential. Long writes are necessary because many devices only allow
about 20 bytes of payload data, which may be insufficient to cover the maximum charac-
teristic length of 512 bytes. Connection drops are encountered even when the devices are
in close proximity. A dropped connection entails re-establishing the BALSA session, which
takes some time. We are aware that Bluetooth support in Android has been extensively
reworked to accommodate BLE but our experiments show that the BLE stack in this OS is
still somewhat unstable.
In turn, the iOS BLE API uses a proprietary mechanism to notify/indicate long values
and lacks a notification/callback to the app when the client disconnects. We also found
the app to crash whenever an API notification message is invoked targeting a specific set
of clients. The proprietary notification mechanism is a nuisance when an Android client
is used because it triggers the BLE connection to be terminated. A callback to the iOS app
when the client disconnects is necessary for the latter to take appropriate action. In our
case, it would be useful to know when a client disconnects to promptly clear the security
state in the Application layer security manager. Lastly, an Objective C message to send a
characteristic value change notification is provided by iOS. This message takes three pa-
rameters: the new value, the characteristic and an array of clients. We found that when the
latter is different than ♥✐❧, the app crashes. This is unfortunate because such behaivour is
not documented and it prevents sending notifications to specific clients. In practice, this
constrained the Sensor to serve a single Client at a time to be able to use notifications.
In any case, the issues encountered with Android and iOS areminor and inconvenient,
but ultimately surmountable and did not impede BALSA from being implemented.
7.6.2. Mote Runner implementation
We have replaced the Apple device with an actual embedded sensor to approach the
realworld usage scenario. Weused an embeddedboard (mote) poweredby anARMCortex-
M3 running Mote Runner [111]. This mote is connected via a UART to a Bluegiga BLE113
BLEmodule [26], which is soldered at the top right corner of the development board shown
at the right hand side of Figure 7.6. Even though small applications can be executed in the
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Figure 7.6: Embedded prototype hardware.
module’s microcontroller, we decided to implement all the logic in the Host controller to
avoid dependencies on a particular module and adhere to the suggested architecture. In
particular, the BLE controller is responsible for holding the BLE service definitions, adver-
tising these services, and accepting/maintaining the low level BLE connections. All data
received from Clients is relayed from the BLE controller to the Host controller via the UART.
The application running on theHost controller passes data to theApplication layer security
manager, which then decides whether to respond directly or request (and wrap accord-
ingly) a response from the Sensor App.
Mote Runner provided a single native AES API call to encrypt data. However, BALSA also
requires decryption. Even though it would have been possible to implement decryption
in the Application layer security manager, we were in a position of doing so directly in the
Mote Runner native API. Interestingly such an implementation does not consume much
space but the required tables are very large (a couple of kilobytes), which is non-negligible
considering the limited amount of available memory in the mote.
The BLE controller notifies the Host controller when a Client subscribes to a given
characteristic. Unfortunately, such a notification does not include information about the
Client, which means that only a single client can be supported (as otherwise the Sensor
would not know which keys to use to protect the notification/indication). This issue is
closely related to the iOS API message for characteristic value change notification previ-
ously discussed. We speculate that the root cause for both issues is that BLE controllers are
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unable to send notifications to certain clients only. For the scenarios that we have inmind
restricting Sensors to serve a single client at a time is acceptable and desirable, although it
would have been preferable to enforce such a restriction via configuration and not as an
imposed limitation. We acknowledge that there may be scenarios that could benefit from
allowing multiple concurrent connections, and therefore outline in Section 7.8 how BALSA
may be enhanced to support those scenarios.
7.6.3. Empirical results
Our embedded device based prototype has shown that it is possible to implement
BALSA in a realistic scenario resulting in a very usable system. We have experimented with
the Sensor running on a mote and a Client running on three different mobile devices: an
LG Nexus 4 phone with Android 4.4.4; a Samsung Galaxy Note II phablet with Android
4.4.2; and a Samsung Galaxy Note 10.1 2014 tablet with Android 4.4.2. We have found that
establishing the BALSA Session takes about 850 msec in average. Variation among the same
mobile device is similar, about –30 and +60 msec. Variation between devices is not con-
stant: the LG phone and the Samsung tablet behave very similar, while the Samsung ph-
ablet is 50 msec slower in average and about 100msec slower the worst case. We hypothe-
size that this may be due to other apps consuming resources in the phablet which—unlike
the other two devices—is heavily used as the author’s personal device. Also, the phablet is
the oldest device in the group (2012), while the LG phone is frommid 2013 and the tablet
from early 2014. In any case, we expect for the time that it takes for the BALSA Session to be
established to be shorter than the time that it takes for theUser and the Client to authenti-
cate to the Backend and retrieve the ticket. Furthermore, this is a one-time operation that
spans the entirety of the BLE connection.
Checking whether a characteristic is sensitive consists of a simple table lookup, so it
takes negligible time. Consequently, when the Client operates on regular characteristics
there is no observable overhead. The basic READ and WRITE operations take about 80
msec in average, but there is a large variation consistent acrossmobile devices. Operations
have been observed to take as little as 55 msec and as much as 120 msec. Interestingly,
there is no direct correlation between the time that it takes to complete an operation and
the size of the characteristic value that is being transported: it takes about the same time
to send a 1 or a 16 octet characteristic value. Based on this, we concluded that there is
no benefit to be gained from truncating the MACs sent during the data exchange protocol
(cf. Section 7.5.2).
Operations on sensitive characteristics are expected to take at least twice as long as
the basic operations given that besides the actual exchange of the characteristic value, an
additional exchange for theMAC is required. Our experiments reveal that in average about
20 and 30 additional milliseconds are required for read and write operations, respectively.
These times account for the encryption of the characteristic value, the calculation of the
MAC, delivery delay to the underlying layer, as well as the corresponding verifications and
decryption. These results indicate that BALSA may not be suitable for time sensitive appli-
cations.
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From the point of view of the User no lag is perceivable when sensitive characteristics
are read or written. In the case of notifications/indications no lag can be perceived since
these operations are not initiated by theUser.
7.7. Related work
The securitymechanisms for association andpairing are defined in theBluetooth spec-
ification [27]. These mechanisms have been also described and analyzed by NIST [155].
Gomez et al. have conducted an overview and performance evaluation of BLE in [93]. The
vulnerabilities and limited security offered by the Passkey Entry mechanism have been
studied by Ryan [170], Rosa [169], and Shaked et al. [180].
Perry et al. outline an enhancement to the BLE specification by suggesting to use a key
agreement protocol based on the Merkle’s Puzzle [158]. They propose using their scheme
as “a new additional associationmodel, like Passkey Entry". Even though theirs is an inter-
esting academic proposal, it would require changes to the Bluetooth specification, which
is unlikely to happen in practice and would not be backwards compatible.
The BALSA Session establishment protocol (cf. Section 7.3.1) can be seen as a simplifi-
cation of the Kerberos protocol [147]. The ticket sent by the Backend to the Sensor roughly
corresponds to the Kerberos Session Ticket. However, due to the practical difficulty of
maintaining reliable synchronized clocks on Sensors, using timestamps to ensure fresh-
ness (as done in Kerberos) is impractical. As a consequence, BALSA uses nonces instead of
timestamps. In particular, during the BALSA Session establishment protocol, there is an in-
teraction between the Client and the Sensor prior to requesting the ticket whereby Snonce
is requested from the Sensor (cf. Section 7.4).
BALSA is closely related to the protocols used to establish secure channels to smart
cards, in particular to the AES-based SCP03 [92]. Indeed, key derivation proposed for BALSA
(cf. Section 7.5.1) has been inspired by that of SCP03. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between the settings where smart cards and BALSA are used. Namely, commu-
nication with smart cards follows a very strict client/server model whereby the terminal
sends a command to the smart card followed a response sent from the opposite direction.
In the case of BLE, the peripheral can send unsolicited messages to the client, e.g., noti-
fications and indications. Accordingly, the communication model in BLE is slightly more
complex, and consequently, smart card secure channel protocols cannot be readily used
“out-of-the-box" in BLE . BALSA and SCP03 achieve the security properties of the secure
tunnel in a different way: in SCP03 confidentiality is achieved by using AES in CBC mode,
which is unsuitable for our purposes as it has already been discussed in Section 7.3.2. CBC
mode often requires padding, which yields longer ciphertexts that can break compatibility
with existing BLE service definitions and in some cases exceed the BLE MTU for GATT opera-
tions. In SCP03 “MAC-chaining" is used to ensure integrity of the sequence of commands
withing the session. This consists of prepending the MAC of the previous command to the
current (encrypted) command to calculate itsMAC. In contrast, BALSA prepends the stream
cipher counter to the encrypted characteristic value to calculate the corresponding MAC.
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Both mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the sequence of messages seem equally effec-
tive and efficient. The only argument favoring the usage of counters over MAC-chaining is
not needing to store the previous MAC value in the state of the Application layer security
manager. Given the weakness of this argument, it appears that both mechanisms could
be used interchangeably.
7.8. Refinements, extensions, and future work
There are certain specific areas where BALSA could be refined and extended:
• Support several concurrent Client connections: the Sensor could use an indepen-
dent stream cipher with a notification key KN and counter ctrN . This cipher would
be shared between all connected Clients, and would be used to ensure that only
these Clients can retrieve the plaintext value from the notifications encrypted with
it. A notification for value v would be sent as c = AES_CTR(KN ,ctrN ,v) to all sub-
scribed Clients. In turn, theMACwould still be calculated on a per-Client basis using
KMAC_SCn and included in the MAC notification. However, instead of the full-length
MAC, only a portion of length l would be included. This way, the MAC notification
would have k = ⌊20/l⌋ MAC slots allowing for at most k concurrent Clients. The cur-
rent KN and ctrN , as well as the MAC slot index assigned to the Client would be sent
by the Sensor at the end of the BALSA Session establishment protocol. The former
two values would be arbitrarily chosen by the Sensor at boot time and each time the
count of connected Clients with active BALSA Sessions reaches zero.
• The first two READS (SensorID and SensorRandom) could be bundled together if
|S ID | ≤ 6 to save one round trip time. Alternatively, the SensorID could be included
in the BLE advertisement packet.
• It may be advantageous to permit the Client to reconnect to the Sensor without re-
questing authorization from the Backend when the interval between reconnects is
very small, which may be an indication of a dropped connection. For this, a “re-
sumed" session establishment protocol would need to be defined.
• We have relied on the low power consumption characteristics of BLE to ensure that
the power budget of the sensor is not significantly increased by using BALSA. Nev-
ertheless, we have not conducted detailed power measurements on our prototype.
Doing so will allow quantifying the power requirements of BALSA, both in terms of
communication and additional processing. Regarding the former, we consider that
there is little that can be improved beyond enabling the BLE interface on-demand
usingLoRa (which would be required to be bi-directional to enable such function-
ality).
The next step regarding hardware consists of integrating the BLEmodule directly to the
sensor. Particularly, removing the development board at the right hand side of Figure 7.6
by designing a new version of the mote with such a module integrated into it.
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Regarding software, actual services instead of the Test Service should be implemented
after cleaning up the prototype code. Defining and implementing a service providing di-
agnostic information and statistics about the long-range radio in the mote along with the
correspondingmobile device application for visualizationwould be helpful. Amote appli-
cation capable of receiving, processing and installing firmware updates via a BLE service
would also be very useful. BALSA could be used to create a direct secure tunnel between
the Backend and the Sensor. A service could be defined for the Client to be able to relay
data between the Backend and the Sensor. Such a direct secure tunnel could be used for
exchanging information normally sent by the Sensor via the WSN, or to change sensitive
key material in the Sensor without disclosing it to the Client when LoRa is unavailable or
unsuitable.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
U
SAGE of mobile devices for day-to-day operations has been increasing dramat-
ically in the past few years and continues to rise without showing any signs of
stagnation. The complexity of today’s mobile devices is no different from that of
traditional PCs in terms of operating systems, services, applications, and communication
interfaces. As a consequence,mobile devices have becomemore versatile and are involved
in scenarios that were not realizable with mobile phones a decade ago. At the same time,
their attack surface is larger, making them more vulnerable to attacks [105]. Not surpris-
ingly, cybercriminals are increasingly targeting mobile devices [77,81,100,119,135,203].
It is hardly an exaggeration that many people’s lives seem to revolve around their mo-
bile devices, which constitute their main—or at least a very important—channel to ex-
change information and use online services. In many cases, these interactions need to be
protected, which is precisely the aim of the hardware and software add-ons proposed in
this doctoral thesis. These add-ons are complementary and related. For example, the lo-
cation of a mobile device can be used as an authentication factor when interacting with
Internet-of-Things sensors. Similarly, transaction security and location verification can be
combined to restrict access to certain information, based not only on the user, but also on
the location from which the request is made.
We do not argue that all operations conducted from mobile devicesmust use a com-
panion hardware device such as the one described in Chapter 5. For many day-to-day
applications, deploying such devices would be overkill. For other applications, e.g., those
involving financial transactions or operationswith critical consequences, using suchhard-
ware based security may well be warranted, especially when the underlying mobile plat-
form cannot be trusted. Such a companion hardware device should be compatible with
the largest possible set of mobile device models. Consequently, we have developed two
prototypes using analogue interfaces that are pervasive across mobile devices. We have
shown the limits of the haptic interface for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication
and concluded that if an analogue interface is to be used, the connected audio interface
provides a muchmore viable option for effective communication.
Employing hardware built into the mobile device, such as a Secure Element (SE) or a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), it is also possible to achieve certain security goals as
described in the context of mobile payments in Chapter 2. However, embedded hardware
for security purposes has so far failed to be embraced on a large scale, given the cost and
difficulties of implementing, managing, deploying, and sharing it and its applications. In-
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stead, the focus is increasingly being shifted to the streamof data in connectionwith usage
patterns and the environment thatmobile devices generate, e.g., by leveraging their nearly
continuously connected nature, frequent user interaction, andmultitude of sensors. Such
a streamof data is then analyzed to detect deviations fromnormal and expected usage pat-
terns. In this context, themechanisms proposed in Chapter 4 (Privacy-preserving location
verification of mobile phones) and Chapter 7 (Secure interaction with Internet-of-Things
sensors) are very well suited to improve access control mechanisms with a minimum of
additional hardware requirements.
Usage of mobile devices will continue to rise in the foreseeable future. These devices
will gain additional functionality and interfaces to communicate with their users and the
environment. In this doctoral thesis we have not solved all security problems arising from
the ever increasing usage of mobile devices for security-sensitive operations. However,
we have proposed a set of practical solutions to some of these issues. Our solutions—be
they obtaining a trustworthy location of the mobile device to be used during authenti-
cation (and for handling such location information in a privacy-preserving manner), or
being able to authenticate transactions originating from mobile devices, even when such
devices are under full attacker control, or preventing unauthorized devices from commu-
nicating with Internet-of-Things sensors—can be realized today and will remain useful in
the future as mobile devices continue to evolve, gain more capabilities, and become ever
more pervasive.
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